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Municipal Government: Does Institutional Structural Reform Make a Difference in Local Government?

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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: DOES INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURAL REFORM MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

By

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Early reformers reasoned that by changing institutional structure in local government you could solve organizational problems. Institutional structural reform in local government has interested scholars ever since. The reform movement in the early 20th century firmly established the council-manager (administrative) model of government, which along with the mayor-council (political) model, is now utilized in 92% of all U.S. municipalities. Recent scholars have observed and reported on the fact that, increasingly, mayor-council municipalities are adopting structural changes that resemble characteristics found in council-manager municipalities and vice-versa. This research seeks to examine the question of whether these structural changes have any effect on these local governments by examining the behavior of Chief Administrative Officer's (CAO) and municipal outputs. The author examines a representative sample of 266 administrative and political municipalities within the U.S. having a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The institutional structures of these 266 municipalities are measured for political model and administrative model characteristics using three separate independent variables. The effects of institutional structural change is measured

using group mean T-tests, ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression for per capita expenditures, working time allocation between the management, policy, and political role activities for the CAO, the quality of services provided, and the involvement level of the CAO compared to the council in the mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensions of municipal responsibilities.

The study findings are mixed; significant effects are found in some but not all variables. Changing local government structures from characteristics found in the political model to characteristics found in the administrative model: makes no difference in municipal expenditures; makes a difference in how a CAO allocates his time in management and political activities but not policy activities; makes a difference in how the CAO perceives quality of services; makes a difference in the level of involvement for the CAO in the policy, administrative, and management dimensions of responsibility but not the mission dimension. Overall, this study has found that, by using more complex methods to measure institutional structure change, changes in institutional structures do make a difference in important areas of CAO behavior and outputs in local governments.

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this to my wife Colleen. Without her understanding and help not only this project but most of the things that I have accomplished in life would not have been possible.

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Since the reform movement in the early 1900's the institutional structure of local governments within the United States has interested scholars. Most research centered on local government structure has focused on the two most dominant structural forms found within local government, namely mayor-council and council-manager. However, for local government scholars there has also developed substantial diversity in how they describe the various structures that local governments in the United States adopt.

Every five years the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) conducts a national *Municipal Form of Government* survey of municipalities within the United States. For the purposes of this survey the ICMA recognizes the five most common forms of local government in the U.S. today. These five forms of local government include the mayor-council, council-manager, commission, town-meeting, and representative-town-meeting forms (DeSantis & Renner, 2002; MacManus & Bullock, 2003).

According to data collected by this ICMA survey in 2006, the data indicates that the vast majority of municipalities surveyed within the U.S. (89%) operate under either the mayor-council plan (34%) or the council-manager plan (55%) form of government (Moulder, 2008). 2010 survey data (ICMA, 2010) show that this percentage has now grown to over 92% of all municipalities. The remaining communities either did not report

what form of government that they operated under (4%) or reported operating under the Commission (1%), Town meeting (5%), or Representative Town meeting (1%) forms.

The *mayor-council plan* is defined in the ICMA survey as,

> An elected council or board serves as the legislative body. The chief elected official (CEO) is the head of government, with significant administrative authority, generally elected separately from the council" (Moulder, 2008, p.27).

The council-manager plan is defined as,

> An elected council or board and CEO (e.g. mayor) are responsible for making policy with advice of the CAO. A professional administrator appointed by the board or council has full responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the government (Moulder, 2008, p.27).

In some instances these two dominate municipal forms are referred to as reformed (council-manager) or unreformed (mayor-council) local government. Scholars have utilized this classification system (or one very similar to it), usually limiting their studies to the two most dominate forms of government (mayor-council and council-manager), to analyze the affects of form of government on a number of research variables.

Scholars have examined the characteristic differences between the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the two dominate forms of government (mayors and city managers) (Nolting, 1969; Stillman, 1974; Stillman, 1982; Wikstrom, 1990; DeSantis and Newell, 1996). The daily activities of mayors and city managers has been studied in a number of ways including how each divides their time between the policy, administrative, and political roles that they must perform (Newell & Ammons, 1995). Scholars have also examined the influence that socio-demographic aspects has on the form of government chosen (Sherbenou, 1961; Kessel, 1962; Schnore and Alford, 1963; Alford and Scoble, 1965; Dye and MacManus, 1976; Sanders, 1979; Giles, Gabris, and

Krane, 1980) including geographic region (Sanders, 1979; Farnham, 1986) and the age of the city as well as the change in population (Sanders, 1979).

In recent years, however, "Increasing evidence in existing literature…suggests that the two major municipal government structures…may be inadequate to describe the various hybrid forms of government that have been evolving" (DeSantis, 2002, p.95).

Scholars have observed and reported on a number of structural changes that are taking place in municipalities across the country. Researchers show that changes such as an increased use of appointed chief administrative officers (CAOs) in mayor-council form cities, direct election of mayors and an increased use of ward or district elections for city council members in council-manager municipalities have occurred in recent years (Adrian, 1988; Moulder, 2008; MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon & Brucato, 2000; Frederickson, Logan & Wood, 2003).

The most comprehensive empirical attempt to reexamine the traditional mayor-council/council-manager typology in recent years is put forward by Frederickson, Johnson and Wood in the form of their "Adapted Cities Framework". Through a number of articles published during the early 2000's (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson, Wood, and & Logan, 2001; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003; Frederickson, Johnson ,& Wood, 2004a) and cumulating in the book *The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change* (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004b), Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood undertake a thorough review of the existing institutional structures that exists in cities within the U.S. and develop a classification system based upon a number of structural variables that exist within contemporary municipalities. In an effort to present a more accurate description of the similarities and differences present in cities today, these scholars develop an entirely new nomenclature,

along with a new set of categories to describe each municipality's form of government. Frederickson et al. uses an array of structural features present within a municipality to identify similarities and differences between cities. Using these identified features, they then create a framework consisting of five categories in which to classify cities. These five categories include "Political Cities", "Administrative Cities", "Adapted Political Cities", "Adapted Administrative Cities", and "Conciliated Cities" (Frederickson et al., 2004b). These categories can be described as follows.

1. *Political Cities*: these cities represent the classical political extreme, they utilize a separation of powers structure between the council and the mayor with the mayor acting as CEO and not serving on the city council.
2. *Adapted Political Cities*: these cities are most clearly distinguished from pure political cities by the presence of a professional CAO appointed by the mayor.
3. *Conciliated Cities*: these cities are no longer obviously based solely on a separation of powers model or a unity of powers model. They have a CAO that is appointed jointly by the mayor and council and the council may be elected at-large or by district in the city.
4. *Adapted Administrative Cities*: these cities are usually distinguished from pure administrative cities in that the mayor is directly elected, may have the veto, may be full-time, and may have additional input into the manager's appointment.
5. *Administrative Cities*: these cities represent the classical council-manager unity-of-power form. The mayor is a member of council with no separate executive duties and is appointed from among the council. Council is part-time and is elected at-large in the city. Council terms are usually short (2 year terms). The

CEO is appointed by the entire council and is in charge of all administrative functions.

These three scholars utilize this new classification system to illustrate how over time most cities within the U.S. (especially those over 50,000 in population) have incrementally changed their institutional structure. Their study indicates that structural features found in most municipalities today are such that the majority of these municipalities no longer fit clearly into either the traditional mayor-council (their "political cities") or the council-manager (their "administrative cities") distinctions. It is Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood's assertion that most municipalities are now better classified using one of their two adapted cities types (Frederickson et al., 2004b). If indeed this new classification system better explains the differences in modern municipalities, then applying this framework to municipalities should assist in explaining many important variables of concern to researchers.

Significance of the Study

While most of the relevant studies of local governments within the U.S. have concentrated on an analysis of differences found between the two dominant forms of local government described above (mayor-council and council-manager), assuming a dichotomous relationship between them, this study intends to compare and contrast between these same local governments utilizing the more complex structures such as those found in Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood's 'Adapted Cities' framework.

Although the commission form of government is acknowledged to exist as a successful local government form in the U.S., because of the small number of municipalities that operate under this form of government within the country (less than

2%), it is excluded from this study. The town meeting and representative town meeting forms, found primarily in the New England region of the country, are also excluded from this study for similar reasons.

Building upon the basic structural characteristics found within Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood's five types of municipalities in the 'Adapted Cities' framework, each municipality will be classified as either political, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, or administrative.

Using data captured from a representative national survey of municipalities within the United States, the author intends to establish whether classifying a municipality under the 'adapted cities' classification system helps to explain differences for a number of different research variables. One would assume that as a city adapts from a political type city, taking on the characteristics of a more reformed administrative type city, one should observe differences in the roles performed by the various system actors and that attributes usually associated with more reformed cities will become more prevalent.

In this study the author randomly surveyed eight hundred municipalities in the United States with populations between 10,000 and 250,000 in order to obtain a representative sample from which to make comparisons and to draw inferences. Participants for this survey are obtained from a probability sample drawn from the listing of municipalities in the 2010 ICMA Municipal Year Book. From these responses, information concerning the institutional structural characteristics concerning the mayor, council, staff, and the municipality in general are collected in order to properly classify each city using the basic 'adapted cities' framework. Additionally, information concerning the municipalities CAOs (the mayor or city manager) individual characteristics is also collected along with their individual perceptions of the level of

involvement that both themselves and the members of the council that they work with have concerning a number of activities. Information concerning the quantity and quality of services provided by the municipality and time spent on policy, management, and political activities are also obtained. From this study the author hopes to determine that a significant difference is shown to exist between the five types of political and administrative cities identified and that the institutional structural changes that are taking place in municipalities in the U.S. in recent years have affects on important variables.

There are not an abundance of research studies conducted using the adapted cities framework. As Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) comment concerning the claims put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood in their 'Adapted Cities' framework, if their claims are correct then ,"the value of the adapted cities framework to empirical scholarship is potentially enormous" (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, p.876). One possible reason for lack of study, advocated by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) and mentioned earlier in this paper, is the lack of an explicit process for coding cities into the framework and the difficulty in operationalizing the five categories.

In an extensive literature review on the adapted cities framework, only three studies that actually use the framework to perform empirical analysis are located (Wood, 2002; Wood & Fan, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). In addition, one that examines the framework compared to the traditional dichotomous typology (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2009) and one study that attempts to improve the analysis value of the framework are also discovered (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008) (these are outside, of course, of the original Frederickson et al. articles).

In a 2002 study, Wood (2002) examines 57 cities between 25k and 1million in population to analyze if there is any relationship between voter turnout and the

classification of a city. In this study Wood finds that voter turnout is dependent on form of government, with political cities having the highest voter turnout and administrative cities the lowest. He determines that direct election of mayors, separation of political powers between the mayor and council, full-time status and expanded executive authority of the mayor are likely contributors to higher voter turnout.

Another study published in 2008, is conducted by Wood and Fan (2008). They use the adapted cities framework to evaluate whether citizens in adapted cities are more likely to rate the quality of services higher than those in non-adapted cities. In a study of 74 cities in 30 states they find that citizens in administrative cities are more likely to rate the quality of services in the top rating than are those in adapted cities.

A study published in 2010 by Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) looks at the relationship between type of city and expenditure levels in 263 Michigan municipalities. They conclude that no evidence can be found that links city structure with per capita expenditures.

The 2009 study written by Carr and Karuppusamy (2009) is an attempt to assess whether the two ideal types of municipal structure are adequate in describing the structure of Michigan cities and to use the adapted cities framework to examine the patterns of adaptation in these same cities. This study examines the charters of 263 cities in Michigan to look at the patterns of adaptation in these cities utilizing the adapted cities framework. They find that most adaptations in these cities take place in mayor-council cities with much less adaptation occurring within council-manager cities (42% of council-manager cities remained as pure administrative cities). They call for more studies to 1) build upon and refine their approach to coding cities; 2) apply studies to cities in other states; 3) address whether the adapted city is indeed a new form of

government; and 4) use the adapted cities framework to reexamine the link between government structure and municipal policy.

Have adaptations that are instituted in administrative cities such as the direct election of a mayor or the election of council members from wards or districts actually have any significant effects? Has the introduction of an appointed chief administrative professional in political cities actually increased efficiency? Does the mixture of the activities that each participant becomes involved in change as a city adapts to become more administrative or more political? Is a combination of these institutional changes also responsible for changes in important variables within these cities? This study's intent is to test whether the well documented structural changes that have taken place in many municipalities in the U.S. in recent decades has any effect, based upon variables designed to measure municipal functions and role activities. This study is important to public administration because it can provide evidence that such structural changes do matter and that professionally administered cities are substantially different than those not professionally administered.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

A Brief History of City Government Development

A review of the literature concerning form of local government reveals that there is not any one single and independent method that can be utilized to classify the various periods that have transpired in the history of municipal government within the United States. Although the various authors use differing methods to describe the periods of American city government development occurring over the past two centuries, they all do agree that change has occurred and that different time periods do exist.

Adrian (1988) puts forward a theme of perpetual change when describing the form of government that cities in the United States have taken over the past 200 years. While he does concede that there is still much room for debate when discussing the actual effects of structure and form on a city's administration and policymaking functions, he posits that there can be little debate on its effects upon one particular institution of democracy, elections. According to Adrian, cities originally inherited the traditions common to English cities in colonial times. Cities then 'Americanized' city governments after the adoption of the new federal Constitution to conform to the new and unique American ideas of separation of powers, including a bicameral council within their structures. In the early 1800s Jacksonian democracy and the accompanying long ballot took hold in American cities. These ideas persisted in local governments until the complexities associated with larger populations and the introduction of a plethora of

services that cities were required to perform led to the popular dissatisfaction of machine politics. This dissatisfaction helped to introduce the progressive movement and the related reforms that it helped to blossom in the late 1800s and early 1900s. These reforms first moved city governments toward the adoption of a strong mayor form government, then to a commission form of government, and finally to council-manager government (which has endured ever since). Adrian states that the reform movement of the early 20th century was "an effort to return to the simplicity of the American colonial system, a system in which there was no separation of powers" (Adrian, 1988, p. 9). The conception of the council-manager system is more Hamiltonian than Jeffersonian with its emphasis of professionalism and efficiency over political leadership and subgroup representation. Overall, Adrian's theme centers on a continuous pattern of change for reform within the American city over the entire time of the republic.

Svara (1994) divides local government reform into five time periods since 1884. He illustrates how that in each of the five time periods the institutional reforms that are put forward are reflective of the conditions present during that particular period. For example, early reformers wanted to reconcile support for representative democracy with principles of hierarchy and merit. Svara's five periods include:

1. Innovation: 1894-1919. Reformers believed that structural and legal change were pre-conditions for other changes. Major problems addressed by reformers in this period included fragmented authority, conflict, corruption, poor service quality, and lack of competence in staff. The council manager plan was promoted because it is based on a unitary model that lessens conflict and promotes citywide interest while at the same time it strengthens (and controlls) the chief executive (City

Manager). These early reformers use the council-manager plan to promote democratic aspirations, not just efficiency.

2. Expansion and Orthodoxy: 1920-1945. Some began to think that the manager is assuming too much power. The dichotomy model comes into prominence perhaps to allay this fear. The great depression then exaggerates the need for efficiency. Dominant values in this second period become efficiency, economy, and fairness. These dominant values begin to obscure the wider values of the first period.
3. Consolidation of Reform: 1946-1965. After WWII the major new problems facing municipalities are population growth, shortages in services, and inadequate infrastructure. These problems are spawned by the two great American revolutions of the time; the rise of the suburbs and the rise of the new middle class. The council-manager plan offers solutions to these problems and reform during this period is linked to dynamic urban areas of the country. However, "the meaning and record of the reform movement…was subject to question as the period ended" (p.333).
4. Maturity and Challenge: 1966-1988. The civil rights movement during the 1960s sparks expanded participation and an increase in interest group pressures on local officials. Incentives and requirements from the federal government placed upon local governments also broaden the number of programs that local governments are involved in. This makes cities much more alike in the service ranges that they offer. Professional politicians win seats in local elections. New Public Administration (NPA) gives a rationale for managers to become policy leaders and as a result they lose much of the protective cover of neutrality. ICMA realizes during this period that professional management is not synonymous with

the council-manager form of government. Major problems faced during this period include expanding civil rights, opening processes to wider participation, and meeting expanding needs with fewer revenues. The values of reform during this period are equity, openness, and supporting local officials.

5. Reaffirmation and Renewal, or 'The End of Reform': 1989-Present. The current period of reform may be viewed from two alternative perspectives. One view holds that traditional reform is so established that it is no longer reform. From this viewpoint it is difficult to distinguish reformed from unreformed government anymore because of the hybridization of the institutions of government. The second viewpoint sees local government reform programs as reaffirmed and renewed in the present period. This second view is supported by looking at the many measures put into place to advance values of the reform program. These measures include those that can be found within the 7th model charter. This 1989 document provides for alternative methods of selecting representative leadership in cities, such as the use of district elections and the direct election of mayors. These institutional alternatives offer solutions to today's need for purposeful, customer-driven, open and inclusive, and productive government.

For Svara the reform movement within each period addresses institutional reforms that are reflective of conditions that are present within that particular period. The current period of reform that we now live in is no different.

Chester Newland (1995) uses the idea of four successive periods to describe the history of the council-manager governmental plan. These are:

1. The Political Reform Period (early progressive era till 1940s)
2. The Structural Orthodoxy Period (1940s into the 1960s)

3. The Social Activism Period (1960s through the 1970s)
4. The Diversity and Dynamics Period (1970s thru the 1990s)

Reformers acting during the first period are not trying to 'escape' from politics as many scholars propose. According to Newland, these early reformers are instead trying to replace the corrupt 'transactional' politics of the day and to facilitate 'transformational' politics. It is not until the second 'orthodoxy' period in the 1940s that the two dominant doctrines of executive aggrandizement and the politics-administration dichotomy begin to prevail. Newland (1995) states that it is primarily the idea of the powerful executive that alters the perception of the council-manager government plan in the 1940s through the 1960s. This strengthening of the manager eventually leads to a call for reform by some in an effort to change the perceived detached and neutral city government in the 1960s. By the time the 1960s are reached the old politics of reform has gradually withered and the greatly expanded powers of the executive have now come to the point where it lacks popular support and the authority that this popular support brings with it. By the 1980's orthodoxy to 'the plan' (as Newland refers to the original council-manager plan) is not only challenged but is significantly eroded institutionally by the advent of council staffs, district elections, and the popular election of mayors within council-manager cities. Diversity is the characteristic that can be used to describe council-manager cities in this latest period.

The evolutionary change of reformed government is described by Frederickson, Wood, and Logan (2001) viewed through the seven model charters adopted over the past century. The major evolutionary changes described by Frederickson et al. within the seven model charters are outlined in the list below:

- 1st – 1900 – advocated strong executive mayor system; it was not accepted well – during interim the commission form of government came forward
- 2nd – 1915 – advocated council-manager plan for the first time
- 3rd – 1927 – no big changes from 1915; mentioned mayor pro-tem; mentioned council staff
- 4th – 1933 – added department of personnel recommendation; personnel to be removed by CM
- 5th – 1941 – complete rewrite; merit mentioned; guidelines for mayor election; recommended professional executive in mayor-council cities
- 6th – 1964 – gave alternative for council elections; first mention of directly elected mayor in council-manager form
- 7th – 1989 – addressed the "leadership & representation" issues; gave new roles and responsibilities to mayors

From the first model charter adopted in 1900 through the 7th version adopted in 1989, the complexity and malleability of American cities is clearly illustrated by Frederickson et al. in the changes contained within each version.

Different Methods of Classifying City Structures

Just as there is diversity in classifying the different periods describing the history of city government in the United States, there is also diversity in how scholars describe the various structures that local governments in the U.S. adopt.

As discussed earlier, the ICMA recognizes the five most common forms of local government in the U.S. today in their regular survey. According to 2001 survey data the vast majority of cities (91%) within the United States now operate under either the

mayor-council (38%) or the council-manager (53%) form of government (MacManus & Bullock, 2003). Scholars in the past, usually look at city structures based upon this method of classification (and usually only between the two most common types of mayor-council and council-manager for study). However, recognizing structural changes in recent years has (DeSantis & Renner, 2002) led many scholars to begin to look for alternative methods of classification. Several of these proposed schemes are listed here in order to illustrate the different approaches scholars have taken.

In 1998 the then Executive Director of ICMA, Bill Hansell, wrote two articles in that association's monthly publication concerning structural reforms in local city government (Hansell, 1998a; 1998b). In these articles Hansell points out that almost every element of the original reform plan (small councils, election at large, nonpartisan elections, mayor selected from among the council, and elected officials viewed as citizen volunteers with no compensation) has since been reformed, "to the point where citizens are having a difficult time telling the difference…" (Hansell, 1998a, p.15). He goes on to propose four types of council-manager structural forms. These four forms are:

1. Classic Council-Manager Type: The mayor is selected from among the council.
2. Mayor At-Large C-M Type: The mayor has similar power to council but elected at-large.
3. Mayor (empowered) C-M Type: The mayor is given certain powers such as the veto, review of manager's budget, and nomination of the manager.
4. Mayor (separation of powers) C-M Type: The mayor is CEO but the charter requires a manager that is appointed by mayor but confirmed by council and only removed by council (this makes it different than mayor-council with a CAO).

According to Hansell the needs of the community, such as the presence of a lot of council conflict, dictates the type of structure imposed. Much of this article is a response to concern over reforms that have taken place in some large council-manager plan cities (i.e. Cincinnati, Ohio) and have strengthened the mayor at the expense of weakening the city manager.

A 2002 article by DeSantis and Renner (2002) develops a seven category classification system for those 3,561 cities in the 1996 ICMA Municipal Form of Government Survey listed as either mayor-council or council-manager (the other forms of government included within the survey and those city samples with fewer than 2,500 in population are excluded in their analysis). They expand somewhat on Hansell's typology discussed above and classify these cities as: *Classical council-manager* (894 cities or 25.1%); *council-manager with at-large mayor* (1125 or 31.6%); *council-manager with an empowered mayor* (345 or 9.8%); *strong mayor with a CAO* (262 or 7.5%); *Strong mayor without a CAO* (392 or 11.2%); *weak mayor with a CAO* (245 or 7%); and finally, *weak mayor without a CAO* (298 or 11.3%). While this classification system is based upon the role and formal authority given to the mayor of a city, the authors do also look at the electoral systems in the three types of council-manager cities to see if there is any correlation between the 'reformed ' (council-manager) structure and a city's reformed electoral systems. What they find is surprising. It is not the most reformed type of cities (the classical council-manager system) as one might expect where the highest percentage of nonpartisan election systems are found, but rather it is in cities with a separately elected mayor. In fact the classical council-manager cities in the study have the lowest percentage of nonpartisan election systems out of the three council-

manager types. This simply illustrates how much more complicated cities are than the traditional classification categories suggest (DeSantis & Renner, 2002).

The final method of classifying cities presented here represents the most current and comprehensive empirical attempt to relook at the traditional mayor-council/council–manager typology. Throughout a number of articles published during the early 2000s (Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001; Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a) and cumulating in the book *The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change* (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004b), Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood, and others, undertake a thorough review of the existing institutional structures in cities within the U.S. and develop a classification system based upon a number of these structural variables.

This study is the result of the authors' perceptions, "It is our empirical observation that categorizing cities as mayor-council or council-manager had little real capacity to explain how cities were actually democratically structured, organized, and managed" (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p.4). These traditional mayor-council and council-manager designations are both legal distinctions (from state incorporation laws) and institutional concepts. Rather than cities distributed in a bi-modal distribution of structural characteristics along these two traditional conceptual forms, their research finds that, "the detailed features of these traditional models have been so mingled as to all but eliminate the importance of the formal designation of a city as either a mayor-council or council-manager city" (p.7).

In an article written in 2000, Ebdon and Brucato (2000) find evidence that election methods utilized within these two traditional types of cities are becoming more similar (specifically in the use of the direct election for the mayor and the use of the

district election method for council). They also find that the use of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) in mayor-council form cities is increasing. They conclude that the convergence that they observe between the two traditional forms of city government appear to be driven by an emphasis on different values, the complexity of additional values other than *efficiency* in council-manager cities, and the increasing importance council-manager cities are placing on *representation*. They conclude that both of the traditional forms are, "increasingly combining these two values in their structural design" (Ebdon & Brucato, 2000, p.2228).

Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood take this concept even further. To these scholars the two categories of mayor-council and council-manager, "fail to describe very important similarities and differences in city structures" (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004b, p. 101). In an effort to present a more accurate description of the similarities and differences present in cities today they develop an entirely new nomenclature, along with a new set of categories to use in describing city form. First they label cities into three separate 'types' (Frederickson et al., 2004a) which they label as type I cities (which describes the original mayor-council type of city, also called political cities), type II cities (the unity of powers model labeled an administrative city), and finally type III cities (those cities that are adapted forms). They then create a five category classification plan for these cities that uses a number of different structural features to identify similarities and differences among them. The five classifications that they propose are:

1. Political Cities: (type I) this refers to the classical non-reformed mayor-council structure with the separation-of-powers between mayor and council.

2. Administrative City: (type II) this is also referred to as a pure administrative city. It is the classical reformed city with a unified council and the council-manager plan.

   There are three variations of the Type III or adapted city:

3. Adapted Political Cities: while still a separation-of-powers structure, the major differences between political and adapted political cities are the presence of a professional full-time CAO, usually some at-large council members, and the presence of a part-time council.
4. Adapted Administrative City: the major differences between a pure administrative city and an adapted administrative city are the direct election of the mayor and the probable election of some or all council members by district.
5. Conciliated City: the conciliated city is, "a complete mix of the primary principles and logic of political and administrative cities" (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p. 107). The primary difference in this and a political adapted city involves the limited authority of the mayor. In conciliated cities the CAO has executive authority over departments. The Mayor has no role in council, as is the case in an administrative city, except possibly a vote in the case of a tie.

These three scholars utilize this new classification system to illustrate how that over time most cities in the U.S. have incrementally changed structurally so that today the majority should be classified as one of the type III or adapted city types rather than the classical mayor-council or council-manager. Their findings do indicate a trend in council-manager cities away from a "preoccupation with efficiency and toward political problem solving" (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p. 105) and in mayor-council cities an adaptation, "toward greater efficiency and managerial capacity" (p.105).

In a more recent article, Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) propose a process for coding cities into this 'adapted framework' based upon the charter elements that are identified by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004b). In their revised classification process, the statutory distinctions between the council-manager form of government and the mayor-council form of government are preserved. This additional distinction results in two types of conciliated cities instead of Frederickson's one; a 'conciliated administrative' city and a 'conciliated political' city. This complicates the typology by expanding the classification system to six categories instead of the original five, but it does allow for the preservation of the distinction between the mayor-council and the council-manager structured cities (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008).

Recent Structural Changes Found in U.S. Cities

For a number of years scholars have observed structural changes taking place in cities within the U.S. In an article in 1988 Charles Adrian (1988) identifies 5 trends of convergence taking place between the two major forms of cities within the U.S. These trends include an increase in the use of professionals (CAOs), an increase in the use of mayor's as political leaders for problems with 'indeterminate' resolutions, and the use of ward systems to increase representation in cities that are growing more heterogeneous.

Numerous other studies have identified similar changes taking place within U.S. cities. These changes include an increased use of CAOs in mayor-council cities, the direct election of the mayor in council-manager cities, and the increased use of ward or district elections for city council members (MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon & Brucato, 2000; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003; Moulder, 2008).

The 2008 analysis by Moulder (2008) uses 2006 ICMA survey data to show that, since the last survey was conducted in 2001, there has been a four percent increase in the number of cities reporting the use of a CAO and the facts that most cities now allow for the use of initiatives (58%) and legislative referendums (75%). In most cities that are included in this survey (76%) the mayor is directly elected, usually is part-time (86%), and usually has no term limit (91%) (Moulder, 2008). One very interesting finding in this study is that since 1996 there has been a steady drop in the authority of the CEO to develop and make recommendations on the budget submitted to the council (from 13% in 1996 to 11% in 2006). There has, at the same time however, occurred an increase in authority given to the CAO (up from 57% to 65%) to do the same. They conclude that the most noteworthy changes are the increases in the use of CAOs in mayor-council cities and the number of form changes occurring within the council-manager plan cities.

Possible Reasons for these Structural Changes

Scholars have also examined various reasons that may have caused these structural changes in cities over the past few decades. The two primary types of city government found in the U.S., the mayor-council and the council-manager forms, are described as containing the tendency to either experience conflict (as in mayor-council forms) or cooperation (as in council-manager forms) (Svara, 1990). The unreformed mayor-council system is built upon the idea of a separation of powers between the council and the chief executive officer (the mayor). The reformed council-manager system is built upon the idea of a unified government with a controlled executive (the city manager). These models are sometimes referred to as the presidential model and the parliamentary model respectively (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a).

In an earlier article on the subject, Chester Newland (1995) places the blame for much of the structural change that is taking place in cities on a return to 'transactional' politics. Newland says that the emphasis that political science places on 'politics as power' during the 1950s and 1960s coupled with the increase in partisanship in local politics gives rise to this return to transactional politics. The reform movement and its use of the council-manager plan are designed to facilitate collaborative authority and the use of 'transformational' politics. The unreformed mayor-council plan, on the other hand, emphasizes separation of powers and fragmented administration. Transformational politics and professional expert administration are the ideals of the council-manager plan while transactional politics and politically sensitive administration are the ideals of the mayor-council plan (Newland, 1995). To Newland, the positive values within the mayor-council plan are being incorporated into the council-manager plan, thus eroding the orthodoxy and causing diversity to prevail.

In the late 1990s Bill Hansell (then ICMA executive director) puts forward the idea that there are three reasons that led citizens to question the council-manager form of government (Hansell, 1998a; 1998b). First, because professionalism has been extended to all parts of service delivery, people question why a professional manager is required to manage these professionals. Second, because the profession has never imposed qualifications on professional city managers, citizens question why a mayor cannot be as equally qualified as a city manager. And third, because councils lost the ideal of a citizen volunteer, a real conflict of roles and competencies is now built into the system.

Some scholars see the changes occurring as an offshoot of the accountability movement (MacManus & Bullock, 2003), or as the result of the increasing convergence of the values of efficiency and representation within the two major forms (Ebdon &

Brucato, 2000). Others see the forces of change as coming from the demographic, economic, environmental, political, technological, and urban patterns taking place within the country (Kemp, 2000).

In their various articles written on the subject of institutional changes in American cities and in their 2004 book *The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change,* Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a; 2004b) make the argument that in many cases these changes appear to be the result of cities trying to use an institutional fix to solve leadership and other problems that they are facing. They put forward that the basic values that typically characterize the two traditional forms of cities are, the ideal of efficiency, management, and productivity capability within council-manager cities and political leadership, responsiveness, and accountability within mayor-council cities. They contend that after the 1970s, "changing values and disappointment with the status quo would change both political and administrative cities just as the reform movement had driven earlier change" (Frederickson et al., 2004b, p.51). They describe three forces that are driving these patterns of change within U.S. cities: 1) the drive for political responsiveness; 2) the drive for political leadership; and 3) the drive for administrative efficiency. These forces are manifested in several assumptions that promote change (Frederickson et al., 2004a).

First, it is assumed that the addition of a CAO in mayor-council cities will lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness. This assumption is based on studies of council-manager cities with professional city managers. Svara states that studies show that when council-manager cities are compared to mayor-council cities, the reformed cities are more likely to have, "greater efficiency, sounder finances, and stronger management performance" (Svara, 2008, p.10). Council-manager cities also exhibit a higher minority

representation on staff and a number of other positive features. Svara goes on to say that comparative studies usually do not find a distinction between mayor-council cities that hire or do not hire a professional CAO. As a result, this first assumption may be questionable.

A second assumption Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a) express goes as follows. If a council-manager city increases the role of the mayor within the institutional system, or the council is elected by district rather than at large, then the results will be better specific representation (Frederickson et al., 2004a). Their findings indicate that, beginning over 50 years ago, American cities began a convergence of the two separate values of administrative efficiency and political representation by imposing structural changes upon their institutional systems. Changes made in one form added to it the prominent features that are to be found in the opposite traditional form. For example, the direct election of mayors and the district election of council member so prominent in the mayor-council form are adopted in council-manager cities to increase political representation. Similarly, mayor-council cities begin including professional executives (CAOs). They state that, "Citizens appear to favor blending the contrasting logic of unity of powers and separation of powers and believe this blending to be compatible" (Frederickson et al., 2004a, p.329).

In short, scholars propose a number of different reasons to explain the structural changes taking place in American cities over the past few decades. The return to transactional politics; the rise of professionalism in all areas of service delivery leading citizens to question the need for professional managers at the top; the lack of professional qualifications for city managers; the rise of the career local politicians bringing with it a conflict of roles; a rise in the accountability movement; forces of change from

demographic and other external areas; and disappointment with the status quo leading to a drive for political responsiveness, political leadership, and administrative efficiency. All of these reasons are suggested to drive structural change in municipalities.

Possible Consequences of Structural Changes and Reasons to Keep Forms Separated

While there is little disagreement that structural change is taking place in American cities over the past few decades, there are divergent views on the desirability pf these changes or on the effects that these changes are actually having on the processes taking place in cities. James H. Svara, in particular, is critical of claims made that, "excessively discounts the significance of form" (Svara, 2005, p.503). In a number of articles, Svara promotes the idea that the two traditional forms of mayor-council and council-manager are still relevant for explaining differences in behavior and outcomes even when structural changes such as those that define 'adapted cities' are occurring.

According to Svara, structures make a difference in the attitudes and behavior of officials and the performance of local government. While discussing the continued need for model charters that promote the reform ideas within the council-manager plan, Svara says, "Models are based on values that signal what kind of attitude and behavior is deemed appropriate" (Svara, 2001a, p.30). Early reformers use the council-manager form of government not only to advance the administrative performance of cities but also to promote their democratic aspirations (Svara, 1994). The council-manager plan is promoted because it is based upon a unitary model that is intended to lessen conflict and promote city-wide interest. Unlike the mayor-council plan, it strengthens the executive while at the same time controlling him. The appointed executive has advantages over an elected executive system where the role of the council can be limited and the possibility

of debilitating conflict is possible between the mayor and council. Form provides a contextual setting to the organization (Svara & Nelson, 2008). Mayors in mayor-council cities are more likely to use a 'power over' leadership style while mayors in council-manager cities are more likely to use a 'power to' facilitative leadership style.

The allocation of authority, how executive responsibilities are assigned, and if a top administrator is responsible to a mayor or to the council (if one is present) are three features that differentiate the two traditional plans (Svara & Nelson, 2008). The mere presence of a CAO in a city or the adoption of the direct election of a mayor does not create a hybrid out of the two systems unless one of the three features mentioned above are altered. For example, if the council is given sole responsible for the appointment of the CAO in a mayor-council city or if the directly elected mayor in a council-manager city is given executive responsibilities, then one might be able to say that an alteration of the original form has taken place. However, giving the mayor the power of a legislative veto does not constitute or equate with giving the mayor executive authority in a city because such a veto is a tool for determining policy not executive power (Svara, 2008a).

In a 2010 article, Kimberly L. Nelson and James H. Svara (2010) propose a revised method of classifying a city's form of government based upon two dimensions of the constitutional principles of separation of powers and integrated authority. In their classification system they derive seven variations of cities based upon, "The extent to which the mayor is distinguished from the council" and , "The professional status of the CAO based on the range of elected officials to which the CAO is accountable and the CAOs autonomy in determining scope of responsibilities" (Nelson & Svara, 2010, p. 551). Using a data base created from virtually all U.S. cities with population of 10,000 or more, they make several findings. In council-manager cities, one-third selects the mayor

internally, though much more so in smaller communities (Nelson & Svara, 2010). In addition, in council-manager cities direct election of the mayor is more common than having a mayor selected by council, but only 1% of such cities have a mayor that nominates a city manager that is then appointed by the council (Nelson & Svara, 2010). In mayor-council cities it is found that in 16% of these cities the CAO is actually appointed by the council and not the mayor, however, this is again more common in smaller cities (under 100,000) than in larger ones. The most common method of CAO appointment in these mayor-council cities is appointment by the mayor with approval of the council (Nelson & Svara, 2010). In larger mayor-council cities (over 250,000) the most common method of appointing a CAO is appointment by the mayor without council approval needed (12% of all council-manager cities). In most (52%) mayor-council cities, however, the mayor serves as the chief executive officer and does not have an appointed CAO. Svara and Nelson (2010) propose that the seven categories they put forward represent a progression from a city with "low centralized political leadership and high professional autonomy to high political leadership and low professional autonomy" (p. 558). Using this seven category variable in research performed in the future may show different results than using the dichotomous mayor-council, council-manager system (Nelson & Svara, 2010).

Scholars have the tendency in recent years to assert that CAOs in mayor-council cities are the functional equivalent of city managers in council-manager cities. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the idea that the addition of a CAO can bring more professional administrative efficiency to a mayor-council form city is one of the driving forces of change. The idea that, "Most CAOs function very much like a city manager…" (Frederickson et al., 2004a, p. 325) is a common theme.

In her 2002 article examining CAOs in the twenty six largest cities in the United States that operated under the mayor-council form of government, Nelson finds that many of the stereotypical ideas about CAOs do not consistently hold up under close examination (Nelson, 2002). She looks only at the formal factors involving CAOs, such as who hires and fires the CAO and how duties and responsibilities are assigned. She finds that several factors are important in evaluating the role of the CAO in a city. These formal factors include: who has the authority to appoint and remove the CAO, how the formal status of the CAO is established (charter, ordinance, or informally), and what formal authority that the CAO is given (appoint personnel, the budget, daily operations). The role of the CAO in the cities she studied varies depending on how these factors are enacted in each city (Nelson, 2002).

David Ammons (2008) examines the differences between the roles of CAOs in mayor-council cities and City Managers in council-manager cities by asking questions of those individuals who have served in both capacities during their careers (Ammons, 2008). What he finds in this examination is that while these individuals do not see the two traditional forms of government as polar opposites they do see mayor-council cities as distinctly more political than council-manager cities. More than half say that both CAOs and CMs have an equal influence on the budget (although 46% said that the CM has more), 80% say that the city manager has more responsibility than the CAO, but a plurality (30%) say that the CAO's job is more complex and more political than the city manager's. Overall, while the surveyed group did see a lot of similarities between the jobs, they also saw big differences. These differences include how political the job is, the influence each has on the budget and personnel functions, and the responsibility level of

each. They agree on role similarities but reject the idea of role equivalency (Ammons, 2008).

One of the most significant differences that form of government makes concerns policy choice (Feiock, Jeong, & Jaehoon, 2003). In a panel design study that uses ICMA surveys on economic development from 1984 and 1989, these authors find some significant differences between these two forms of government. Their findings help to confirm the idea that the use of the council-manager form of government promotes greater consideration toward longer-term interests for citizens while the structure of incentives that are found in the mayor-council form of government can lead officials to use developmental policies as a stage to promote personal and political goals. Their study shows that the council-manager form of government works to constrain opportunistic behavior. In the discussion of their findings they write:

> Finally, this article has argued that the separation of administration from electoral control enhances efficiency because it removes high-power incentives for executives, reduces transaction costs, and makes commitment more credible for elected officers. If this argument has merit, the city management profession and scholars of local institutions may be too sanguine about the movement toward adapted cities in which council-manager governments alter the architecture of local institutions by adding a directly elected mayor (Feiock et al., 2003, p. 623).

The findings of these scholars suggest that there are indeed consequences that are possible when structural adaptations are made to the two forms of government. There is a rational reason for keeping the two forms of government separate for analytical study.

Conclusion

From these readings the evidence is fairly clear; institutional structures in cities within the United States have undergone changes. Indeed, this change appears to take place since the beginning of the Republic. The adapted cities framework developed by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a; 2004b) helps to empirically highlight and describe many of these changes taking place in recent years in both council-manager and mayor-council form cities.

While there is little debate among scholars concerning the fact that adaptations in municipalities are taking place, considerably more debate is found concerning what these changes actually mean. Questions such as 'when does a change mean a fundamental shift in institutional orientation?' and 'do certain structural changes alter the relationship between the CAO and the elected body?' still go mostly unanswered. What do these changes mean for policy and operational decisions that affect the outputs and outcomes of these cities?

In a recent article in *Public Management,* Svara and Nelson (2008) concur that forms of local government such as the council-manager plan, based on parliamentary principles, continue to incorporate essential features even as certain electoral and executive features are altered. These forms can operate with various combinations of changes in these features and yet still incorporate, "the essential features of unified authority, assignment of executive responsibilities to the professional top administrator, and accountability of the administrator to the entire council" (Svara & Nelson, 2008, p.12).

The debate over the question of 'what difference does structure make?' will continue. Only empirical studies of actual cities' policies, outputs, and outcomes and

their association with structures present within those cities will help to answer this important question.

Developing Independent Variables

Reformers of the early 20th century believe that by changing the institutions of local government through structural reforms they could replace the political leadership that so dominates municipal structures at the time and bring efficiency and professional management to city services (Adrian, 1988). The council manager plan is promoted in an effort to promote a unitary model of government that will lessen conflict, promote citywide effort, and strengthen the chief executive (the appointed city manager) (Svara, 1994).

Most research concerning municipal governments has contrasted council-manager form cities against the non-reformed cities (those based upon an elected mayor that performs the duties of chief executive officer (CEO) along with a separately elected city council). This dichotomous comparison is usually employed to ascertain differences between these two forms regarding service performance levels and other data of interest to the researchers. As discussed above, scholars have recently begun to point to a convergence among the structural characteristics between these two classical forms of local governments. Scholars argue that each of the two separate forms possess adopted institutional attributes of the other to the point that it is, in many cases, hard to distinguish one from the other (Frederickson et al., 2004b). Frederickson et al. calls these type cities 'hybrid' or 'adapted' cities. Their studies indicate that most cities in the U.S. now fit into this 'adapted' category and because of this fact the diagnostic value of using the dichotomous distinction of council-manager and mayor-council is greatly diminished.

To enhance the body of knowledge regarding these 'hybrid' cities the author uses form of government as the independent variable in this study. This form is derived based upon the institutional characteristics designated by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood in their 'Adapted Cities Framework" (Frederickson et al., 2004b). As such, the following table, adapted from their book, is used to categorize each individual municipality into one of the five types of cities developed by these authors (political, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, administrative).

Table 2.1 Summary of Adapted Cities Structural Framework

		Variable	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Administrative	Administrative
1	Key	How is the Mayor elected	Directly	Directly	Directly or by	Directly	By Council
2	Key	How Are Most Council Members Elected	District	District, At-large, or mixed	District, At-large, or mixed	District, At-large, or mixed	Most At-large
3	Key	Is a CAO Present	No	Likely	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	Key	Is Mayor is on the council	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
5		Does Mayor have veto power	Yes	Yes	Maybe	No	No
6		Mayor Full or Part-time	Full-time	Full-time	either	Usually Part-time	Part-time
7		Mayor has a staff	Yes	Yes	maybe	No	No
8		Council Full or Part-time	Full-time	Either	Either	Part-time	Part-time
9		Does Council have a Staff	Yes	Maybe	No	No	No
10		Election method - Partisan or Nonpartisan	Either	Either	Either	Usually Nonpartisan	Nonpartisan
11		Who do Department Heads report to	Mayor	Mayor	CAO	CAO	CAO
12		Who appoints the CAO	Mayor is CAO	Mayor alone	Mayor with Council Consent	Council	Council
13		Presence of Civil Service	Maybe	Maybe	Usually	Usually	Usually
14		Presence of Bidding System	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Key	Statutory Form	mayor-council	Likely mayor-council	Either	Likely council-manager	council-manager

Each variable is measured from a specific question asked in the survey instrument. The survey questions used and the accompanying response for each category are as follows:

Table 2.2 Summary of Study's Classification method

	Variable	Survey Question #	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Administrative	Administrative
1	How is the Mayor elected	6B	Directly	Directly	Directly or by Council	Directly	By Council
2	How Are Most Council Members Elected	7A	District	District, At-large, or mixed	District, At-large, or mixed	District, At-large, or mixed	At-large
3	Is a CAO Present	8A	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	Is Mayor is on the council	6E	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
5	Does Mayor have veto power	6F	Yes	Yes	Yes or No	No	No
6	Mayor Full or Part-time	6H	Full-time	Full-time	Full-time or Part-time	Part-time	Part-time
7	Mayor has a staff	6I	Yes	Yes	Yes or No	No	No
8	Council Full or Part-time	7C	Full-time	Full-time or Part-time	Full-time or Part-time	Part-time	Part-time
9	Does Council have a Staff	7D	Yes	Yes or No	No	No	No
10	Election method - Partisan or Nonpartisan	9D	Partisan or Non-Parisan	Partisan or Non-Parisan	Partisan or Non-Parisan	Nonpartisan	Nonpartisan
11	Who do Department Heads report to	8D	Mayor	Mayor	CAO	CAO	CAO
12	Who appoints the CAO	8C	none	Mayor	Both Jointly	Council or Both Jointly	Council or Both Jointly
13	Presence of Civil Service	9A	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No
14	Presence of Bidding System	9C	Yes or No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Statutory Form	2D	mayor-council	mayor-council	mayor-council or council-manager	council-manager	council-manager

It is important to maintain the integrity of the original adapted cities framework using the five ordinal categories as shown above. In order, however, to capture a more elaborate classification system than the multinomial categories developed above, an interval level independent variable is also developed.

In a 2008 article, Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) suggest several enhancements to the original adapted cities framework intended to improve the process for coding cities into the different types. They also propose the importance of keeping the two original forms of mayor-council and council manager distinct. This separation of form is important to address criticisms of scholars such as Svara (2005) that stress the differences in normative values expressed within each separate form. "Our approach preserves the

statutory platform as the base for coding cities in this framework and limits the adaptations on each platform to only two categories" (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, p.876). In order to accomplish this separation their enhanced framework includes six rather than the original five city categories. In their enhanced framework they divided conciliated type cities into two separate types; one for conciliated political cities and one for conciliated administrative cities. Their enhanced coding system is found in the following table.

Table 2.3 Summary of Carr and Karuppusamy Classification System

	From the enchanced Charter Framework					
	Political	**Adapted Political**	**Political Conciliated**	**Administrative Conciliated**	**Adapted Administrative**	**Administrative**
	Tier one Provisions					
1	Charter does not allow appt CAO - Mayor is CAO	Charter permits Mayor to appt CAO who report to the Mayor	Charter permits Mayor to appt CAO w/ ccuncil consent - who reports to the Mayor	Charter permits CAO	Charter permits CAO who reports to Council	Charter permits CAO who reports to Council
2	Mayor is FT and directly elected	Mayor is FT and directly elected	Mayor is PT or FT and directly elected or appointed by council	Mayor is PT or FT and directly elected or appointed by council	Mayor is PT and directly elected	Mayor is PT and selected from council
3	Council is FT & usually elected by district (At-large is not uncommon in large cities)	Council is FT & usually elected by district (sometimes by mixed system)	Council is FT or PT elected At-large	Council is FT or PT elected At-large or by district	Council is PT & elected At-large or by mixed methods	Council is PT & elected At-large
4	Mayor does not serves on council	Mayor does not serves on council	Mayor does or does not serve on the council	Mayor usually does not serve on council	Mayor serves on council	Mayor serves on council
	Tier two Provisions					
5	Mayor has Veto	Mayor has Veto	Mayor may have veto power	Mayor has Veto	Mayor may have veto	No Mayor Veto
6	Mayor and council serve 4 year terms	Mayor and council usually serve 4 year terms	Mayor serves term for less than 4 years and council terms are 4 years	Mayor serves 4 years or less & council usually serves 4 years	Mayor seves 2 yrs & council 4 years or less	Mayor & council serve 2 year terms
7	Mayor prepares the budget	Mayor prepares the budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget
8	Dept heads report to the mayor	Dept heads report to the mayor	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO
9	Mayor appoints most key officials	Mayor and council share authority to appoint key officials	CAO & council share power to appoint key officials	CAO, Mayor, & council share power to appoint key officials	CAO & council share power to appoint key officials	CAO appoints key officials (some elected ok)
10	Council is large (7-9) and standing committees are authorized	Council is large (7-9) and standing committees are authorized	Council is small (5-7) & standing committees not authorized	Council is small (5-7) & charter is usually silent on standing committees	Council is small (5-7) & standing committees not authorized	Council is small (5-7)
11	Mayor and council have staff	Mayor has staff & council may have staff	Mayor has staff & council may have staff	Mayor & council may have staff	No mayor/council staff	No mayor/council staff

To develop the continuous independent variable for this study, a combination of the two frameworks (the original and the enhanced) are utilized. In order to maintain the distinction between municipalities operating under the mayor-council and council-manager form of government, two types of conciliated municipalities are recognized (political and administrative) as suggested by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008). Point values are assigned to each institutional feature with the value given determined by the importance that each framework places on that particular feature. For example, in the original framework several features are labeled as 'key' features. In the enhanced framework structural features are divided between what Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) describe as 'tier one' and 'tier two' features. To assign point values for each city those features considered most important (referred to as tier I features in the Carr & Karuppusamy framework) are assigned a higher point value than those that are less important (tier II features). In the table shown below each tier one feature change is given a value of 2 points and each tier two feature change is given a value of 1 point. The cumulative point count of each feature change is consistent with this method of assigning point values. For example, under the Tier one category of 'CAO INFORMATION' in the table, a city that does not allow for appointment of a CAO is given a point value of '0'. If a city allows the mayor to appoint a CAO, that city is assigned a point value of '2'. If the mayor can appoint the CAO but must obtain the council's consent two additional points are added to the score making it '4' points total. Finally, if the CAO is appointed by the council as a whole (the most administrative feature of all) then two additional points are again added to the score giving that city a total point count of '6'. Using this manner of scoring, as more administrative adaptations

are made to any specific feature a higher score is produced. The higher the score the more administrative the municipality is structured.

To maintain a separation between the two distinct forms of mayor-council and council-manager, a value of 20 points is assigned to a council-manager city and a zero value is given to a mayor-council form city.

Table 2.4 Score variable point allocation system

			Political	Adapted Political	Political Conciliated	Administrative Conciliated	Adapted Administrative	Administrative
A	Keep Forms Separate	CITY FORM						
1		Council -Manager Form	na	na	na	20	20	20
2		Mayor-Council Form	0	0	0	na	na	na
		Subtotal	**0**	**0**	**0**	**20**	**20**	**20**
B	Tier 1-1	CAO INFORMATION	Charter does not allow appt CAO - Mayor is CAO	Charter permits Mayor to appt CAO who reports to the Mayor	Charter permits Mayor to appt CAO w/ council consent - CAO reports to the Mayor	Charter permits Appointment of CAO	Charter permits Council to appt CAO (usually called City Manager) CAO reports to council	Charter permits Council to appt CAO (usually called City Manager) CAO reports to council
3		(For M/C) Charter does not allow CAO	0	na	na	na	na	na
4		(For M/C) Charter allows mayor to appoint CAO	na	2	na	2	na	na
5		Mayor appoints with Council consent	na	na	4	na	4	na
6		Council appoints CAO	na	na	na	na	na	6
7		CAO reports to the Mayor	na	0	0	na	na	na
8		CAO reports to Council	na	na	na	2	2	2
		Subtotal	**0**	**2**	**4**	**4**	**6**	**8**
C	Tier 1-2	MAYOR ATTRIBUTES	Mayor is FT and directly elected by the public	Mayor is FT and directly elected by the public	Mayor is PT or FT and directly selected from council	Mayor is FT and directly elected or selected by council	Mayor is FT and directly elected by the public	Mayor is PT and directly selected from among member of the council
9		Mayor is Full Time	0	0	na	0	0	na
10		Mayor is Part Time	na	na	2	na	na	2
11		Mayor is Directly Elected	0	0	na	0	0	na
12		Mayor is Appointed by Council	na	na	2	na	na	2
		Subtotal	**0**	**0**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**4**
D	Tier 1-3	COUNCIL ATTRIBUTES	Council is FT & usually elected by district although at-large is not uncommon in large cities	Council is FT & members are elected mostly by district and sometimes by mixed system	Council is FT or PT, members are usually elected At-large	Council is FT or PT and members are usually elected At-large and sometimes by district	Council is PT & usually elected At-large or by mixed methods	Council is PT & usually elected At-large
13		Council is Full Time	0	0	na	0	0	na
14		Council is Part Time	na	na	2	na	na	2
15		Council Elected by Districts	0	0	na	0	0	na
16		Council Elected by other method (eg. At-large)	na	na	2	na	na	2
		Subtotal	**0**	**0**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**4**
E	Tier 1 - 4	MAYOR ON COUNCIL	Mayor does not serves on council	Mayor does not serves on council	Mayor does (or not) serve on the council	Mayor usually does not serve on council	Mayor serves on council	Mayor serves on council
17		Mayor does not serves on council	0	0	na	0	na	na
18		Mayor serves on the council	na	na	2	na	2	2
		Subtotal	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**2**
F	Tier 2 - 1	MAYOR VETO	Mayor has Veto	Mayor has Veto	Mayor may have veto power	Mayor has Veto	Mayor may have veto	Mayor does not have Veto power
19		Mayor has Veto	0	0	na	0	0	na
20		Mayor does not have veto	na	na	1	na	na	1

Table 2.4 (Continued)

				Political	Adapted Political	Political Conciliated	Administrative Conciliated	Adapted Administrative	Administrative
H	Tier 2 - 3a	BUDGET PREP		Mayor prepares the budget	Mayor prepares the budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget	CAO prepares budget
25		Mayor prepares the budget		0	0	na	na	na	na
26		CAO prepares the budget		na	na	1	1	1	1
		Subtotal		**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
I	Tier 2 - 3b	DEPT HEADS REPORT T		Dept heads report to the mayor	Dept heads report to the mayor	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO	Dept heads report to CAO
27		Dept heads report to the mayor		0	0	0	na	na	na
28		Dept heads report to the CAO		na	na	na	1	1	1
		Subtotal		**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**
J	Tier 2 - 4	APPT. OF KEY OFF.		Mayor appoints most key officials (e.g. clerk, attorney, treasurer)	Mayor and council share authority to appoint key officials (e.g. clerk, attorney, treasurer)	CAO & council share power to appoint key officials (e.g. clerk, attorney, treasurer)	CAO, Mayor, & council share power to appoint key officials	CAO & council share power to appoint key officials	CAO appoints key officials (a few may be directly elected)
29		(M/C Only) Mayor appoints most key officials		0	na	na	na	na	na
30		Mayor and council share authority to appoint key officials		na	1	na	1	na	na
31		CAO & council share power to appoint key officials		na	na	2	na	2	na
32		(C/M only) CAO appoints key officials		na	na	na	na	na	3
		Subtotal		**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**
K	Tier 2 - 5	COUNCIL SIZE		Council is large (7-9) and standing committees are authorized	Council is large (7-9) and standing committees are authorized	Council is small (5-7) & standing committees not authorized	Council is small (5-7) & charter is usually silent on standing committees	Council is small (5-7) & standing committees not authorized	Council is small (5-7) & standing committees not authorized
33		Council large (7 members or more)		0	0	na			
34		Council is smaller (7 members or less)		na	na	1	1	1	1
35		Standing committees are authorized		0	0	na	0	na	na
36		Standing committees not authorized		na	na	1	na	1	1
		Subtotal		**0**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**2**
L	Tier 2 - 6	STAFF		Mayor and council have staff	Mayor has staff & council may have staff	Mayor and council may have staff	Mayor & council may have staff	Mayor/council do not have staff	Mayor/council do not have staff
37		Mayor has staff		0	0	0	0	na	na
38		Mayor does not have staff		na	na	na	na	1	1
39		Council has staff		0	0	na	0	na	na
40		Council does not have staff		na	na	1	na	1	1
		Subtotal		**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**2**
				0	**3**	**22**	**28**	**37**	**50**

Using the table above to classify each individual city allows the author to depict where an ideal city in each of the six categories will potentially score. The total point count for each city results in scores ranging from zero (for an ideal pure political city) to a score of 50 (for an ideal pure administrative city). Scores for the ideal municipality in each of the six types of cities is observed at the bottom of the chart. An ideal adapted political city scores a 3; an ideal political conciliated city scores a 22; an ideal

administrative conciliated city scores a 28; an ideal adapted administrative city scores a 37; and an ideal pure administrative city scores a perfect 50. Of course, few cities will exactly meet the ideal scores described above, but rather each falls somewhere along the continuum.



Figure 2.1 City Continuum

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This literature review chapter presents a discussion of the research available within the Public Administration field concerning the areas of interest included within this analysis.

Research conducted concerning the relationship between form of local government and municipal per capita expenditures is reviewed. Additionally, the existing literature concerning the management, political, and policy roles of the chief administrative officer of a municipality are also presented. A discussion of the literature concerning the provision and quality of municipal services in relation to form of government is also examined. Finally, literature concerning the involvement levels of the chief administrative officer in relation with his or her municipal council for activities associated with the mission, administrative, policy and management dimensions in their respective municipalities is also reviewed.

Information that is provided in this chapter is meant to enhance the reader's knowledge concerning the relationship that exists between the independent variables put forward in this study and the nine dependent variables analyzed.

Form of Government and Expenditures

Reformers of the early 20th century believe that by changing the institutions of local government and looking to the corporate model for structure, they can replace the dominant

system of political leadership and subgroup representation and bring efficiency and professional management to city services (Adrian, 1988). Searching for evidence of this promised efficiency, several scholars and researchers, over the years, examine the relationship between form of government and the expenditure levels of municipalities. Most of these scholars look to find evidence that reformed municipal government is more efficient. Almost all of the studies utilize some variant of the dichotomous (mayor-council and council-manager) measure of government structure in their analysis. The results of these numerous studies often show mixed or contrary results.

In 1961 Edgar L. Sherbenou (1961) uses data from forty-nine suburban Chicago cities, with populations greater than 5,000, in order to evaluate expenditure, tax, and debt patterns in relation to government institutional structure. Within these forty –nine cities, twenty-four have the council-manager form of government and the remaining twenty-five have a non-council-manager form. When he compares the averages for total per capita expenditures, per capita debt, and municipal property tax per capita he discovers that those cities under the council-manager system of government exhibit higher per capita expenditures and higher per capita property taxes but lower per capita debt. He also notes that the major variable in this pattern is, in his opinion, the greater wealth of the citizens found in many of the suburban communities that have adopted the council-manager plan. Sherbenou asserts that the argument used by council-manager proponents, that the plan tends to develop a public confidence in the in the efficiency of municipal government, is supported by this data. An increase in public confidence leads to demands for the expanding of services and an increase in the willingness to pay (Sherbenou, 1961).

In 1966 Bernard Booms (1966) collects data from seventy-three cities in Ohio and Michigan with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 in order to examine determinates of

public expenditures. Thirty- six of these cities are council-manager form cities and the other thirty-seven are mayor-council form. Using multiple regression analysis Booms looks at the relationship between per capita expenditures and several independent variables, including a dummy variable for form of government. The main conclusion of this study, according to Booms, is that a significant difference exists between the two forms of cities in average per capita expenditures (Booms, 1966), with mayor-council cities exhibiting higher per capita expenditures than council-manager cities. He does concede, however, that the absence of controls for several characteristics found in cities limits the study's findings.

Also in 1966, Samuel Nunn (1966) conducts a study designed to analyze the infrastructure policies and per capita spending on capital facilities for seven council-manager cities in Texas and seven mayor-council cities in Indiana. The populations in these fourteen cities range from a low of 24,000 to a high of 933,000 persons. In addition to Nunn's desire to determine whether different levels of formality and private participation are associated with the policies between the two types of municipalities, he also wants to determine if the capital expenditure patterns between the two types of cities vary significantly. Using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods, Nunn (1966) is able to determine from the data that the policies of the two types of cities do appear to utilize two different approaches in the provision of capital facilities for the public. Policies in council-manager cities are more formalized and contain more specifications involving cost sharing arrangements with private contractors as opposed to the more informal and flexible case by case methods mayor-council communities use. In addition he also finds that the council-manager cities in Texas spent considerable more resources on infrastructure such as water, sewer, and roads per capita than did the mayor-council cities in Indiana (Nunn, 1966) and this is true even when demographic, economic and fiscal differences are controlled.

In 1967, Robert T. Lineberry and Edmund Fowler (1967) look at the impact that policy structures, in both reformed and unreformed cities in America, have on taxation and expenditure levels in these cities. Using a random sample of 200 of the 309 cities in the United States in 1960 with populations greater than 50,000, these scholars examine the effect of a number of social and socio-economic factors on government spending and taxation levels. Their conclusions are (with some exceptions such as expenditures in partisan verses non-partisan cities), reformed cities spend less and tax less than unreformed cities (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967).

In 1971 Richard L. Cole (1971) examines the relationship the variables of region and structure of local government have on the policy outputs, put into operational form such as percentage of civil service employees, per capita expenditures on planning, and per capita urban renewal requests (Cole, 1971). Using data from all United States cities with a population of more than 50,000, Cole creates a calculated reform variable based upon a city's adopted form of government, manner of election, and its manner of districting council seats. His analysis indicates that political structure, when used alone, proves an "inadequate predictor" of urban policy (Cole, 1971, p.651). For the three dependent variables he looks at, only the per capita spending on planning is found to be significant. Cole concludes that these results have broad implications for those attempting to base a model of urban politics upon a single phenomenon such as structure. Any such model, "must account for a variety of socioeconomic cleavages as well as a variety of political variables" (Cole, 1971, p.655).

In 1974 Roland J. Liebert (1974) takes issue with the earlier findings of Lineberry and Fowler (1967) concerning municipal expenditures and their relationship to reformed or unreformed structures. Using data captured from a survey of 676 United States cites with a population of more than 25,000, Liebert argues that prior studies discount the effects of functional responsibility on expenditure levels. Municipal spending levels are determined, he argues, more

by the responsibility of a city to perform a function than by the level of community policy commitments (Liebert, 1974). For example, he points out the fact that in the vast majority of cities that he surveyed (516 out of the 676) responsibility for the education function rests with some other governmental entity. Likewise, in 511 of the 676 cites, the responsibility for the three major welfare programs for 1965 are either not assumed by or delegated to the municipalities. When the data from the earlier Lineberry and Fowler study is reevaluated to include a control for functional inclusiveness Liebert finds only mixed results (Liebert, 1974). Findings indicate that while one-third of unreformed cities tend to show more responsiveness to minority interest via higher expenditure levels, reformed cities show only slight responsiveness to middle class concerns and their predisposition for lower expenditures. Liebert concludes that any evaluation of structure and expenditures in municipalities must also include controls for functional inclusiveness (Liebert, 1974).

Building upon Liebert's (1974) ideas concerning functional responsibility, Thomas Dye and John Garcia (1978), in 1978, examine 243 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) along with 340 suburban municipalities with more than 10,000 in populations that surrounded those SMSA's. Their analysis finds that municipalities that they call 'functionally comprehensive' cities (those responsible for the functions of education, welfare, and hospitals) show higher per capita tax revenues, higher per capital general revenues, and higher per capita intergovernmental revenues compared to those that did not provide these functions (what they termed 'functionally specialized' cities) (Dye & Garcia, 1978). In fact, when functional responsibility is controlled by using the simple measure of 'total number of functions', it explains 42% of the variation in per capita expenditures and 40% of the variation in per capita taxes in the central cities examined (p.112). They did not find any evidence that increasing functional responsibility in cities adversely affects spending levels for other common municipal functions

such as per capita police expenditures. They conclude that "Functional responsibility explains more of the variance in overall taxing and spending levels than any socioeconomic variable" (Dye & Garcia, 1978, p. 119).

Using as his dependent variable city general expenditures less outside aid, William Lyons (1978) analyzes 285 cities in the United States with a population of at least 50,000 by creating regression equations for expenditures in the years 1960, and 1970 and also for the change in expenditures that occur from 1960 – 1970. Anticipating that reformed cities exhibit a greater response rate to environmental demands for decreased spending and that unreformed cities respond more to demands for increased spending, he uses multiple regressions on both sets of cities to test his hypotheses. To indicate the conditions likely to increase the demand for service levels Lyons controls for population size, percent nonwhite, median age, percent population increase, percent homeowner occupied, and per capital income (Lyons, 1978). He also controls for whether or not the city is responsible for providing the education function. Lyons' analysis appears to confirm his hypotheses. He concludes that policy variations are likely significantly related to whether a city is structured as reformed or unreformed. "Reformed cities respond more pronouncedly to those pressures that tend to reduce spending; unreformed cities respond more to those pressures that increase spending" (Lyons, 1978, p. 130).

In 1980 David Morgan and John Pelissero (1980) examine the impact that structural reform in cities has on taxation and spending levels. They perform an interrupted time series analysis on eleven cities in the United States with populations of more than 25,000 that have significantly changed their political structure in the years between 1948 and 1973. They then compare these findings to eleven matched control cities that have made no structural changes in the same time period. They conclude from this analysis that government structural changes have almost no impact on changes to either taxing levels or spending levels (Morgan & Pelissero,

1980). To them the evidence suggests that structural reform changes have little effect, long-term, on fiscal decisions.

In the same year of 1980, Kenneth Meier (1980) presents research that seeks to examine the prevalent belief that the structural reorganization of executive agencies results in the reduction of employment and expenditures within those agencies that are reorganized. Using a longitudinal design, Meier analyzes data from 16 states that have undergone major reorganizations between 1965 and 1975 and compares those states employment and expenditures levels with 16 states that have not undergone such reorganizations. According to Meier, the effects of reorganization on either employment levels or expenditure levels prove not statistically significant (Meier, 1980). He concludes that history is a much more likely explanation for reductions in these two variables in states during this time period than reorganization efforts.

In a 1986 study, Naomi Wish (1986) is interested in assessing the relationship between city structure and expenditures and the effects that expenditures have on quality of life measurements. She uses data obtained from the 65 largest MSAs in the United States to examine this relationship. Expenditure levels found do appear to confirm the previous findings of Lineberry and Fowler, mayor-council governments do indeed outspend council-manager governments in the examined population (Wish, 1986). She also discovers that the MSAs with council-manager governments are also more likely to have a better quality of life score. When the relationship between structure and region is examined, however, she finds that cities in the northwest are characterized by mayor-council structures and these cities represent almost half of the data sample within the analysis. In the end she concludes that regional and geographical variations contribute more to the variations observed in the city data than form of government (Wish, 1986).

In 1986 Paul Farnham (1986) returns to the examination of variation in the number and effect of functions on local government expenditures using a more varied data set than is used in previous research. Farnham looks at data from the 2,500 communities in the United States listed in the 1975 Census Bureau's estimates as having a population of 10,000 residents or more. He assesses the relationship that exists between a city's population, geographical region, and the 12 common municipal functions (Farnham, 1986). He finds that, in general, the larger the city's population the more functions that city performs; most of the cities in the study did not provide the education, welfare, hospital, housing, or urban renewal functions. He concludes that his analysis reaffirms the position that controlling for functional variation among local governments is needed when analyzing expenditures of those communities (Farnham, 1986). He also concludes that the impact of functional variation differs among the central, suburban, and independent cities examined in his dataset (Farnham, 1986).

Kevin Deno and Stephen Mehay (1987) utilize the median voter behavior framework to reexamine the same 73 cities that Booms originally reports on in 1966. When reexamining Booms' original data using this new framework, they find that Booms' original conclusion, that council-manager governments have lower expenditure levels than mayor-council cities, cannot be substantiated (Deno & Mehay, 1987). In addition to analyzing Booms' original data, Deon and Mehay also analyze a national sample of 148 municipalities in order to examine the effects that government structure have on wage and compensation levels (Deno & Mehay, 1987). They find that wages and compensation levels do differ significantly between the two forms of government, with mayor-council cities maintaining these costs lower than their council-manager counterparts. They do discover, however, that when fringe benefits are included in the equation, there is no statistical difference between the two types of cities (Deno & Mehay, 1987). They conclude, "...it does not appear that simply appointing a professional manager either mutes the

forces of electoral politics or provides incentives for efficiency...If matters were so simple, the urban fiscal crisis could have been solved long ago" (Deno & Mehay, 1987, p.639).

Using 1987 expenditure data from all United States cities with populations at or above 25,000, David Morgan and Sheilah Watson (1995) examine how per capita direct municipal spending (less intergovernmental revenue) is affected by mayoral power. The uses the sum of 12 items included in a 1987 ICMA survey of municipal chief executives to measure formal and informal powers possessed by a municipality's mayor (Morgan & Watson, 1995). Performing the analysis using linear regression, the authors control for population, percent of residents over age 65, percentage of homeowners, percent of residents with a high school education, population change, functional scope, and mayoral power. Regression analysis shows that mayoral power does not significantly influence per capita expenditures in either mayor-council or council-manager communities (Morgan & Watson, 1995). They determine that intergovernmental revenue, level of education, homeownership, and percentage of elderly population, do however, have an influence on per capita expenditures.

In the results of a study published in an article in 1998 by Theodore Stumm and Matthew Corrigan (1998), a sample of 149 cities with populations over 10,000 is analyzed to determine if two measures of efficiency, property tax rates and the general fund expenditures of a community, are significantly different in cities with or without professional managers. The results of their analysis indicate that cities with professional managers, on average, do have lower property tax rates than those cities without professional managers (Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). In addition, results also indicate that the presence of a professional manager in a community is apparently helps ensure that general fund expenditures are substantially lower than they are in cities without a professional manager (Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).

Rebecca J. Campbell and Geoffrey K. Trunbull (2003), in a 2003 article, suggest that other studies have, "ignored the broader view of local government structure beyond the question of management expertise" (Campbell & Trunbull, 2003, p.23). These authors suggest that the unified government found in the council-manager plan verses the separation of powers structure found in the mayor-council plan might lead to differences in spending levels. There intent is to examine how separation of legislative and executive powers affects government spending. They collect data from all cities with a population of 10,000 or greater in MSA's located in the Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, and West regions of the United States for the years 1982 and 1992. They also gather data from all of the counties located in the same areas during the same time period. Their final data set contains information from 347 municipalities and 356 counties (Campbell & Trunbull, 2003). Results of the analysis find an inconsistency between findings for the city and the county governments. The data indicate no difference in spending between city governments regardless of government form or whether a professional manager or elected chief administrative officer is present. However, while the city data indicate no difference between the spending levels of a separation of executive-legislative powers form and a unified executive-legislative structure, data does show that those county governments that adopt a structure that separate executive and legislative powers tend to spend more than those that operate under a unified executive-legislative structure (Campbell & Trunbull, 2003).

In a 2004 study of municipalities in the United States with populations between 2,500 and 25,000, French (2004) uses data gathered from 559 municipalities and analyzes it to help determine whether council-manager cities exhibit different spending levels than non-council-manager cities. Per capita expenditures are defined as municipal budgeted expenditures less expenditures for education. French controls for many of the socio-economic variables previously associated with municipal expenditure levels such as region, urban-rural status, population

change, median household income, and number of services provided by the municipality (French, 2004). Using an Independent Samples T Test and multiple regression analysis, French shows that a significant difference is detected in the per capita expenditures between the municipalities with the council-manager form of government and those with non-council-manager government structures (French, 2004). He does go on to caution, however, that, "per capita expenditures may not provide an appropriate measure of efficiency and / or effectiveness in local government" (French, 2004, p.206).

In a 2006 research article, Changhoon Jung (2006) examines data from 504 United States cities with populations over 50,000 for the period 1980 -2000 using a pooled cross-sectional time-series research design. Jung examines the expenditure levels for six common municipal functions; police, fire, interest on municipal debt, along with non-capital expenditures on highways, sanitation, and public health (Jung, 2006). Jung concludes from his analysis that the per capita spending levels in reformed and unreformed municipal cities does not significantly differ. He does, however, find that in some specific functions (police for example) per capita spending in council-manager cities is significantly less than in those municipalities that do not utilize the council-manager form of government (Jung, 2006). Jung suggests that further detailed studies be performed considering other variables, including variables capturing the newer hybrid city structures (Jung, 2006).

In 2008 Lynn MacDonald (2008) collects data on over 3000 cities in the United States between the years 1980 and 2002 from a variety of sources. He wants to analyze how three components of municipal government namely form of government, size of the city council, and the election method of councilors, affects municipal expenditure levels (MacDonald, 2008). MacDonald defines city expenditures as the direct general city expenditures less any education and intergovernmental grants. He uses a sophisticated time-series model to look at the cross-

sectional estimates for cities between the years 1980 and 2002, controlling for a number of explanatory variables. MacDonald's analysis finds no significant difference in expenditures for any of the three components he examines (MacDonald, 2008).

Stephen Coate and Brian Knight (2009) examine the relationship of local government form and public spending in a Working Paper prepared for the *National Bureau of Economic Research* in 2009. Using econometric models, Coate and Knight analyze data based upon a large sample of cities covering the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. They use both a panel analysis and a cross sectional analysis to examine this data (Coate & Knight, 2009). Based upon the acceptance of various assumptions put forward (Coate & Knight, 2009), they interpret the data as demonstrating that spending in mayor-council form cities is lower relative to spending in council-manager governments.

Up to this point, all of the studies examined utilize a dichotomous classification of municipal governments (reformed verses unreformed; mayor-council verses council-manager; council-manager verses non-council-manager). A 2010 research article by Jered B. Carr and Shanthi Karuppusamy (2010) is the first found that looks at expenditures in cities using a more elaborate classification method. Carr and Karuppusamy look at the per capita expenditures of the general fund for 263 cities in the state of Michigan for the year 1999 using several different classification systems. In addition to the classical mayor-council or council-manager classification system, these authors utilize categories proposed by DeSantis and Renner (2002), the three types of cities put forward by Frederickson et al. (Frederickson and Johnson, 2001; Frederickson et. al., 2004a), and a hybrid of the adapted cities framework developed by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008). Using OLS regression, these authors estimate the effects of the various structures on per capita expenditures. Their analysis provides no evidence that, in any of the

systems of classification examined, structures of local government are significantly related to per capita expenditures (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).

Reformers thought that through encouraging adoption of the corporate model in local government they could bring efficiency to city services (Adrian, 1988). Many researchers have attempted to use expenditure levels in cities as a proxy to measure this efficiency gain. The link between the form of government that a municipality operates under and the expenditure level within that municipality is not clearly shown from the available literature. Some have tended to confirm the idea that reformed (council-manager) municipalities spend less than their non-reformed (mayor-council) counterparts (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006). Other scholars find the exact opposite; that council-manager form cities spend more (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate & Knight, 2009). For most of the research, however, little evidence is found to link form of government and expenditures; rather, other socio-economic variables such as functional responsibility, region, population size, metropolitan status, etc. are more closely linked to municipal spending (Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980; Wish, 1986; Farnham, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull, 2003; Jung, 2006; MacDonald, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).

Almost all of the studies in the existing literature utilize some variant of the dichotomous (mayor-council and council-manager) measure of government structure in their analysis of municipal expenditures (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006; Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate & Knight, 2009; Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980; Wish, 1986; Farnham, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull, 2003; Jung, 2006; MacDonald, 2008). Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) use multiple structural

classification systems for local governments but limit their study to only municipalities in the state of Michigan.

The author of this study anticipates that as the form of a municipality's institutional structure changes, the per capita expenditure levels in that municipality will also change. Hypothesis one is developed to test the idea that the institutional administrative structures in a municipality make a difference in the level of municipal spending. Multiple classification systems for each municipality are utilized and compared to net general fund per capita expenditure levels. Net general fund per capita expenditures is calculated using each municipality's adopted general fund budget, deducting any funding designated for educational purposes, and then dividing that amount by the municipality's population.

> Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be different depending on how the municipality's institutional form is classified.

Form of Government and CAO Time Allocation

Research that examines how city administrators allocate their work time is also an area of interest for many scholars over the past fifty years. Much of the interest in time allocation stems from the complexity of roles scholars discover in the position of the city manager in local governments.

In a 1958 article published under the title "The Manager Is a Politician", written for a special symposium issue of *Public Administration Review,* Karl Bosworth (1958) writes how managers with different "styles" still take political roles. Almost all managers, even those that adopt 'The Administrator Manager' (Bosworth, 1958, p.217) style that emphasizes internal administration functions to the exclusion of any policy

initiatives, have to make up and present a budget to the council. It is in this role of budgeter, if not in any other, that he is political. "Even if a manager has had budgetary guidance from the council, he cannot ordinarily escape some public responsibility for his proposed budget" (p. 217). By proposing a firm budget the manager implies some 'needs' and 'wants', "the essence of politics" (Bosworth, 1958, p. 217). Such a finding implies a role for city administrators beyond that of a simple internal administrator and invites an inquiry into how those administrators allocate their time between different roles.

Deil S. Wright (1969) posits that the behavior of city managers is characterized by the use of three analytically distinct role categories; namely, the roles that city managers take in the realms of managerial, policy, and political activities. Wright uses data in his analysis that he collects from a survey of forty-five of the fifty-five cities in the United States with populations greater than 100,000 at the time. Wright asks each city manager to rank the roles of managerial, policy, and political in terms of the amount of time spent on each. In addition, each city manager is also asked to rank his personal preference among the roles and the extent to which he feels each contributes to successful performance (Wright, 1969). Wright finds that a majority of city managers say that they spent the majority of their time acting in a managerial role (60% rated this as first among the three activities in time allocation). However, only 46% of managers rank this role first in their personal preference choice and only 37% rank the managerial role first in contributing to successful performance. One-third say that the political role ranks first in contributing to successful performance and 22% say that the policy role ranks first in this category. Wright concludes that these results show that the city manager is "more than a

politician" (Wright, 1969, p. 241). A city manager's total role is actually an amalgamation of the three distinct roles of administration, policy, and political activities.

In a 1977 article, Frank Aleshire and Fran Aleshire (1977) write about how city managers now have to play a new 'game' that has different rules than the 'old game' in the 1950s. The changing environment of local government finds an interaction of federal, state, and local governments. This interaction changes how city managers spend their time (Aleshire & Aleshire, 1977). It is their estimate that managers of the day spend about 30 percent of their time either with the city council or on council related activities, another 30 percent on internal management issues, 10 percent on public relations, and (representing the biggest shift in the manager's role under the new rules) a full 30 percent on intergovernmental relations. It is their contention that, to succeed, managers must recognize the new roles required to meet their changing environment (Aleshire & Aleshire, 1977).

Other authors also write about how the city manager of the day allocates his or her time. Donald A. Blubaugh (1987) (a city manager in Hayward, California at the time) writes about the changes that have taken place in the time allocation of city managers. Historically, Blubaugh writes, 70 percent of a managers time is devoted to the internal affairs of a city and 30 percent to working directly with the council and other governmental agencies (Blubaugh, 1987). Now, he concludes, 70 percent of the time of an urban city manager is spent, "developing local policy, encouraging cooperation among policymakers, and coordinating efforts with other governmental jurisdictions" (Blubaugh, 1987, p. 9). Similarly, in a 1989 article, Martha L. Hale (1989) uses data from a study based on structured observations of five city managers in Los Angeles County to examine how city managers use their time. Hale places the primary roles of the city manager in the

categories of Brokers, Information Agents, and Administrative. The role of Brokers take the largest segment of the managers' time, that of information agent second, and, surprisingly, administrative the least (Hale, 1989).

In 1985 Charldean Newell and David Ammons (1987) perform a survey of 418 municipalities in the United States with a 1980 population greater than 50,000. The 527 responses that they receive from the chief executive officers and their principle assistants from these cities provides data that allows them to analyze how these executives spent their working time, along with how they would prefer to spend it. Newell and Ammons classify all of the respondents as city managers, mayors, assistant city managers, or mayoral assistants. They question these individuals regarding the actual amount of time that they devote to the policy, administrative, and political roles of their position (Newell & Ammons, 1987). Mayors and their assistants in non-council-manager cities appear to spend more hours per week at work than do city managers and their assistants. Analysis of how these executives actually allocate their time shows that while all four groups spent a large portion of their time in the management role of their jobs, there are some significant differences between them. City managers spent more than half of their time (51%) on management activities while mayors spent slightly less on the management role (44%). In addition, while mayors spent about 26% of their time on policy role activities, city managers spent almost 32% of their time on policy activities (Newell & Ammons, 1987). Not surprisingly, there is a significant difference in the amount of time spent on political activities between city managers and mayors. Mayors spent 30% of their time on these political activities compared to only 17% for city managers. For all four groups, it appears that these executives are in general satisfied with how they allocate their work

time, with only modest differences overall between actual and preferred time allocations (Newell & Ammons, 1987).

When Newell and Ammons examine the data closely looking for variables that could help explain the variations seen between the three roles of policy, administrative, and political, they make several discoveries. Officials in smaller cities, those executives that are older in age and city managers in general are likely to devote a greater percentage of their time to the management role (Newell & Ammons, 1987). Those executives with a graduate degree in Public Administration are likely to spend a smaller amount of their time in the management role than those without such a degree. They discover three variables that are significant in helping to explain the time devoted to the policy role. Those that are city managers, are younger in age and those who serve in larger population communities are more likely to devote a greater percentage of their time to the policy role (Newell & Ammons, 1987). Two variables, being a mayor and holding an MPA degree, explain those who are likely to devote more time to the political role in the community in which they serve. Newell and Ammons conclude that, "The classical theorists of council-manager government were correct in their assumption that form does make a difference" (Newell & Ammons, 1987, p.250). They go on to say, "...form of government does influence the activities and role emphases of key officials" (p.250).

In a 1995 article by Charldean Newell, James J. Glass, and David N. Ammons (1995), the authors take data from the same 1985 survey just mentioned above (Newell & Ammons, 1987) but use only data obtained from council-manager cities and city managers (153 city managers). They supplement this information with a second survey, which includes structural characteristics question, sent to the same cities in 1988. They receive 140 usable responses from these cities. When they examine the structural

characteristics of reporting cities they find that the presence of many unreformed characteristics, such as the direct election of the mayor, is the rule rather than the exception (Newell, Glass, & Ammons, 1995). Many mayors (42%) in those respondent council-manager cities over 100, 000 populations have an independent staff and 81% of mayors and 76% of council in all of these 50,000 plus population cities receive a salary. When looking at variations concerning the management, policy, and political roles in city managers working in these cities, the researchers find some interesting facts. For example, if a mayor and council members receive compensation for the services that they perform, city managers are more likely to list the management role as the most important of the three (Newell et al., 1995). Similarly, if staff assistance is provided to the mayor or council, then the city manager is likely to perceive the policy role as the most important. Interestingly, if the council is made up of a higher percentage of women or minorities, the city manager devotes a higher percentage of his or her time to the policy and political roles on the job. The authors conclude that the changing environment of cities has changed the role emphasis for city managers. The 'professionalization' of elected officials, perhaps allowing the mayor and council to take a more active role in policy issues, permits the manager to concentrate more on the management role. The diversification of city councils by the inclusion of more women and minorities causes a more politicized council today than in the past (Newell et.al., 1995). This change results in city managers spending more time on the policy role, less time on the political role, and about the same on the management role.

P. Edward French and David H. Folz (2004) use data from 502 respondent cities ,collected from a random survey of 1,000 municipalities with a population from 2,500 to 24,500, to examine how the chief executive officers of these cities divide their working

time between the policy and management roles (French & Foltz, 2004). Results from this data are then compared to the 1985 data analyzed in the Newell and Ammons study discussed earlier. They find that the small city executives that they examine are very similar to those respondents of the earlier study from larger cities. Both groups spent the bulk of their time on management role related activities (French & Folz, 2004). They did, however, discover that small town city managers spent a substantially larger percentage of their time (56%) on management activities compared to the larger city managers surveyed in 1985 (51%). The size of a city did not appear to affect the proportion of time that city chief executive officers spent on policy role activities; both large and small city managers spent about the same percentage of time (31% -32%) on these policy role activities. These authors conclude that many of the difference between the mayor and manager's time allocations noted in larger cities, is confirmed to also exist in smaller communities (French & Folz, 2004).

In 2009, Jerri Killian and Enamul Choudhury (2010) conduct an email survey of 1,960 appointed city managers and chief administrative officers in cities with a population of at least 10,000 for which they could locate email addresses. Their survey solicits 427 responses from the 1,960 requests, with all but a handful coming from those cities with a population under 250,000 (Killian & Choudhury, 2010). Among the data that they solicit from these administrators is information concerning the use of their working time. The find that the mean working week for these administrators is 57.4 hours, very close to the 56.5 hours that Ammons and Newell find in their 1985 study (Newell & Ammons, 1987). When these administrators report on how they actually used their working time and on how they would prefer to use their working time, Killian and Choudhury find some similarities and some differences compared to the results in the

Newell and Ammons earlier study. Regarding time spent by administrators in the management role, data indicate that administrators in 2009 actually allocate most of their time to the management role. More than half (66%) of the respondents said that they spent 50% to 100% of their time on management role activities (Killian & Choudhury, 2010), however, only 59% indicted that they would spend this same amount of time of these activities if given a choice. When looking at policy role activities, 63% of those responding indicate that they actually spent between 25% and 50% of working time on this role; 59% say that they would spend an equal amount of time on the policy role if given a preference. Finally, the political role receives the lowest time allocation from those responding to the survey. About three-quarters of respondents indicate that they spent between 0% and 25% of their time on the political role; however, if given the choice, the percentage drops to 58%. This indicates that these administrators prefer to spend more time on political role activities than they are currently (Killian & Choudhury, 2010). These researchers point out that this desire to spend more time on political role activities is a "significant departure" (p.17) from the earlier study's findings that administrators are, in general, satisfied with their actual time allocation. They conclude that ,"...contemporary city managers seem to have a strong desire to spend more time in the community relations arena and to assume a more active political role" (Killian & Choudhury, 2010, p. 18).

The existing literature on form of government and its relation to the allocation of working time by the CAO of a municipality shows that CAOs do allocate the time that they spend on the job between various roles and activities associated with these different roles. The three roles originally put forward by Wright (1969), namely the roles of management, policy, and political, still seem to explain the primary activities that

contemporary chief administrative officers perform; although CAO roles have been looked at using different perspectives (Aleshire & Aleshire, 1977; Blubaugh, 1987; and Hale, 1989). Most of these studies find that most administrators spend a great deal more of their time on those activities that are related to the management role (Newell & Ammons, 1987; Newell, Glass, & Ammons, 1995; French & Folz, 2004; and Killian & Choudhury, 2010), less on policy role activities, and the smallest proportion on political role activities.

In this study the author intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the time allocations by chief administrative officers in the different forms of government and how they allocate their time between the administrative, policy, and political role activities. Previous studies have primarily focused on the differences between the mayor-council and council-manager forms of government. For this study, the intent is to expand the current literature discussion on time allocation by CAOs, by examining time allocations using additional typologies for classifying municipalities. It is proposed that as the institutional structural features of municipalities are altered between more reformed and less reformed characteristics, the allocation of working time for CAOs between the administrative, policy, and political roles will change as well.

Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management activities will change.

Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to political activities will change.

Form of Government and Provision of Public Services

Research by Public Administrative scholars has also looked at the provision of public services in local government and the relationship service provision has with form of government. If there is a difference in how responsive the mayor-council form municipality is in comparison to more reformed cities then that should be reflected in the provision and quality of public services provided.

In 1978, Thomas R. Dye and John A. Garcia (1978) conducted a study of 243 central cities and 340 suburban cities with populations above 10,000. In their study they examine twelve municipal functions (education, welfare, housing, libraries, health, police, fire, streets, sewerage, sanitation, and parks). They sought to describe the variations in functional responsibilities between cities as well as observe some of the regional, structural, and demographic correlates of those variations (Dye & Garcia, 1978). What they discover is that much of the difference in functional responsibility of cities can be assigned to the regional, structural, and demographic variations between the cities they examine. Dye and Garcia (1978) find that central cities have a greater tendency to be providers of a more comprehensive list of services than their suburban counterparts, which tend to be more specialized in the services they provide. For example, few suburban municipalities provide education, welfare, or hospital services but almost one-third of central cities in the United States provide these services. Of the twelve services they examine, central cities average providing 9.77 while suburb cities

only average providing 7.89. Region is also found to play a pronounced role in the number and type of services cities provide. Dye and Garcia (1978) discover that in some service areas this difference is very pronounced, especially when comparing the Northeast and West regions of the country. Almost three-quarters of Northeastern cities (73.6%) have responsibility for providing education services while only 12.1% of western region cities are responsible for this service. The same is true for welfare services (64.2% compared to 14.6% in the west) and for hospitals (43.4% in the northeast compared to 17.1% of cities in the west). The level of services that the other two regions of the country provide (south and Midwest) fall somewhere between these two extremes (Dye & Garcia, 1978).

Differences in service provision levels are also found when these authors look at reformed verses unreformed governmental structures (Dye & Garcia, 1978). They note that reformed cities with managers are usually more specialized in the service areas they provide. Reformed cities with managers are usually more capable of handling the problems found in common areas such as streets, sewage, parks, etc. Unreformed municipalities, on the other hand, can better handle service problems in the areas where they find increased responsibility; such as education, welfare, and health services (Dye & Garcia, 1978).

In a 1979 article authored by Heywood T. Sanders (1979), the relationship between the form of government in a municipality and the quality performance of the services it provides are explored. Sanders (1979) looks at data from 838 cities in the United States with a population of greater than 25,000 and examines the bond ratings and fire insurance ratings of these cities in order to assess governmental performance. Based upon his analysis, Sanders (1979) concludes that the form of government that a

municipality operates under plays only a very limited role in the performance quality within these two areas. The bond rating of a municipality exhibits only a very limited relationship with the form of government that a community operates under. He determines that a city's size, age, and the region it is located in are more important factors than form of government in determining service performance quality (Sanders, 1979). Sanders also finds that the most important factors in determining the fire ratings given to municipalities are population size and region, not form of government. In reviewing 1978 ICMA survey data for the police and fire services, Sanders (1979) does note the fact that employment numbers for these two service departments are slightly higher for unreformed cities verses reformed cities, however, he attributes much of this difference to metropolitan status, region, population, and ethnicity. Sanders' conclusion is that it is the population, character, and location of a city rather than its form of government, that most affects the provision of public services (Sanders, 1979).

Speaking about differences found between reformed and unreformed municipalities, Glen Abney and Thomas Lauth (1986) talk about different methods of control they perceive to be used within the two types of cities. In order to accomplish their objectives, appointed officials in reformed cities appear to exhibit a style of control based upon rational criteria. The elected officials of unreformed cities appear to rely on control through the manipulation of department heads (Abney & Lauth, 1986). Department heads found in reformed (council-manager) cities have a different perception of city managers in their city than department head do in unreformed cities. City managers are perceived to place more emphasis on equity, efficiency, and effectiveness concerning service provision than administrators in unreformed cities (Abney & Lauth, 1986). Department heads perceive elected officials as emphasizing maintenance and

expansion of services more than city managers as well. Council members, they note, that serve in reformed cities, are less likely than their unreformed counterparts to intervene with government functions on behalf of citizens and they also make fewer requests to administrators on behalf of their constituents (Abney & Lauth, 1986).

In a 1988 article, Irene S. Rubin (1988) examines some of the political and budgetary implications the use of enterprise funds have in Illinois municipalities. Enterprise funds are distinguished from other funds in cities by the fact that they derive all or some of their financial support from fees or other revenue directly gained from the service that they provide (Rubin, 1988). In her study Rubin analyzes data from survey responses of 133 cities in Illinois with populations between 5,000 and 130,000. Some twelve different enterprise funds are reported as being utilized by these cities; most reporting cities, however, only utilize one or two enterprise funds (85 out of the 133). The most common uses of enterprise funds are for water services (88%), parking services (34.6%), and wastewater (24.8%) (Rubin, 1988). On average, these cities receive 21% of their total revenue from these enterprise funds. Rubin (1988) examines several hypotheses relating to the relative use of enterprise funds in these cities including whether a municipality operates under a reform or unreformed government form. Two hypotheses may be drawn when reformism is used to explain the use of enterprise funds in cities, according to Rubin (1988). First, theoretically, enterprise funds may be in use to protect the municipal services performed within them from political tradeoffs and, therefore, reformed cities are more likely to use these types of service delivery systems. Secondly, on the other hand, enterprise funds may be intended as a way of protecting patronage in certain areas by reducing accountability and removing services from budgetary implications (Rubin, 1988). Analysis of the data shows that cities that

contained more reformed government are more likely to use enterprise funds to provide certain services than are cities with unreformed governments (Rubin, 1988). The question of why this occurs is left unanswered by the author. The author suggests that the technical expertise required to establish such enterprise funds is more likely to be found in more-reformed cities with professional management. Similarly, cities with an atmosphere of scandal and mistrust are more likely to adopt a more-reformed institutional structure and budgets in these cities may become structured to minimize the financial discretion of mayors or managers through the use of enterprise funds (Rubin, 1988).

In 1990, Kathy Hayes and Semoon Chang (1990) examine data from 191 cities with a population greater than 10,000 in order to determine whether those under the council-manager form are any more efficient than those under the mayor-council plan. To test this idea they calculate efficiency measures for three municipal services, refuse collection, police protection, and fire protection (Hayes & Chang, 1990). Using economic modeling techniques, these authors find that no difference in efficiency measures is found between the council-manager form of government and the mayor-council form. They did find that larger mayor-council cities are more efficient than smaller mayor-council cities but no such difference exists between larger and smaller council-manager municipalities (Hayes & Chang, 1990). In the end they conclude that what form a city adopts does not provide a significant indicator of how efficient that city operates in the three areas examined (Hayes & Chang, 1990).

More recently, Alejandro Rodriguez (2007) also tests the proposition that reformed government is more cost-efficient in service delivery than unreformed government. Rodriguez analyzes 67 counties in Florida using a mixed method of analysis including surveys, secondary archives, and personal interviews. The study looks

at two measures of service output, namely, county road pavement conditions, and per capita county expenditures on road maintenance and improvement, to see if reformed government positively relates to cost-efficient service delivery (Rodriguez, 2007). Rodriguez's analysis finds that those counties with more reformed government did indeed show lower expenditures in road maintenance and improvement but also have better road pavement conditions (Rodriguez, 2007). He concludes that, "These findings are congruent with the reformed tradition theory that reformed governments are more cost-efficient than unreformed governments – in this case, better roads at a lower cost" (Rodriguez, 2007, p. 987).

This review of the literature shows that studies examining the relationship between form of government and provision of public services have produced conflicting results. On the one hand, some studies show the existence of a relationship between government form and service performance or outputs (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1979; Abney & Lauth, 1986; Rodriguez, 2007). On the other hand, other research notes that differences between the two forms of government are more related to geographical location, population size, or other characteristics of the municipality (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1979; Hayes & Chang, 1990). All of these studies, however, utilize the dichotomous variable of reformed (council-manager) verses unreformed (mayor-council) form when conducting their analysis.

In this study the author intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the quality of services in municipalities between the different forms of government. Previous studies primarily focus on the differences between the mayor-council and council-manager forms of government. For this study, the intent is to expand the current literature and examine how that a municipality's quality of service is perceived by the

person most directly in charge of delivering that service, the CAO. This is accomplished by examining this variable using additional typologies for classifying municipal government form. It is proposed that as the institutional structural features of municipalities are altered between more reformed and less reformed characteristics, the perception of the quality of service, as observed by the CAO of that municipality, will change as well.

> Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes the perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services offered within their municipality will change.

Division of Responsibilities and form of Government

The idea of the politics-administration dichotomy in public administration is one of the enduring theoretical constructs (Svara, 1998). In local government this theoretical model holds that; 1) "the city council does not get involved in administration"; and 2) "the city manager has no involvement in shaping policies" (Svara, 1998, p. 51). Several authors look at the history of the traditional dichotomy model and question its presence at the beginning of the field of Public Administration. Rosenbloom (2008) states that it is quite clear that originally the dichotomy is put in place to separate partisan politics from the daily administration of programs. It is his assertion that the meaning of the dichotomy is expanded during the period between 1926 through 1937 to include the more general orthodox meaning of politics that includes public policies. Rosenbloom concludes that this is deliberately done primarily because researchers of the day did not want to offend funders and supporters who are looking to emphasize the non-political nature of their work and are afraid of looking like they are manipulators (Rosenbloom, 2008). Lynn

(2001) takes the viewpoint that the traditional bureaucratic paradigm existing before the 1940's is the victim of revisionist history. His review of the literature finds no hard line stand by earlier writers that lead to the complete separation of politics and policy from administration. James Svara (1999a) joins in with Lynn's analysis and in fact goes on to say that Wallace Sayre (1958), in an attempt to basically set up a straw man, deliberately hardens the ideas of early writers concerning the dichotomy. Empirical evidence has time and time again shown this strict interpretation of the dichotomy in local government to be untrue. Researchers over the years, concentrate repeatedly on the supposed distinction between policy and administration found in the orthodox dichotomy model.

In a 1958 article by Karl Bosworth (1958), he states openly in his title, "The Manager is a Politician". The manager, if in no other area of operation (Bosworth writes), makes up the budget and therefore is in the political arena. The manager also functions in the role of policy researcher (Bosworth, 1958) and as such uses his or her knowledge of municipal affairs and other information to advise the council on the ramifications of their proposals. The manager likewise operates as a community leader (Bosworth, 1958). Managers help to settle public problems and study informal power structures of their communities so that can use these channels to achieve their goals. Bosworth concludes by writing how one should think about city managers, "...let us think of them as officers of general administrative direction *and* political leadership, for that is what they are" (Bosworth, 1958, p. 222).

Robert Loveridge (1968) analyzes data from 59 managers and 338 members of city councils located in the San Francisco Bay region in order to examine the policy role conceptions that each possesses. Loveridge wants to examine how city managers defined their policy role, what expectations council members have for the manager's policy role,

and examine any conflict between the two (Loveridge, 1968). He discovers that a full 75% of city managers reject the classic dichotomy model that places managers only in administrative responsibilities. How the city manager personally perceives his own role in policy activities, coupled with the expectations the council members possess concerning the appropriate level of manager activity in these areas, comprise the two important factors in defining the manager's role in policy activities (Loveridge, 1968). Eighty-eight percent of city managers view themselves as policy innovators and 81% see themselves as policy advocates. A substantial percentage of these managers (40%) say that they should even encourage potential candidates to run for city office (Loveridge, 1968). The view of the council members is, however, distinctively different from those of the managers in the survey. Loveridge (1968) finds that, in general, council members seem to view the manager more as a staff administrator rather than as a political executive. Council members also have a strong consensus on the idea of the traditional dichotomy relationship. In general, council members view the manager as the administrator and themselves as the policy makers (Loveridge, 1968). They see the manager in a role defined as administrative. The manager is seen as a council advisor not a policy innovator; a source of information and not a policy or political leader. Such opposite views of the role of the city manager can lead to conflict between the manager and council and in a large majority of city managers the study did identify this as one of their major sources of problems (Loveridge, 1968). Loveridge (1968) concludes that managers resolve this dilemma one of two ways. Firstly, the manager either camouflages his activities in these controversial areas (or confines his activities to behind the scenes work); or secondly, the manager only gets involved in the relatively safe policy areas and stays out of controversial areas (Loveridge, 1968).

David N. Ammons and Charldean Newell (1988) write , "The fact is, the politics vs. administration dichotomy presumed to be established through the council-manager plan has proven to be far less absolute than at least some of the reformers had originally thought" (p. 14). Data from 226 chief executives of cities in the United States with a population over 50,000, indicate that there is, in reality, a mixing of roles between the mayors and managers of these communities. Mayors that act as CEO's in their cities do manage and city managers do indeed act in policy and political roles (Ammons & Newell, 1988). When asked to choose between the management, policy, and political roles and designate the most important, city managers chose the management role 38.5% of the time, the policy role 55.8% of the time, and the political role only 5.8% of the time. These authors conclude that a city's selection of a form of government (mayor-council or council-manager) should not keep the CEO from performing the roles needed to keep the organization functioning (Ammons & Newell, 1988).

Robert T. Golembiewski and Gerald T. Gabris (1994) list continuation of the usage, by those in public administration, of the distinction between politics and administration, as one of the six themes that are turning what has been in the past a successful idea (council-manager government) into a failure. The distinction in the past proved useful, but clinging to this idea is becoming harmful (Golembiewski & Gabris, 1994). Robert S. Montjoy and Douglas J. Watson (1995) also find the traditional view of the dichotomy in local government as untenable. The traditional interpretation of the policy / administration dichotomy is, "neither practical nor desirable in council-manager government" (Montjoy & Watson, 1995, p. 231). Managers often play a very important role that is both needed and advantageous to the elected officials.

Delmer D. Dunn and Jerome S. Legge Jr. (2002) use factor analysis to analyze three models scholars use to characterize the relationship between elected and appointed officials: the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy model, the modified dichotomy model and the partnership model. The orthodox dichotomy model describes a relationship where a "rather strict separation of politics and administration" exists with particular functions, as previously discussed, assigned to each of the two actors (Dunn & Legge, 2002, p. 402). The modified dichotomy model holds that there is a distinction between politics and policy, and the dichotomy also holds for politics and administration; but not policy and administration; it allows for a more active leadership role for administrators (Dunn & Legge, 2002). The partnership model holds that not only can administrators venture into policy making but, likewise, elected officials may venture into the executing of laws and policies. They examine 488 responses from top managers in local governments across the country using factor analysis seeking to discover which of the three models local managers identify with and what factors help to explain the correlations (Dunn & Legge, 2002). In their findings, they locate an important group of managers that identify with each of the three models. A number of managers still identify policy implementation as primarily the administrators' job, and most managers still can, "relate to a model that insulates and buffers management and policy implementation from elected officials" (Dunn & Legge, 2002, p. 417). Somewhat contrary to much of the literature, the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy has not vanished from the profession with a sizable number of managers still identifying with it; however, the other two models contribute more to explaining variance. Lastly, they find that many managers at the local level identify with the partnership with elected officials model (Dunn & Legge, 2002), suggesting the empirical reality of recent literature putting

forward such a model. They conclude that the partnership model that so many managers identify with may, "be exactly what is needed to enhance democratic governance" (Dunn & Legge, 2002, p. 419).

In a 2009 article, Yahong Zhang and Richard C. Feiock (2009) investigate the mechanisms that lead elected officials to defer their power in policy making to the local manager. They use data in this analysis they gather from the mayors and managers of 123 cities in Florida (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). They find that the lack of formal authority given to a mayor is not a major reason for policy making power to be assigned to the city manager. This goes against some other research indicating the exact opposite (Morgan & Watson, 1992) and supports suggestions that institutional structures are less a factor in explaining local officials' power. They also find that higher levels of professionalism from city managers did indeed help them to gain additional policy making power (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). Likewise, if an elected body and manager have dissimilar ideologies, the elected bodies are prone to hesitate in giving greater policy power to the manager than if the two agree. Zhang and Feiock (2009) conclude that these findings reconfirm the fact that the sharing of power in policy making by councils is determined more by non-institutional factors than by institutional ones. A manager that has greater administrative power (defined as the number of leadership and department head positions under the direct appointment and removal of the manager) is also less likely to possess greater policy making power (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). Other findings include: women managers are less likely to have greater authority in policy making processes; the larger the city, the less likely it is that a manager dominates the policy making process; and, the more wealthy a city, the less policy making authority the council is likely to delegate to the manager. In conclusion, Zhang & Feiock note that their findings do not support the

modified dichotomy model (that assumes the dominant role of city managers in the policy role), but rather they find that managers try to reconcile the tensions between complying with the political control of the governing body with the responsibility that they have to the local government. Managers consciously trade off their administrative power for policy making power (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). It is the non-institutional factors that are all significant in their model in determining if the elected body will defer policy making authority to the manager.

In an effort to 'reconceptualize' the relationship that exists between the policy and administration functions in council-manager cities, James H. Svara (1985) presents a model he labels the "Dichotomy and Duality" model. Svara contends that the various models depicting the relationship between elected officials and administrators in policy and administration put forward over the years suffer from both empirical and normative problems (Svara, 1985). He goes on to describe how, in addition to these problems, "that we are burdened with such imprecise definitions of the central concepts that distinctions between office and function are difficult to make" (Svara, 1985, p. 224). To combat these problems, Svara proposes a new model that divides the old politics-administration dichotomy into four separate dimensions of the governmental process. The mission, policy, administration, and management functions of the government process are the four functions of the governmental process that 'blend' into each other in a continuum are yet are conceptually distinctive from each other and operationalized for analysis (Svara, 1985). The 'mission' and the 'management' functions, at the extremes of the continuum, are largely dichotomized, with elected officials primarily responsible for the mission functions and administrators for management functions. The internal functions on the continuum, the policy and administration functions, consists of shared responsibilities

(duality) between elected and appointed officials. Svara graphically displays this distribution of responsibility for these four distinct functions, using a line to show the division of responsibility (See Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1 Svara's Dichotomy/Duality Model

Svara (1985) defines and operationalizes these four functions for council-manager governments. Svara defines mission as, "the organization's philosophy, its thrust, the broad goals it sets for itself, and the things it chooses not to do" (Svara, 1985, p. 224). For example, mission activities include determining the purpose or scope of services and the tax levels that a community wants to adopt. Determining direction in these broad areas concerning what should and should not be done in a city is usually the function of the elected officials, although administrators often give advice on what can and cannot be accomplished. Policy function activities are define by Svara as, "middle-range policy decisions, e.g., how to spend government revenues, whether to initiate new programs...and how to distribute services at what levels within the existing range of

services provided" (Svara, 1985, p. 225). These functional responsibilities are shared by both elected and appointed officials. For example, elected officials approve new programs and projects and pass a budget but administrators make recommendations on these decisions and determine service distribution formulas. Another shared functional responsibility between administrators and elected officials is the administration functions. Svara defines these functions as, "the specific decisions, regulations, and practices employed to achieve policy objectives" (p. 226). This functional responsibility is usually the purview of the appointed administrators in a council-manager city; however, elected officials often do get involved in administration through the use of legislative oversight, intervening in service delivery (handling citizen complaints for example), and specifying very specific techniques to be used in implementation of adopted policies. The last function in the model, management, Svara defines as, "the actions taken to support the policy and administrative functions. It includes controlling and utilizing the human, material, and informational resources of the organization to best advantage" (Svara, 1985, p. 227). The management function is usually the functional responsibility of the manager, but the council does get involved occasionally in areas such as ratifying or initiating internal management changes. Examples of where council might get involved in management functions might include such actions as prompting changes in merit pay, grievance procedures, or minority hiring. Svara (1985) uses interviews with officials in five large cities in North Carolina (over 100,000 populations) as empirical validation of his model. While all cities examined fall into a general pattern as is depicted in Figure 3.1, there are some differences between them. Svara lists four deviations from the general pattern. These four deviations are listed as 'strong manager', 'council dominant', council incursion', and 'council-manager standoff' to describe the change in functional

responsibility mixed he finds in each (Svara, 1985). In conclusion, Svara finds that the new model, "is an advance over the dichotomy model which prescribed behavior for a pure but powerless manager, on the one hand, or the mixture in policy or coequal models which gave the manager license to be powerful but at the cost of political purity and democratic control" (Svara, 1985, p. 230). Svara's model allows for neither a complete separation of policy and administration nor a complete intermingling. It protects the conditions for democratic governance but also allows for the best use of the talents of both administrators and elected officials (Svara, 1985).

In a 1985 article authored by William P. Browne (1985), research is conducted to test just one of the four dimensions in the dichotomy/duality model put forward by Svara (1985). Browne uses a questionnaire from 114 Michigan city and village managers to study policy initiation in these cities. He discovers in these cities and villages, 74 percent of managers say that policy leadership is a 'very necessary' requirement of their position (Browne, 1985). In addition, one-third report that either themselves personally or their staffs take the lead in almost every single policy issue, and 60% say that most policy questions arise not from the council but from the manager's office. Managers also indicate that in 99% of the cases their relationship with their council is either excellent or good, and large majorities say that their councils are very supportive of them on 'individual initiatives' (Browne, 1985). A very strong relationship is also found to exist between those managers that anticipate a high level of council acceptance of their policy leadership and the predisposition of managers to exercise that leadership. No linkage is found between managers personal characteristics such as years of experience, etc. and those managers' predispositions to take a leadership role in policy initiation. Browne concludes that, "municipal environment, rather than the aforementioned personal

characteristics of the office holder, determines the policy role of the municipal manager..." (Browne, 1985, p. 621). Browne also concludes that his findings show the utility of using Svara's model on the one dimension of policy (Browne, 1985).

Looking at Svara's model from the perspective of leadership, Greg J. Protasel (1995) uses the model to help visualize policy leadership in council-manager cities. Protasel shows that when the separate and shared responsibilities of the council and manager in the dichotomy/duality model are oriented to the same axes several facts become clear. Firstly, the manager has a larger overall separate area of responsibility than does the council. Secondly, the manager and council share most of the responsibility area in the policy dimension but the overall area of coverage in the policy area does not match that area covered in the other three dimensions (Protasel, 1995). This implies that a leadership gap within the policy dimension area exists that is covered neither by the manager nor the council. To fill this gap Protasel describes four patterns of leadership in council-manager cities that emerge. A traditional leadership pattern is one that allows the council to retain the policy-making power and the city manager retains the administrative power. In a dominate manager leadership pattern the manager still maintains the control over administrative functions but also serves as the dominate actor in the policy function (Protasel, 1995). Finding the mayor and manager sharing policy leadership describes Protasel's third pattern. Lastly, the strong mayor pattern describes the mayor acquiring much of the manager's power within the policy function and thus it requires that the mayor become a strong political leader within the community (Protasel, 1995). In this fourth pattern the mayor acts more like he is located in a strong-mayor community rather than in a council-manager one. Protasel emphasizes that the direct election of mayors in council-manager cities can actually enhance the council-manager plan by helping to close

the policy leadership gap; however, introducing aspects of a separation of powers model (as found in mayor-council cities) may take this idea too far and create more leadership problems than it solves (Protasel, 1995).

In subsequent research, Svara is able to empirically support the dichotomy-duality model in a number of studies including: a survey of city and county managers in North Carolina (Svara, 1988a), in a study involving six pairs of moderately large council-manager and matched mayor-council cities (120,000 to 650,000) in several states (Svara, 1988b), in a survey of 131 North Carolina and Ohio city managers (Svara, 1995), and, in an examination of 31 cities in the United States with population over 200,000 (Svara, 1999b). In recent writings, Svara finds, "a political-administrative relationship in local government characterized by high level of interaction and varying but reciprocal influence" (Svara, 2006b, p. 1081). Svara describes this relationship as a model of 'Complementarity', "...that presumes distinction, deference, and restraint, as well as intermixture, reciprocal influence, and interdependence" (Svara, 2008, p. 49). He goes on to say that, "Complementarity is primarily grounded in a model of overlapping roles in the relationship between politicians and administrators, but to some extent it draws on models of separate roles, administrative autonomy, and political responsiveness as well" (Svara, 2008, p. 49). Recently, Tansu Demir (2009) uses survey responses from 346 city managers in the country to empirically test the complementarity model view of the politics-policy continuum using activities rated on a five point Likert scale. Rated activities are related to the variables identified along a continuum with political particularism at the political end of the spectrum and personnel management at the management end of the spectrum (Demir, 2009). Demir's analysis of the data he collects seems to illustrate that the complmentarity model provides a reasonably good model of

the political-administrative relationship in local governments in the United States (Demir, 2009). Demir writes, "...politics and management seem to have a dichotomous-like relationship, while policy and administration seem to be blended, with reciprocal influence and overlapping roles" (Demir, 2009, p. 885).

The existing literature seems to indicate that the generally held belief that the idea that a strict politics-administration dichotomy has existed since the modern beginning of the field of public administration is at best a simplistic generalization (Rosenbloom, 2008; Lynn, 2001; Svara, 1999a). Many scholars in past decades have found major issues both empirically and normatively with the strict interpretation of the dichotomy in local governments (Bosworth, 1958; Loveridge, 1968; Ammons & Newell, 1988; Golembiewski & Gabris, 1994; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; Dunn & Legge, 2002; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; and Svara, 1985). James Svara (1985) proposes a model (dichotomy-duality) that suggests a blending of politics and administration through a continuum of four dimensions. This blending occurs from the most political of the dimensions, mission activities, into the policy making activities dimension, through the administration activities dimension, and into the most administrative dimension, that of management activities (Svara, 1985). Numerous studies reaffirm the utility of the dichotomy-duality model (Browne, 1985; Protasel, 1995; Svara 1988a; Svara, 1988b; Svara, 1995; Svara, 1999b; Demir, 2009) in giving a better picture of the relationship between elected officials in local government and appointed managers.

This study intends to enhance the existing literature concerning the relationship between the elected and appointed officials in local governments in the United States across the four dimensions discussed in Svara's dichotomy-duality model using the different forms of local government as described by the Adapted Cities Framework.

Chief Administrative Officers in cities in the United States are surveyed to ascertain their perceptions of the levels of involvement for themselves, the mayor, and the city council members within their respective communities. Past studies using the dichotomy-duality model have primarily focused on the differences between the mayor-council and council-manager forms of government. For this study, the author intends to expand the current literature concerning the roles played by the various local officials by examining these variables using additional typologies for classifying municipalities. It is proposed that as the institutional structural features of municipalities are altered between more reformed and less reformed characteristics, the percentage of total involvement between the chief administrative officer verses the council in the four dimensions put forward in the dichotomy-duality model, as observed by the CAO of that municipality, will change as well.

Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Mission activities will change.

Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Administrative activities will change.

Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Management activities will change.

The following hypotheses are tested to determine whether or not there is a statistical difference in the dependent variables citied in the analysis and the different forms of government used as the independent variables.

Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be different depending on how the municipality's institutional form is classified.

Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management activities will change.

Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to political activities will change.

Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services offered within their municipality will change.

Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Mission activities will change.

Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Administrative activities will change.

Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Management activities will change.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The survey used in this study is designed to examine cities within the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000. Many of the questions asked within the survey are designed to collect information that allows the researcher to develop the independent variables as outlined in Chapter 2, *Developing the Independent Variables*. Other questions are designed to solicit information that provides evidence that will allow the researcher to test the hypotheses that are proposed concerning the relationship between the independent variables developed and the dependent variables examined. Many of the questions ask the subject to give his or her perception concerning the relative importance, allocation of time, or active involvement level of important actors within the municipality. This information provides the researcher with important and worthwhile insights into the structural makeup of individual municipalities as well as the perceptions and daily activity of individuals directly involved with public administration at the local level of government in the United States.

Data Sources

This study design is to compare and contrast cities and towns in the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 using a variety of different institutional classification typologies. A number of different classification systems exist to describe the form that local governments utilize in regard to their institutional structure. Chapter 2

of this study discusses several existing classification systems and develops an additional one. The classification systems this study uses include a dichotomous nominal variable, a multinomial variable, and an interval level variable.

The traditional dichotomous classification of municipalities as either mayor-council (unreformed) or council-manager (reformed) provides the author with a nominal level measurement on which to classify municipalities for comparison. For the purpose of this study, all forms that utilize a mayor-council, mayor-board, mayor-alderman, or other variation of an elected official serving as the chief executive officer of the city are all classified as mayor-council (this is the same classification the ICMA survey uses).

The 'Adapted Cities Framework', put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) and discussed in detail in chapter 2, provides this study with a five category multinomial level measurement for contrast and comparison.

Finally, the zero to fifty point scoring system discussed and developed in chapter 2, utilizing a number of institutional structural features drawn from several different classification systems, provides the interval level measurement for this study.

The initial survey in this study is mailed to the chief administrative officers of 800 municipalities representing a random sample of all 50 states within the United States. The simple random sampling procedure described by David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias in Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition (1981) is utilized in order to obtain a random sample of all municipalities within the United States classified as either council-manager or mayor-council with a population between 10,000 and 250,000.

First, a list of all municipalities with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 is developed from the International City Management Association (2010) Municipal Year

Book 2010 for all municipalities classified within this listing as either mayor-council or council-manager. Each of the 2,975 (there were 1,850, or 62%, council-manager and 1,125, or 28% mayor-council) cities listed are then assigned a number (1000 to 3975). A random number generator is then used to develop a final list of 800 cities nationwide to participate in the survey. This random sample of 800 cities (502 (63%) council-manager and 298 (37%) mayor-council) represents 49 states. These 800 municipalities are then mailed the printed survey instrument along with a letter explaining the purpose, content, use of, confidentiality of the survey, and a self addressed stamped envelope for returning the printed survey. In the explanation letter each participant is also given the web address of an online survey instrument that they can use to complete the survey if they desire to do so. A search of municipal websites provides email addresses for 643 chief administrative officers out of the 800 participant municipalities in the survey. A follow-up email is then sent to these captured email addresses a few days after the printed surveys are mailed. The link to the online survey instrument as well as an attached Microsoft WORD file containing a copy of the printed survey is included with this email.

A second wave follow-up letter, including a copy of the same printed survey, is mailed to all participants that have not responded within approximately six weeks after the initial survey is mailed. Again, a follow-up email containing the same information included in the initial email is sent a few days after the second wave follow-up letter is mailed. A third wave follow-up email is finally sent several weeks later to all those who have not yet responded. This email contains the same information as the previous two.

The CAOs (city managers, administrators, and mayors) of participant municipalities are ask to respond to a number of questions regarding their individual background, education, political ties, and other demographic information. Information is

also gathered on general municipal information including annual budgets, property tax rates, and unemployment rates. Additionally, in order to classify each municipality into the proper city type, information concerning the institutional structure surrounding the mayor, city council, city staff, and the municipality in general is also solicited. Participants are also asked to rate the involvement levels of themselves (as the mayor or appointed CAO of the city), their mayor or CAO counterpart (if present), and their city councils, for thirteen activities identified by Svara (2006) that are then used to measure the mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensions of the CAO/council relationship. Data is also collected to establish the individual respondent's time allocation for the policy, administrative, and political roles performed each day within the municipality. Finally, participants are asked to rate their own perceptions of the quality of services that the municipality provides for 12 specific municipal services. To supplement the survey data, budget information concerning each participating municipality's general fund expenditures is obtained from each municipality's website for the most current fiscal year. Supplemental demographic data on each municipality iss also obtained from the United States Census Bureau's website.

Unit of Analysis

Data for this research study is solicited from eight hundred randomly chosen cities and towns in the United States with populations between 10,000 and 250,000 (this sample equals 27% of the total population under study) (see tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). Participants returned two hundred and seventy surveys (a return rate of 34%). Four surveys are deemed unusable; three because of insufficient data completion in the survey

and one municipality's population is deemed outside of the study parameters. A net total of two hundred and sixty-six surveys are included in the data set.

Table 4.1 Summary of Population

Region	Council-Manager Form		Mayor-Council Form			
	Count	Percent of Region	Count	Percent of Region		Regional Totals
Northeast	328	**47%**	367	**53%**	**100%**	**695**
	(18%)		(33%)			(23%)
South	559	**72%**	213	**28%**	**100%**	**772**
	(30%)		(19%)			(26%)
Midwest	446	**49%**	465	**51%**	**100%**	**911**
	(24%)		(41%)			(31%)
West	517	**87%**	80	**13%**	**100%**	**597**
	(28%)		(7%)			(20%)
TOTAL	**1850**	**62%**	**1125**	**38%**	**100%**	**2975**
	(100%)		(100%)			(100%)

Table 4.2 Summary of Survey Sample

Region	Council-Manager Form		Mayor-Council Form			
	Count	Percent of Region	Count	Percent of Region		Regional Totals
Northeast	91	**51%**	89	**49%**	**100%**	**180**
	(18%)		(29%)			(23%)
South	151	**69%**	67	**31%**	**100%**	**218**
	(30%)		(22%)			(27%)
Midwest	110	**48%**	121	**52%**	**100%**	**231**
	(22%)		(41%)			(29%)
West	150	**88%**	21	**12%**	**100%**	**171**
	(30%)		(7%)			(21%)
TOTAL	**502**	**63%**	**298**	**37%**	**100%**	**800**
	(100%)		(100%)			(100%)

Table 4.3 Summary of Survey Responses

Region	Council-Manager Form		Mayor-Council Form			
	Count	Percent of Region	Count	Percent of Region		Regional Totals
Northeast	29	**69%**	13	**31%**	**100%**	**42**
	(16%)		(14%)			(16%)
South	57	**66%**	30	**34%**	**100%**	**87**
	(35%)		(31%)			(33%)
Midwest	41	**50%**	41	**50%**	**100%**	**82**
	(24%)		(44%)			(31%)
West	45	**82%**	10	**18%**	**100%**	**55**
	(25%)		(17%)			(21%)
TOTAL	**172**	**65%**	**94**	**35%**	**100%**	**266**
	(100%)		(100%)			(100%)

A total of one hundred and eighty-five variables are derived from the survey responses, city budget documents, and the census data information. The author uses these variables to present information on institutional form (or type) of government structure, city demographics, the allocation of the chief administrative officers time, perceptions of the levels of professionalism of staff, and the perceived involvement levels of both the CAO and city council regarding a number of activity dimensions. A total of twelve independent variables in combination (including the three independent primary research typology variables) are used by the author to evaluate the usefulness of the nine hypotheses proposed.

Operational Definitions

In this study several of the terms need to be defined to provide any clarification that might be required for use in the research design. The following terms are used in the study and their definitions are as follows:

Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) – the individual within a government that is responsible for the administrative functions of the municipality (this may be the elected mayor or an appointed professional administrator).

Council-manager form of government – this is a self reported form of government that generally places the responsibility for administrative functions of the municipality with an appointed manager and the responsibility for political and policy functions in a council (or its equivalent) to whom the appointed manager is accountable and responsible.

Mayor-council form of government – this is a self reported form of government that has an elected official serving as the chief executive officer and may or may not have an appointed chief administrative officer who is generally responsible for the administrative functions of the municipality. This includes variations in government forms such as the mayor-board, mayor-alderman, or any other variation with an elected official serving as the CEO.

Partisan – the association of individuals with a political party.

Non-partisan – no association of individuals with a political party.

Dependent Variables

Dependent variables utilized within this research include: 1) per capita general fund expenditures; 2) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO to management related activities; 3) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO to policy related activities; 4) percentage of total working time devoted by the CAO to politically related activities; 5) the CAOs perceived overall quality of services offered by the municipality; 6) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in

mission activities; 7) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in policy activities; 8) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in administrative activities; and, 9) the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in management activities.

Per capita general fund expenditures are calculated by taking the total general fund expenditures for the municipality and dividing this figure by that municipality's population. Because it is important that general fund expenditures should focus on common functions, any educational expenses related to public education are excluded from this expenditure amount. In most municipalities education falls under a separate jurisdiction other than the municipal government.

Percentage of total working time devoted to management related activities is captured from the actual percentage of total work time that the respondent estimates that he / she devotes to the management related activities in the municipality (includes staffing, budgeting, coordination of departments evaluating, directing, etc.).

Percentage of total working time devoted to policy related activities is captured from the actual percentage of total work time the respondent estimates that he / she devotes to the policy related activities (includes all meetings with council members, agenda setting, and policy development, policy proposal, and policy advise).

Percentage of total working time devoted to political related activities is captured from the actual percentage of total work time the respondent estimates that he / she devotes to the politically related activities (includes ceremonies, public relations, meetings with other governmental officials at other levels of government, speeches, etc.).

The perceived quality of services offered by the municipality is defined as the average rating that a respondent gives for all city services. Survey participants are asked

to rate the quality of services offered by their municipality on the following 3 point scale: 1) Service available but less than desirable; 2) Service available and meets the needs of citizens; and 3) Service exceeds citizen's expectations. An interval level variable is created that takes the sum of all of the individual service ratings given by that respondent and then divides that sum by the number of services that the respondent indicates are provided by that municipality; thus giving the average rating of all services within that municipality.

The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in mission activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council for three specific mission related activities. These three mission related activities include: A) determining the purpose and services of municipal government, B) developing strategies of future development of the municipality, and C) setting long-term fiscal priorities for the municipality. Respondents are ask to rate these activities for all three of these participants using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. Separate variables are created that sum the ratings scores for all three mission activities for of the three officials, thus providing a total mission involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council for each municipality (if appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then calculated by: 1) taking the total mission score for the CAO and then dividing that sum by the number of questions included under that dimension (3) to calculate an average CAO mission score; 2) then taking the total mission score for the council and then

dividing that sum by the number of questions included under that dimension (3) to come to an average council mission score; 3) and finally, dividing the average mission score of the CAO into the sum of both 1) and 2) (Average CAO plus average council mission score). For example, if the average mission score for the CAO was 4 (12/3) and the average mission score for the council was 4.333 (13/3) the process described above will produce a percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council of .48 (calculated as: 4 / (4 + 4.333) = .48). This same procedure is also used to calculate the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council variable for hypothesis 7 (policy activities), hypothesis 8 (administrative activities), and hypothesis 9 (management activities) as well.

The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in policy activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council for four specific policy related activities. These four policy related activities include: A) developing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs, B) the budget process, C) identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government, and D) developing solutions to current issues. Survey respondents are ask to rate these activities for all three participants using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings scores for all four related policy activities for each participant thus providing a total policy involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if

appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then calculated using the same process discussed above.

The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in administrative activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council for three specific administrative related activities. These three activities include: A) evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs, B) resolving citizens complaints about services, and C) implementing programs and delivering services. Survey respondents are ask to rate these activities for all three participants using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings scores for all three related administrative activities for each participant thus providing a total administrative involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then calculated using the process described above.

The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in management activities is defined as the percentage of the total involvement effort (total effort is defined as 100% including both the CAO and the council) that the CAO contributes. Survey participants are ask to rate the perceived involvement level of themselves (as either mayor or CAO), their counterpart (either the mayor or CAO), and their city council for three specific management related activities. These three activities include: A) changing management practices or reorganizing city government, B) hiring

decisions about department heads, and C) hiring decisions: employees below department head level. Survey respondents are ask to rate the three participants involvement levels using a six point Likert scale coded as follows: 0) none, 1) very low, 2) low, 3) average, 4) high, 5) very high. A variable is created that sums the ratings scores for all three related management activities thus providing a total management involvement score for each mayor, CAO, and council in each municipality (if appropriate). The percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council is then calculated using the process described above.

Independent Variables

The nine hypotheses previously stated are designed to test the value of the research independent variables (which describe the institutional form or type of government) when they are used to predict per capita general fund expenditures; percentage of total work time the CAO devotes to the management, policy, and political role activities; the overall quality of services offered by the municipality as perceived by the CAO; and the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council in the mission, policy, administrative, and management dimensional related activities. In addition to the research independent variables (also discussed below), the following independent control variables are also used in the multiple regression equations for these nine dependent variables.

Form or type of government is captured by three separate research independent variables that are analyzed within this study. Government Form (coded as *govform*) is a dichotomous nominal variable that captures the actual form of government reported by each respondent municipality. This nominal variable is coded 0 for mayor-council (or

equivalent) form municipalities and 1 for council-manager form cities. City Type (coded *ctytype*) is a multinomial level variable that is defined as the city classification type based upon the 'Adapted Cities Framework' put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) and discussed in chapter 2. This five category classification system is coded in a series of dummy variables for the analysis as follows: Political Cities (used as the control or omitted group) is coded in the variable *ctytypeP* as non-political = 0, political = 1; Adapted Political Cities is coded in the variable *ctytypeAP* as non-adapted political = 0, adapted political = 1; Conciliated Cities is coded in the variable *ctytypeC* as non-conciliated = 0, conciliated = 1; Adapted Administrative Cities is coded in the variable *ctytypeAP* as non-adapted administrative = 0, adapted administrative = 1; Administrative Cities is coded in the variable *ctytypeA* as non-administrative = 0, administrative = 1. Finally, '*Score*' is an interval level measurement (developed in chapter 2) that allots a point value to each municipality utilizing a number of institutional and structural features. This variable ranges from a possible numerical low score of 0 (the most political) to a possible high score of 50 (the most administrative).

Population (coded as *pop*) is the population for each responding municipality in the survey and is the actual population reported. This is a numerical value in thousands and no recoding is necessary.

Median Household Income (coded as *mhsinc)* is the actual median household income for each responding municipality. This is a numerical value directly from census information and no coding is necessary.

Percent of families below the poverty level (coded as *pov*) is the actual percentage of families living in each respondent municipality at or below the defined poverty level. This is an actual percentage value directly from census data and no coding is necessary.

Urban-Suburban-Rural defines the metropolitan status of the respondent municipality as it is reported by the respondent. This three category variable is coded as a series of dummy variables as follows: Urban (the control or omitted group) is coded in the variable *durban* as non-urban = 0, urban = 1; Suburban is coded in the variable *dsuburb* as non-suburban = 0, suburban = 1; and Rural is coded in the variable *drural* as non-rural = 0, rural = 1.

Number of Services offered (coded *totsvc)* is the total number of municipal services offered by each respondent municipality, as reported. This is coded as an integer value from 0 to 12.

Region is the geographical region of the country (as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau) in which the respondent municipality is located. This four category variable is coded as a series of dummy variables as follows: Northeast (the control or omitted group) is coded in the variable *regionne* as non-northeast = 0, northeast = 1; South is coded in the variable *regions* as non-south = 0, south = 1; Midwest is coded in the variable *regionmw* as non-midwest = 0, midwest = 1; and West is coded in the variable *regionw* as non-west = 0, west = 1.

Percent of Minority Population (coded as *prcminor*) is the actual percentage of the population in each respondent municipality that is not classified as 'white' under the census race classification. This is an actual percentage value and no recoding is necessary.

A dummy variable (*mccao)* is also included to distinguish those survey respondents that are appointed COAs working in a mayor-council municipality. This dummy variable is coded as a 1 if a respondent is a CAO in a mayor-council municipality and 0 if they are not.

A dummy variable (*caoreporting)* is also used in the analysis of hypothesis 6, 7, 8, & 9 to distinguish whether the survey instrument was completed by the elected mayor or by the appointed CAO in the municipality. There are twenty-four municipalities that authorize an appointed CAO in which the mayor completed the survey. This variable allows us to detect if having the mayor complete the survey makes a statistical difference. This dummy variable is coded as a 1 if the mayor is completing the survey and 0 is the appointed CAO is completing the survey.

Statistical Testing

This study uses several different methods of classifying municipalities in order to compare and contrast the differences between the individual typologies within each individual system. The study evaluates a representative sample of all cities in the United States classified by the ICMA as either mayor-council or council-manager cities and having a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The author uses the data analysis and statistical package *Stata* to evaluate the relationship between the three classification systems chosen and the nine dependent variables.

A hypothesis is a statement that predicts that a relationship exists between an independent variable and dependent variable (Welch & Comer, 2001). If the hypothesis is stated in terms that hypothesize that the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable it is called the null hypothesis. In contrast, the research (or alternative) hypothesis assumes that a relationship does exist between the independent and dependent variable. Both deductive and inductive reasoning are required to "prove" that a hypothesis is true (O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). Disconfirming evidence from statistical tests (based on deductive reasoning) is relied upon to demonstrate the truth of

the hypothesis indirectly by showing that the null hypothesis is false. Evidence that establishes causality, is replicable, and can eliminate alternative hypotheses (based on inductive reasoning) will help to confirm that the hypothesis is correct.

Statistical tests of significance and hypothesis testing rely on disconfirming evidence in order to demonstrate the truth of a hypothesis (O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). To test a hypothesis, "the researcher selects a statistical test to determine the probability that the hypothesized relationship in the population is random" (p. 366). If the relationship is shown not to be simply random by the statistical test used then the null hypothesis can be rejected as false and the alternative research hypothesis is supported showing a relationship exists between the two variables from the survey data.

This study primarily uses regression analysis to analyze the relationship between the three selected independent variables and the nine dependent variables; however, a variety of other descriptive and statistical tools are also employed when appropriate.

As discussed above, each hypothesis is examined using three separate variables that are utilized to classify municipalities via different typologies. These three variables include a dichotomous nominal level classification (government form), a multinomial level classification (city type), and an interval level classification (score).

For each of these three primary research variables the author uses multiple statistical tools to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

The 'difference of the mean test' is a statistical tool that is used to compare the mean values of two groups (Welch & Comer, 2001). This test utilizes the *t* distribution and what is commonly called the t-test to examine the relationship between a nominal level variable and an interval level variable (O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). The two-group mean comparison test is utilized in this study to compare the mean of the two groups in

the nominal classification in which municipalities are classified into either mayor-council or council-manager category. This analysis allows the author to draw conclusions about whether or not the dichotomous classifications of mayor-council and council-manager differ significantly for each of the dependent variables examined. This analysis is performed on each hypothesis.

'Analysis of Variance' (ANOVA) is a statistical tool used primarily for analyzing the differences between multiple group means (O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). In ANOVA the independent variable is generally a nominal classification; the dependent variable must however be interval (Welch & Comer, 2001). ANOVA analysis must fulfill two assumptions: first, that each of the groups constitutes a random sample; and second, that the variances for the populations in all groups are equal (O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999). ANOVA analysis is utilized within this study to compare the means for groups of cities classified using the multinomial level variable used to classify municipalities into the five city types put forward in the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Frederickson et. al., 2004). The ANOVA analysis in this study compares the mean of the five groups in the multinomial classification that types cities into either political, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, or the administrative category. This analysis allows the author to draw conclusions about whether or not these five categories of cities differ significantly from each other in regards to the dependent variables examined. This analysis is also performed for each hypothesis.

Each of the three primary independent variables utilized in this study are also examined using multiple linear regression analysis performed for each of the proposed hypothesis. In linear regression the researcher looks to describe the relationship between

the independent and the dependent variable by a straight line (Welch & Comer, 2001). The general format of the regression equation used in this analysis is:

$$Y = a + bX \quad (4.1)$$

where:

a = the constant or Y intercept

b = the regression coefficient or slope

Y = the predicted value of the dependent variable

X = the independent variable

Technically, regression requires that the variables used are measured on the interval level; however, nominal level independent variables can be incorporated by utilizing a dummy variable technique (Welch & Comer, 2001). Regression analysis is used within this study to compare the relationship between each of the three identified primary research independent variables (government form, city type, and score) and the dependent variables. This regression analysis allows the author to draw conclusions about whether or not these three independent variables are significantly related to the dependent variables examined. This analysis also indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent variables that can be explained by or associated with the independent variable, as indicated by the R^2 value. This analysis is performed for each hypothesis for each of the three classification research variables.

In each of the regression equations discussed above control variables are also utilized to assist in understanding concerning how that change observed in the dependent variable are produced by the independent research variable (Welch & Comer, 2001). Linear regression using the Ordinary Least Squares model is utilized for each of the three independent variables discussed above for the nine hypotheses.

The three independent variables are examined in order to determine if they are related to the general fund per capita expenditures of cities included in this study (hypotheses 1). Previous studies in our review of the literature show that these variables are related. However, the relationship is not always consistent in direction or intensity. The author expects that the population size in municipalities is related to the dependent variable. Larger municipalities are usually more heterogeneous leading to higher demands from citizens. Larger cities also generally have a proportionally larger tax base that is based upon a more diverse economic make-up. Because general fund per capita expenditures are calculated from general fund budget expenditures, per capital expenditures are highly dependent on municipal general fund revenues. General fund revenues are highly dependent on the amount of taxes that residents pay into municipal coffers. Median household income for the city may also be indicative of the amount of taxes municipal residents pay into general fund revenues in the form of property and sales taxes. The percentage of families living below the poverty line in a city is also related to per capita general fund expenditures. The author expects that an increase in the family poverty level places a higher demand on general services offered by the community and thereby an increase in general fund expenditures. Another variable the author expects to be positively related to per capita general fund expenditures is the total number of services offered by the municipality. An additional service offered in one community that is not offered in another similar community, one could expect, causes the first community to have higher general fund expenditures. The author also expects the percentage of minority population within the municipality to relate to general fund expenditure levels. In general, the author expects a larger minority population to translate into a higher demand for many services offered in a city because minorities are

generally associated with higher levels of poverty and therefore a higher cost per capita. Finally, the author anticipates that two geographical differences between municipalities are related to per capital general fund expenditure levels. Both the region of the country in which the city resides along with the proximity of the municipality to larger urban areas, the author expects is related to expenditure levels. Municipalities located in the Northeast and the Midwest regions are anticipated to have higher levels of expenditures than those in the South and West. These two regions are traditionally responsible in more instances for financially demanding services such as public housing, public education, public transportation, and public health issues. Location of a municipality in an urban, suburban, or rural location is also anticipated to affect expenditure levels. Rural areas are generally less densely populated than urban areas and should have a lower level of expenditure demand than either urban or suburban areas. Suburban areas are usually younger communities than urban areas and therefore face fewer aging infrastructure demands and thus a lower expenditure level for these services; however, suburban communities may have higher demands for quality of life services than are found in urban areas and thus higher expenditures within these areas.

The regression equations for hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 examine how the CAOs total percentage of work time is actually allocated among the 2) management, 3) policy, and 4) political roles performed each day. The author anticipates that the independent variables have an impact on how CAOs allocate their time. The author anticipates that in those cities with more independent city managers, CAOs spend more time devoted to management activities and less time to political activities. Studies in the literature usually show that appointed executives devote more of their time to management activities. Population size is also anticipated to be related to each of the three dependent

variables. Larger municipalities are usually more heterogeneous leading to higher demands from citizens. The larger a municipality's population the more services will likely be offered and therefore be require management. Location of a municipality in an urban, suburban, or rural location is also anticipated to affect time allocations. The political demands of a larger urban community are much larger than those found in a small rural city. The lack of staff in rural municipalities also places the CAO into the role of policy expert for the community in many instances. The region of the county that a municipality is located also places differences on the roles that the CAO plays. The south is known to be uniquely conservative on some issues while the Northeast and West are uniquely liberal on the same issues (Erikson & Tendin, 2007). On almost all social issues the south is very conservative and these various public opinion views affect the roles that CAOs perceive as proper and thus affect how CAOs actually allocate their time.

Hypothesis 5 uses the overall quality of services that a municipality offers, as perceived by the CAO, as the dependent variable and examines this variable in relation to the three independent research variables using regression analysis. The author anticipates that as a city reforms its structure from more political to more administrative the quality of the services as perceived by the CAO changes. The author expects that the population size in a municipality also relates to the dependent variable. Larger municipalities are usually more heterogeneous which leads to higher demands from citizens. Such higher demand has a negative effect on the perceived quality of services the municipality offers. Median household income provides the author with an indicator of the community's ability to pay for quality services. Higher income levels should translate into higher levels of service quality. The percentage of families living below the poverty line in a community also indicates resident's ability to pay for municipal services. A higher

percentage of families in a community living below the poverty line translate into residents having a reduced capacity to pay for services but a higher level of need for those same services. The region of the country and whether the city is located in a rural, suburban, or urban location are also examined to determine if these factors also relate to the quality of services offered.

Hypothesis 6, 7, 8, and 9 analyze the percentage of total involvement (total involvement includes the sum of all involvement for both the council and the CAO in a municipality) for the CAO in a number of specific measured responsibilities. The four dimensions of responsibility measured in this study correspond to the four dimensions put forward by Svara (1985) in his "Dichotomy and Duality" model of council and manager relationships. Svara's model is used to compare the appointed administrator's level of role responsibility in relation to the elected council's level of role responsibility for each of the four dimensions described within the model. Because Svara's model only examines the relationship of appointed managers and not elected ones (mayors) , we exclude from the analysis of hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9 those municipalities that do not authorize the use of an appointed CAO. The author uses the involvement level of the appointed CAO is in determining the purpose and services of the city, in developing future development strategies, and in setting long-term fiscal priorities as a proxy for measuring a CAOs Mission involvement (Svara, 2006). A CAO involvement level in developing annual goals, participating in the budget adoption process, identifying current issues requiring municipal attention, and in developing solutions to those current issues are used to measure the Policy dimension activities (Svara, 2006). The Administration dimension is measured by the CAOs involvement in evaluating specific program accomplishments, resolving citizen complaints, and implementing programs and service

delivery (Svara, 2006). Finally, a CAOs involvement level in changing management practices, in reorganization issues, and with making hiring decisions concerning employees at or below the department head level measure the Management dimension activities (Svara, 2006). A variable measuring population is controlled for in each regression model in order to examine its relationship with these four dependent dimension variables. Whether a municipality is located in an urban, suburban, or rural area is also anticipated to have an effect on the CAOs involvement levels. The lack of staff in smaller rural municipalities often places the CAO in those municipalities into the role of expert for the community in a number of different areas including activities relating to the mission and policy dimensions. The region of the county that a municipality is located in also potentially plays a difference in the roles that the CAO plays. For example, on almost all social issues the south is very conservative (Erikson & Tendin, 2007). These variations in public opinion views between the different regions, affects the roles that CAOs perceives as proper to assume. This perception of what are the proper roles to assume, affects how deeply the CAO involves himself in the activities associated with the four measured dimensions. A dummy variable that distinguishes whether the survey instrument is completed by the elected mayor or by the appointed CAO in the municipality is also included in each of the regression equations analyzing these four dimension variables. There are twenty-four municipalities in the data that authorize an appointed CAO in which the mayor completes the survey instrument. This dummy variable allows us to detect whether having the mayor complete the survey makes any statistical difference in the results.

Advantages and Limitations of the Study

This study enhances the existing literature concerning local government in cities in the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The analysis the author performs within this study provides valuable information concerning the perceived quality of services and other administrative and structural attributes of local governments in this population range. This research compares and contrasts local governments utilizing a number of institutional classification structures.

One limitation to this study is the fact that several of the variables analyzed within this study are based on subjective rather than objective data. The actual time allocations of CAOs, the overall quality of services a municipality provides, and the percentage of total involvement for the CAO verses the council are all based on questions that are designed to solicit the respondent's perceptions. It would be more beneficial if more valid and reliable indicators were available, however, comparisons with other existing studies help to lend validity to the conclusions that the author draws.

A second possible limitation to this study is the overall response rate of 34%. A higher response rate might enhance the validity of the results. The study does, however, obtain results from 270 cities and municipalities in the United States. It is also shown that these cities are representative of the entire population of cities between 10,000 and 250,000 (See tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) whether the data is examined by state, region, or government form (mayor-council or council-manager). Two hundred and seventy cities provide us with a thorough analysis of municipalities in the population range under study.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS

Response Rates

In this study, eight hundred surveys are mailed to a random sample of the 2,975 municipalities within the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000. The sample includes 502 (63%) municipalities listed as utilizing the council-manager form of government and 298 (37%) municipalities listed as using the mayor-council form. This sample is in line with the total population under study (62% council-manager and 38% mayor-council). The surveys are mailed to respondents in three waves. Wave one generated 213 returns, wave two generated 48 returns, and wave three generated 9 returns for a total of 270 returned surveys. Four of the returned surveys are discarded as unusable leaving a usable data set of 266 returned surveys. Of these 266 usable returned surveys 171 (64.3%) are received from council-manager form cities and 95 (35.7%) are received from mayor-council form municipalities; again in line with the population under study. The overall response rate of thirty-four percent is considered adequate to support the findings within the survey analysis.

Demographics of Chief Administrative Officers

The demographic aspects of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) in the respondent municipalities are examined using both the dichotomous classification method of mayor-council and council-manager form of government as well as the five category Adapted Cities framework (Frederickson et al., 2004).

When analyzed using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager classification system (See Table 5.1), the author finds that 84% of CAOs in mayor-council municipalities and 88% of CAOs in council-manager cities that responded to this survey are male. Although this difference is not statistically significant (Pearson Chi Square probability = 0.348), it is interesting that the highest percentage of female CAOs occurs in mayor-council municipalities. The vast majority of CAOs in both mayor-council and council-manager municipalities are Caucasian although there are 6% more minority CAOs in council-manager cities than in mayor-council municipalities. Both forms report 2% African-American CAOs but only the council-manager municipalities' report Hispanic (5%) and other (1%) minority CAOs. Although the majority of CAOs in both forms of government report having a 4 year college degree or higher (73% in mayor-council and 97% in council-manager), more CAOs in council-manager cities have attained a Masters degree or higher (50% in mayor-council verses 78% in council-manager). The majority of CAOs in council-manager municipalities (63%) are educated in the field of Public Administration. A majority of appointed CAOs in mayor-council communities also are educated in the Public Administration field (59%) while mayor CAOs are almost evenly split between educations in Business (38%), and other (43%). The vast majority of CAOs in both forms of government are married (93% in mayor-council and 89% in council-manager).

Table 5.1 Demographic aspects of CAOs by form

		Mayor-Council Municipalities			Council- Manager Municipalities
		Mayors	CAOs	Total	
# of Respondents		52	42	94	172
Gender	Male	90%	75%	84%	88%
	Female	10%	25%	16%	13%
Race	Caucasian	96%	100%	98%	92%
	African-American	4%	0%	2%	2%
	Hispanic	0%	0%	0%	5%
	Other	0%	0%	0%	1%
Education	H.S./GED	6%	0%	3%	0%
	Some College	33%	12%	23%	2%
	4 year degree	21%	26%	23%	19%
	Masters	31%	53%	41%	71%
	PhD	2%	2%	2%	2%
	Professional degree	8%	7%	7%	5%
Education Field	Public Administration	12%	59%	35%	63%
	Business	38%	17%	28%	12%
	Engineering	2%	5%	4%	7%
	Finance	5%	5%	5%	3%
	Other	43%	15%	29%	15%
Marital Status	Single	0%	2%	2%	5%
	Married	94%	93%	93%	89%
	Divorced	2%	5%	3%	5%
	Widowed	4%	0%	2%	1%
Political Party	Republican	29%	38%	33%	26%
	Democrat	42%	14%	29%	18%
	Independent	21%	19%	20%	32%
	None	8%	30%	18%	24%
	Other	0%	0%	0%	1%
Ideology	Very Liberal	0%	0%	0%	1%
	Liberal	12%	16%	14%	11%
	Moderate	39%	41%	40%	62%
	Conservative	45%	38%	42%	24%
	Very Conservative	4%	5%	5%	2%
	weekly working hours	47.38	54.44	48.59	54.49

Table 5.2 Demographic aspects of CAOs by city type

		Political	Adapted Political			Conciliated	Adpt. Admin.	Admin
		mayors	mayors	Appt CAO	Total	Appointed CAOs		
# of Respondents		25	30	30	60	12	128	41
Gender	Male	87%	93%	70%	81%	91%	88%	85%
	Female	13%	7%	30%	19%	9%	12%	15%
Race	Caucasian	100%	93%	100%	97%	100%	91%	95%
	African-American	0%	7%	0%	3%	0%	2%	0%
	Hispanic	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	5%
	Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Education	H.S./GED	4%	7%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
	Some College	40%	28%	10%	18%	8%	2%	2%
	4 year degree	8%	31%	32%	32%	17%	17%	24%
	Masters	28%	34%	45%	40%	67%	73%	68%
	PhD	4%	0%	3%	2%	0%	2%	2%
	Professional degree	16%	0%	10%	5%	8%	5%	2%
Education Field	Public Administration	11%	12%	57%	36%	64%	65%	61%
	Business	33%	44%	17%	29%	7%	11%	17%
	Engineering	6%	0%	7%	4%	7%	7%	2%
	Finance	6%	4%	7%	5%	0%	3%	2%
	Other	44%	40%	13%	25%	21%	13%	17%
Marital Status	Single	0%	0%	3%	2%	0%	5%	8%
	Married	91%	96%	90%	93%	100%	91%	82%
	Divorced	4%	0%	7%	3%	0%	4%	7%
	Widowed	4%	4%	0%	2%	0%	0%	3%
Political Party	Republican	32%	32%	31%	31%	40%	25%	29%
	Democrat	50%	32%	19%	26%	10%	17%	20%
	Independent	14%	25%	19%	22%	10%	31%	37%
	None	5%	11%	31%	20%	40%	26%	14%
	Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Ideology	Very Liberal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
	Liberal	13%	11%	23%	17%	0%	9%	19%
	Moderate	30%	43%	38%	41%	64%	60%	68%
	Conservative	48%	43%	35%	39%	36%	27%	14%
	Very Conservative	9%	4%	4%	4%	0%	3%	0%
	weekly working hours	53.52	42.52	51.39	47.1	57.08	54.34	55.05

Most CAOs in mayor-council cities indicate a preference for one of the two major political parties (33% republican and 29% democrat) while most CAOs in council-manager cities indicate a preference for neither (32% independent and 24% none). CAOs in respondent mayor-council municipalities appear to take a more conservative tilt than those in council-manager cities. When survey respondents are ask to describe their ideology 62% of CAOs in council-manager municipalities describe themselves as moderates while almost half of respondents in mayor-council communities describe themselves as either conservative (45%) or as very conservative (4%).

When CAO demographics are analyzed using city type from the Adapted Cities Framework (See Table 5.2), we also observe some interesting characteristics. As expected, the vast majority of CAOs across the five categories (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) are Caucasian males. When education level is examined, the author observes that across all five categories the majority of CAOs have at least a 4 year college degree. Somewhat paradoxically, the Political city category contains double the percentage of CAOs without a 4 year college degree (44%) of any other category but it also contains the highest percentage of PhD's (4%) and Professional degrees (16%) of any of the five categories. When educational field of a CAO is reviewed, the author observes that as a city becomes more administrative it is more likely that the CAO of that municipality is educated in the Public Administration field. Again, as expected, the large majority of CAOs in every category type are married. When ask to state their political preference 82% of those CAOs in the political city category indicate one of the two major political parties (32% republican and 50% democrat) and 57% of CAOs in the Adapted Political category also identify one of the two major political parties; although this is primarily due to the high

rate in which elected mayor CAOs in Adapted Political cities identify with one of the major political parties. The majority of CAOs in the remaining three categories identify themselves as either independent or none (50% in Conciliated, 57% in Adapted Administrative, and 51% in Administrative). When describing their political ideology, CAOs tend to move from more conservative to more moderate as the categories move from Political Cities toward administrative cities. Political City CAOs identify themselves the least of the time as moderates (30%) and the most as conservative or very conservative (57%). Administrative City CAOs identify themselves the most as moderates (68%) and the least as conservative or very conservative (14%).

Overview of Analysis

For each of the nine hypotheses tested within this study, the form, or type, of government for each municipality is captured and analyzed using three separate independent variables. These three independent variables represent a nominal dichotomous variable (mayor-council or council-manager), a five category multinomial variable based upon the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Frederickson et al., 2004), and an interval level variable that develops a point total score for each municipality using a number of institutional and structural features, as developed fully in chapter two.

The author analyzes the nominal dichotomous variable for each municipality using both a two group mean comparison T-Test and an ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis for each dependent variable. These tests allow the author to determine first, if there is any statistically significant difference in the mean of the categories of mayor-council and council-manager, and second, to determine the direction and significance of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable as

well as explain the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that can be associated with the independent variables.

The author analyzes the five category multinomial level variable using a One-Way ANOVA test for each dependent variable as well as an OLS multiple regression analysis. This analysis allows us to draw conclusions about whether the dependent variables of municipalities within these five city classification types differ significantly from each other.

Finally, the author analyzes the interval level variable using OLS multiple regression analysis for each of the dependent variables. This analysis allows the author to draw conclusions about the significance of the statistical relationship between this interval level independent variable and the nine dependent variables.

For each of the regression models in this study a Cooks D test statistic is run to help determine the possibility of outliers in the data set[1]. If a case indicates a Cooks D value that is greater than or equal to twice the equation of (4/N-P-1), the case is deemed to be an influential outlier. To determine the actual effect of the potential influential outlier on the model, a regression is run for each model including and excluding the identified outlier cases. Each regression model is also tested for multicollinearity using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. Using this test, no finding of multicollinearity is made in any of the models. Finally, a White's test for heteroskedasticity is run for each OLS regression equation as well. If heteroskedasticity is detected then a robust regression method is employed. To allow for comparison between the regression models, corrections are made to ensure that all three models within each individual hypothesis

[1] To assure consistency, identified outliers for each hypothesis were removed when calculating the T-test and ANOVA statistics. This does not significantly affect the results.

utilize the same outlier cases. This correction does not significantly change the results of the study.

Hypothesis One

Hypothesis one proposes that the per capita expenditures of a municipality is different depending on how that municipality's institutional form is classified. The author anticipates that changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character will affect the efficiencies within these cities and result in significantly different per capita expenditure levels. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide a breakdown by form of government and type of city regarding the general fund per capita expenditure level for municipalities. Discussion of hypothesis one will follow these tables.

Table 5.3 Per capita expenditures – by government form

	Mayor-Council	**Council-Manager**
N	88	168
Mean Per Capita Expenditures	$721.49	$762.23
Minimum Per Capita Expenditures	$159.60	$227.60
Maximum Per Capita Expenditures	$1500.00	$1795.70

Table 5.4 Per capita expenditures – by city type

	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
N	22	58	11	125	40
Mean Per Capita Expenditures	$791.07	$709.33	$717.10	$745.67	$797.60
Minimum Per Capita Expenditures	$381.90	$159.60	$392.30	$227.60	$276.60
Maximum Per Capita Expenditures	$1500.00	$1427.30	$1183.70	$1591.20	$1795.70

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.5) show that although the mean per capita expenditures of the 168 council-manager cities are higher than those of 88 mayor-council cities, it is not a statistically significant difference. The per capita expenditure level of the 168 council-manager municipalities responding to the survey is $762.23 and the per capita expenditure level of the 88 mayor-council respondent cities is $721.49. Analysis results in a t-statistic of -1.0496 at 254 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .2949 which is higher than .05; therefore it is not a statistically significant relationship.

Table 5.5 Two group means comparison t-test – general fund per capita expenditures

Government Form	N	MEAN	T	Degrees of freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Mayor-Council	88	721.49	-1.0496	254	.2949
Council-Manager	168	762.23			

Table 5.6 ANOVA analysis – adapted city type by - general fund per capita expenditures

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F	Significance
Between groups	237103.68	4	59275.9201	0.68	0.6083
Within groups	21967707.9	251	87520.7484		
Total	22204811.5	255	87077.6923		

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is analyzed to find if a relationship exists between city type and the dependent variable general fund per capita expenditures.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicates an F score of 0.68 with a significance level of 0.6083. This is also over the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table 5.6), thus there is no statistical difference between the five city type categories.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple linear regression is used to evaluate the relationship between general fund per capita expenditure and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score along with the control independent variables of population, median household income, urban/suburban/rural status, total number of services, quality of service, percent minority population, and region of the country. The F statistic is used to test the null hypotheses that the slope is 0 (B1....B10=0), or the statistical significance of our model in predicting the dependent variable (Y). Adjusted R square is also calculated and is used to tell us the

substantive significance of our model, or how much of the change in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. To obtain a percentage figure, multiply the R square number by 100 (example: R square of .01 would equal 1% of the model's dependent variable explained by the model).

The three models are compared side by side in table **5.7** to allow the reader to examine the relationship that these independent variables have the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[2]. The F score of models one and three are statistically significant at the .05 level of significance while model two is significant only at the .10 level of significance. The resulting Adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .0455 for the nominal variable, .0378 for the multinomial level variable, and .0457 for the interval level score variable. This tells the reader that the models only explain 4.55%, 3.78%, and 4.57%, respectively, of the variation in general fund per capita expenditures. This level of explanation indicates that only a very low level of substantive significance is found using our three models. A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicate that in none of the three models do we find that the research variable used to measure government institutional form to be statistically significant. The most significant of the independent variables in the model is the variable indicating whether the municipality is located in a suburban metropolitan area. In all three models this variable is significant at the .05 threshold level. In model one, for instance, the coefficient of this variable is -98.953 and is significant at the .05 level of significance.

[2] The five outliers identified each had a general fund per capita expenditure level significantly above the remaining municipalities. There was no statistical difference detected in models one and three when the regression models were run with the outliers included, however, in model two the significance was.0409 which is below the threshold of .05.

This tells us that a municipality located in a suburban location has $98.953 less in general fund per capita expenditures than a municipality located in an urban location (the comparison variable). The author finds this relationship significant in both models two ($100.315 less) and three ($100.069 less) as well. Although not at the threshold significance level of .05, analysis also shows that in all three models the median household income variable is significant at the .10 level. In model one, for every $1,000 change in median household income, one expects a $1.78 increase in general fund per capita expenditures; in model two one expects a $1.87 increase; and, in model, expect a $1.75 increase.

Table 5.7 Multiple regression – Ind. Var.-city type; Dep. Var. - general fund per capita expenditures

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	254	254	254
Constant	612.412 *** (3.22)	622.429 *** (3.19)	601.569 *** (3.12)
government form	31.063 (0.77)		
score			0.995 (0.81)
Adapted Political		-25.516 (-0.34)	
Conciliated		-70.155 (-0.64)	
Adapted Administrative		-14.410 (-0.21)	
Administrative		37.588 (0.46)	
population	-0.855 (-1.84)	-0.810 (-1.35)	-0.852 (-1.43)
median household income	1.776 * (1.76)	1.869 * (1.82)	1.749 * (1.73)
dummy suburb	-98.953 ** (-2.01)	-100.315 ** (-2.00)	-100.069 ** (-2.03)
dummy rural	-81.412 (-1.30)	-79.544 (-1.26)	-82.572 (-1.32)
total number of services	14.272 (1.58)	14.774 (1.61)	14.403 (1.59)
quality service score	-7.374 (-0.13)	-4.321 (-0.07)	-6.863 (-0.12)
percent minority	2.17 (1.65)	2.163 (1.64)	2.203 * (1.68)
dummy South	3.550 (0.06)	7.117 (0.11)	.542 (0.01)
dummy mid-west	-96.379 (-1.64)	-93.063 (-1.56)	-98.525 * (-1.68)
dummy west	-111.103 (-1.64)	-111.643 (-1.64)	-114.245 * (-1.68)
F score	2.10 **	1.71 *	2.10 **
Adjusted R^2	.0455	.0378	.0457

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

Findings for Hypothesis One

In the analysis that uses the three independent variables described above to classify municipalities, against the dependent variable general fund per capita expenditures, the author finds none of the research variables have a statistically significant relationship which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The Two Group Mean T-Test indicates no statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in general fund per capita expenditure levels. Likewise, the ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities found in the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also finds no statistically significant differences between the five types of cities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that while two of the three models put forward are each significant as a whole, they each explain very little of the change in the dependent variable of general fund per capita expenditures. In addition, none of the three individual research variables are found to be statistically significant in the model. The author therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate that per capita expenditures of a municipality are different depending on how the municipality's institutional form is classified.

Hypothesis Two

Hypotheses two, three, and four examine the percentage of total work time that the chief administrative officer of a municipality allocates to the management, policy, and political roles in their communities. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 provide a breakdown by form of government and type of city regarding these time allocations. Discussion of hypothesis two follows these tables.

Table 5.8 Summary of chief administrative officer's time allocation by government form

Form of Government	Management	Policy	Political
Mayor-Council	50.4%	31.5%	14.6%
Council-Manager	55.3%	32.2%	12.4%

*may not add to 100% due to rounding and the use of different cases

Table 5.9 Summary of chief administrative officer's time allocation by city type

Category of City		Management	Policy	Political
		N=260	N=261	N=260
Political		51.1%	26.9%	18.3%
Adapted Political		48.8%	33.0%	14.3%
	mayors	38.9%	36.8%	19.8%
	appointed CAOs	58.0%	29.4%	9.4%
Conciliated		63.0%	29.2%	7.7%
Adapted Administrative		54.4%	32.3%	12.9%
Administrative		56.7%	33.1%	10.7%
TOTAL		53.6%	33.0%	14.3%

*may not add to 100% due to rounding and the use of different cases

Hypothesis two proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are enacted to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, then the chief administrative officer's concerns with management efficiencies will alter and this will result in significantly different amounts of time devoted to these types of activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table **5.10**) show that the mean amount of time devoted to management activities of CAOs in the 170 council-manager cities is statistically higher than those of CAOs in the 90 mayor-council cities responding to the survey. The mean time a CAO devotes to management activities in the 170 council-manager municipalities responding in the survey is 55.3% of the total working time; the mean time a CAO devotes to management activities in the 90 mayor-council responding cities is 50.4% of the total working time. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -2.1471 at 258 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0327 which is below the threshold of .05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference.

Table 5.10 T-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to management activities

Government Form	**N**	**MEAN**	**T**	**Degrees of freedom**	**Significance (2-tailed)**
Mayor-Council	90	.504	-2.1471	258	.0327
Council-Manager	170	.553			

Table 5.11 ANOVA – city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to management activities

Model	**Sum of Squares**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**Mean Squares**	**F**	**Significance**
Between groups	.294487851	4	.073621963	2.44	0.0476
Within groups	7.69959473	255	.030194489		
Total	7.99408258	259			

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted

Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a relationship exists between city type and the dependent variable, mean amount of time a COA devotes to management activities.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis[3] indicates an F score of 2.44 with a significance level of .0476. This is under the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table 5.11), therefore, a significant difference is found to exist between the five Adapted Cities types.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author also uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship between mean amount of total working time devoted by CAOs to management related activities and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of whether the survey was completed by a mayor CAO or an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. The three models are compared side by side in table **5.12** to allow the reader to examine the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[4]. The F score of model one (mayor-council and council-manager) is statistically significant at the .01 level of significance, as is model two and model three. For model one, using the nominal

[3] If the six identified outliers are included in the ANOVA analysis the F statistic is found to be 1.25 with a statistical significance of 0.2913 which is above the .05 threshold.

[4] The six identified outliers each indicated a percentage of time spent on management activities as either much higher or much lower than other similar municipalities. Regression models run including the outliers did not change the statistical significance of any of the three models shown.

variable *government form,* the F score is 2.97 (significant at the .01 level). The F score for the multinomial model two is 3.49 (also significant at the .01 level). The interval level variable *score* in regression model three has an F score of 2.58 (also significant at the .01 level). The calculated adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models inform the reader that the independent variables, taken together, indicate a substantive significance of, or that they explain, 6.39%, 10.33%, and 5.19% respectively of the variation of the percentage of total working time devoted to management related activities for CAOs in these municipalities.

Table 5.12 Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to management related activities

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	260	260	260
Constant	.386 *** (7.73)	.441 *** (8.24)	.376 *** (7.22)
government form	.104 *** (3.85)		
score			.003 *** (3.39)
Adapted Political		-.130 *** (-2.73)	
Conciliated		.107 * (1.72)	
Adapted Administrative		.044 (1.14)	
Administrative		.070 (1.52)	
CAO in mayor-council municipality	.111 *** (2.86)	.187 *** (4.26)	.090 ** (2.40)
population	-.001 (-1.47)	-.0004 (-1.29)	-.0005 (-1.36)
median household income	.001 * (1.73)	.001 (1.30)	.001 * (1.65)
dummy suburb	.010 (0.33)	.016 (0.58)	.008 (0.26)
dummy rural	.056 (1.54)	.056 (1.59)	.051 (1.41)
dummy South	.027 (0.78)	.024 (0.71)	.022 (0.61)
dummy mid-west	.035 (1.05)	.048 (1.43)	.030 (0.89)
dummy west	-.018 (-0.48)	-.011 (-0.28)	-.023 (-0.60)
F score	2.97 ***	3.49 ***	2.58 ***
Adjusted R^2	.0639	.1033	.0519

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

An examination of the individual independent variables within the three models indicate that in both model one (mayor-council and council-manager) and model three (the calculated administrative score) the research variables are statistically significant at the .01 level and two of the four variables representing the adapted cities framework in

model two are significant at the .10 level of significance. The *government form* variable in model one demonstrates a T-score of 3.85 indicating a significance level of .01 and the *score* variable of model three indicate a T-score of 3.39, also indicating a significance level of .01. Only the Adapted Political research variable in model two reaches a statistically significant level of .05, however, the conciliated city variable is also statistically significant at the .10 level. In all three models the author finds that the dummy variable indicating those mayor-council municipalities where an appointed CAO completed the survey is highly significant. In model one this variable has a coefficient of .111; this tells us that, keeping constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities spend on average 11.1% more of their total time on management related activities than do elected CAOs. Similar results are found in models two and three. In model two the difference is 18.7% and in model three it is 9.0%. This finding is confirmed reviewing the two group mean comparison t-test between the 29 mayor-council municipalities in which the mayor completes the survey instrument and the 31 in which the appointed CAO completes the instrument (*mccao)*. The t-test using the *mccao* dummy variable results in a t score of -3.5584 and a significance of 0.0008. None of the other individual independent variables in any of the three models are statistically significant at the threshold level of significance of .05.

Findings for Hypothesis Two

The author finds in the above analysis using the three independent variables to classify municipalities against the dependent variable percentage of total work time devoted to management activities by the CAO, the dichotomous research variable discerning between mayor-council and council-manager forms of government (model 1)

and the interval level variable that scores each municipality according to various institutional and structural features (model 3), have a statistically significant relationship which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The R square, or substantive significance, of these two models, however, both explain less than 6.5% of the variation of the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is indeed a statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the mean percentage allocation of total work time a CAO in these communities devotes to management activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms what is discovered in model two, that there are some statistically significant differences between the five types of cities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that all three regression models are significant as a whole. In addition, even though both the research variables in model one and model three (government form and score) are statistically significant, both models explain less than 6.5% of the change in the dependent variable. Model two explains 10.33% of the change in the dependent variable. Only one of the research variables used for classifying cities into the Adapted Cites framework in model two is found to be significant at the threshold .05 levels in explaining the variation in the dependent variable, however, the conciliated cities variable is significant at the .10 level of significance. In all three models, however, the variable that captures the fact that an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form municipality completes the survey is significant in explaining the variation in how much total work time a CAO allocated to management related activities. Based upon these findings the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional

form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management activities will change

Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis three proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time the chief administrative officer devotes to policy activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, the chief administrative officer of that municipality will alter his or her reliance level on the council members for policy direction and this will result in significantly different amounts of time devoted to policy type activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.13) show that the percentage of time the CAO devotes to policy activities in the 170 council-manager cities responding to the survey is not statistically different than the mean percentage of time of CAOs in the 91 mayor-council cities responding to the survey. The mean percentage of time that a CAO in the 170 council-manager municipalities devotes to policy activities is 32.2% and the mean time devoted to management related activities by CAOs in the 91 mayor-council respondent cities is 31.46%. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -.3918 at 259 degrees of freedom[5]. The resulting significance is .6955 which is well above the threshold of .05; therefore there is no statistically significant difference.

[5] Calculating both the T-test and the ANOVA for this dependent variable including all five identified outliers did not change the significance of either tests result.

Table 5.13 Two group means comparison t-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to policy activities

Government Form	N	MEAN	T	Degrees of freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Mayor-Council	91	.3146	-.3918	259	.6955
Council-Manager	170	.322			

Table 5.14 ANOVA – adapted city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to policy activities

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F	Significance
Between groups	.082506336	4	.020626584	0.98	0.4176
Within groups	5.37490756	256	.020995733		
Total	5.4574139	260			

The five level multinomial independent variables for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to find if a relationship exists between it and the dependent variable percentage of total time that CAOs devote to policy related activities. Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 0.98 with a significance level of 0.4176; over the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table **5.14**). No significant difference is found between the CAOs in the five Adapted Cities types concerning the percentage of total time spent on policy related activities.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship between the percentage of the total amount of time CAOs

devote to policy related activities and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score along with the control independent variables of whether the survey is completed by a mayor CAO or an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. The three models are compared side by side in table **5.15** to allow the reader to examine the relationship these three independent variables have with the dependent variable.

Table 5.15 Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to policy related activities

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	261	261	261
Constant	.391*** (8.93)	.336 *** (7.07)	.381 *** (8.44)
government form	-.014 (-0.61)		
score			.0001 (0.11)
Adapted Political		.108 *** (2.65)	
Conciliated		.026 (0.48)	
Adapted Administrative		.051 (1.51)	
Administrative		.054 (1.35)	
CAO in mayor-council municipality	-.028 (-0.87)	-.072 * (-1.91)	-.017 (-0.54)
population	.0002 (0.61)	.0001 (0.51)	.0002 (0.54)
median household income	-.0002 (-0.49)	-0002 (-0.43)	-.0003 (-0.56)
dummy suburb	-.013 (-0.55)	-.024 (-0.97)	-.014 (-0.58)
dummy rural	-.024 (-0.79)	-.027 (-0.90)	-.023 (-0.74)
dummy South	-.048 (-1.56)	-.045 (-1.50)	-.048 (-1.57)
dummy mid-west	-.064 ** (-2.19)	-.068 ** (-2.32)	-.063 ** (-2.15)
dummy west	-.020 (-0.60)	-.027 (-0.80)	-.022 (-0.65)
F score	0.99	1.35	0.94
Adjusted R^2	-.0005	.0159	-.0020

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

In each of these regression models the identified outliers are removed[6]. None of the three models are statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. For model one

[6] Each of the five identified outliers had CAO percentage of time allocations to the policy activities at a much higher level than similar municipalities. Including the outliers in the regression equations did not change the significance level in any of the three models.

that uses the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 0.99 (not significant). The F score for the multinomial model two is 1.35 (not significant). Analysis indicates that the interval level variable *score* in model three has an F score of 0.94 (also not significant). These three F scores indicate that none of the three models are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are -.0005 for the nominal variable, .0159 for the multinomial nominal level variable, and -.0020 for the interval level score variable. When the author reviews the individual independent variables within the three models he finds that only in model two, where Adapted Political cities are found to be significantly different from Political cities, are any of the research variables found to be statistically significant. None of the independent control variables in any of the three models are statistically significant at the threshold .05 levels except the variable representing the mid-west region. The mid-west region is found to be significantly different than the northeast region in all three regression models. Performing a One Way ANOVA analysis on region and percentage of working time spent on policy activities finds that CAOs in the Midwest region spent significantly less percentage of their daily work time in policy activities than those in the Northeast, but not the West or the South.

Findings for Hypothesis Three

In the analysis above, using the three independent variables to classify municipalities in comparison with the dependent variable percentage of total working time a CAO devotes to policy related activities, the author finds none of the research variables to have a statistically significant relationship which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these regression

models indicates that the three independent variables explain a very small percentage of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is no statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities regarding the amount of time CAOs devote to policy activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms the findings in model two; no statistically significant difference between the five types of cities is detected, with the exception of adapted political cities in model two. Multiple regression analysis performed using the three research independent variables reveals that none of the three regression models are significant as a whole and none of the models explains much of the change in the dependent variable. Based upon these findings the author cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy activities will change.

Hypothesis Four

Hypothesis four proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to political activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, the chief administrative officer of that municipality concentrates at different levels on these political activities and this results in significantly different amounts of their total working time the CAO devotes to political type activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.16) show that the mean amount of time that the CAOs within the 170 council-manager cities devote to political activities is not statistically different, at the .05 threshold level of significance, than those CAOs in the 90 mayor-council cities responding to the survey[7]. The difference is, however, significant at the .10 level. The mean percentage of working time that CAOs devote to political activities in the 170 council-manager municipalities responding to the survey is 12.38%; the mean percentage of working time that CSOs devote to management activities in the 90 mayor-council municipalities is 14.58%. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to 1.8684 at 258 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0628; above the threshold of .05 but significant at the .10 level. Therefore, there is not a statistically significant difference between the two.

Table 5.16 T-test – percent of CAOs time allocated to political activities

Government Form	**N**	**MEAN**	**T**	**Degrees of freedom**	**Significance (2-tailed)**
Mayor-Council	90	.1458	1.8684	258	0.0628
Council-Manager	170	.1238			

[7] When the T-test is calculated with the six identified outliers included, the difference is significant at the .05 threshold level of significance. The ANOVA test is significant in both cases.

Table 5.17 ANOVA – adapted city type by percent of CAOs time allocated to political activities

Model	**Sum of Squares**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**Mean Squares**	**F**	**Significance**
Between groups	.131762625	4	.032940656	4.20	0.0026
Within groups	1.99845003	255	.007837059		
Total	2.13021266	259			

Using the five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative), analysis is performed to find if a difference exists between these five city types using the dependent variable, percentage of total time the CAO devotes to political activities.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis finds an F score of 4.20 with a significance level of .0026; well below the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table **5.17**). This finding indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups. The Bartlett's test for equal variance for this ANOVA is, however, statistically significant. The assumption of equal variance in each group is one of the primary assumptions required for ANOVA analysis. The statistically significant Bartlett's test result indicates that this equal variance assumption is violated. To compensate for this violation of equal variance a post hoc test on the data is run in SPSS using a Games-Howell multiple comparison statistic. The Games-Howell multiple comparison shows that out of the ten possible combinations of the five different city types (political, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) four combinations are significantly different at the threshold .05 level of significance. Political cities are significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.001 significance); Political cities are also

higher than Administrative cities (.011 significance). Adapted Political cities are significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.014 significance). Finally, Adapted Administrative cities are significantly higher than Conciliated cities (.016 significance). None of the other six combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression is used by the author to evaluate the relationship between the percentage of total working time devoted to political activities by CAOs and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, also including the control independent variables of whether the survey is completed by a mayor CAO in a mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. Again, the three models are compared side by side in table 5.18 to allow the reader to examine the relationship that these three independent variables have with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[8]. Findings indicate that all three of these models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For model one, using the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 3.93. The F score for the multinomial variable in model two is 4.54. The interval level variable *score,* found in model three, has an F score of 4.17. These three F scores indicate that all three of the regression models are statistically significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .0924 for the nominal variable (model 1), .01408 for the

[8] In each of the six identified outlier cities the CAO spent significantly more time in political activities than in similar cities. Running the regressions with the outliers included did not change the significance of any of the regression models.

multinomial nominal level variable (model 2), and .08608 for the interval level score variable (model 3).

A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicates that in models one and three the research variables are found to have a negative and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, controlling for all the other variables. The Adapted Political cities variable in model two is the only research independent variable found to be not statistically significant. The Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative variables in model two are all negative and significantly different from Political cities at the .01 level.

Table 5.18 Mult. Reg. – percent of CAOs total working time devoted to political related activities

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	260	260	260
Constant	.137 *** (5.41)	.139 *** (5.17)	.149 *** (5.69)
government form	-.050 *** (-3.72)		
score			-.002 *** (-3.98)
Adapted Political		.008 (0.34)	
Conciliated		-.109 *** (-3.51)	
Adapted Administrative		-.062 *** (-3.18)	
Administrative		-.084 *** (-3.62)	
Appointed CAO in mayor-council municipality	-.080 *** (-4.08)	-.104 *** (-4.66)	-.076 *** (-4.03)
population	.0002 (1.08)	.0002 (1.00)	.0002 (1.02)
median household income	-.0002 (-0.71)	.00002 (0.06)	-.0002 (-0.55)
dummy suburb	.004 (0.30)	.008 (0.55)	.006 (0.41)
dummy rural	-.00005 (-0.00)	.003 (0.15)	002 (0.09)
dummy South	.041 ** (2.34)	.044 ** (2.57)	.045 ** (2.56)
dummy mid-west	.046 *** (2.69)	.042 ** (2.50)	.048 *** (2.85)
dummy west	.054 *** (2.75)	.055 *** (2.87)	.058 *** (2.96)
F score	3.93 ***	4.54 ***	4.17 ***
Adjusted R^2	.0924	.1408	.08608

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

The *government form* research variable in model one and the *score* variable in model three both indicate a negative relationship with the dependent variable that is significant at the .01 level. Model one indicates that changing the form of government from mayor-council to council-manager, when controlling for all the other variables, results in a -5.0% change in the percentage of time a chief administrative officer devotes

to political activities. Model two predicts that, controlling for the other variables, changing the type of city from Political to Conciliated will result in a 10.9% decrease in time spent on political activities. Changing from a Political to an Adapted Administrative city type results in a 6.2% decrease in percentage of time spent on political activities and changing from Political to Administrative results in a decrease of 8.4%. In model three, a one point increase in the calculated score of a municipality results in a 0.2% decrease in the percentage of time a chief administrative officer devotes to political activities, controlling for the other independent variables. In all three models the author also finds that having an appointed CAO in a mayor-council municipality complete the survey is highly significant. In model one this variable has a coefficient of -.080; this tells us that, keeping constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities responding to the survey spend on average 8.0% less of their total time on political related activities than elected CAOs in mayor-council cities. The reader finds similar results in models two and three. In model two the difference is 10.4% less time spent on political activities for appointed CAOs and in model three it is 7.6% less time. Elected CAOs are more concerned with political activities as giving speeches, public relations and attending ceremonies. This could be attributed to the fact that, unlike appointed CAOs, these elected CAOs must regularly stand for election to office and these activities are more important to accomplishing this goal. The coefficients for each of the three region variables are positive and statistically significant as well. This tells the author that in all three regions outside of the Northeast, CAOs spent a significantly higher percentage of their total time in political related activities than CAOs in the Northeast region did, controlling for the other variables.

Findings for Hypothesis Four

When the author examines the analysis above, that uses the three independent research variables for classify municipalities against the dependent variable amount of time devoted to political activities, the findings indicate that all three of the research variables have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The R square, or substantive significance, of these three regression models indicates that the independent variables explain 9.24%, 14.08%, and 8.608% respectively of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between how CAOs in mayor-council and council-manager municipalities allocate their time to political activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms what is discovered in model two, there is a statistically significant difference between the amount of time CAOs in the five types of cities allocate for political activities, and five of the ten combinations of city type display a significant difference. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that in, all three of the regression models, the research variables are statistically significant. Only one city type category, Adapted Political cities in model two, is not significant. In addition, the regression models are found to all be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to political activities will change.

Hypothesis Five

Hypothesis five proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the perception of the chief administrative officer concerning the quality of the services a

municipality offers will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, then the chief administrative officer of that municipality attempts to meet the 'needs' of the community rather than its 'wants' at a different levels. This results in CAOs in different types of municipalities perceiving the services in those municipalities meeting the needs of the citizens within those communities at differing levels. Tables 5.19 and 5.20 provide a breakdown by form of government and type of city regarding the number of services and the quality scores given by chief administrative officers for those services. Discussion of hypothesis five will follow these tables.

Table 5.19 Quality/number of services – by government form

	Mayor-Council			**Council-Manager**
	mayor CAOs	**appointed CAOs**	**Total**	
N	52	42	94	170
Mean Rating	2.30	2.25	2.28	2.23
Minimum Rating	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.4
Maximum Rating	3	3	3	3
Mean Number of Services	10.63	9.24	10.01	9.74
Minimum # of Services	4	2	2	4
Maximum # of Services	12	12	12	12

Table 5.20 Quality/number of services – by city type

	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
N	25	60	12	126	41
Mean Rating	2.17	2.31	2.29	2.23	2.21
Minimum Rating	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.4	1.7
Maximum Rating	2.9	3	2.7	3	3
Mean Number of Services	10.76	9.78	10.08	9.79	9.39
Minimum # of Services	7	2	7	4	5
Maximum # of Services	12	12	12	12	12

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.21) shows the mean quality of services rating given by chief administrative officers in the 170 council-manager cities is not statistically different than is that given by chief administrative officers in the 94 mayor-council cities that responding to the survey[9]. The mean quality of services rating is the calculated average rating of the twelve common municipal services as rated by the chief administrative officers on a scale of 1 (available but less than desirable) to 3 (exceeds citizen's needs). The mean quality of services rating in the 170 council-manager municipalities responding in the survey is 2.226 and the mean quality of services rating by CAOs in the 94 mayor-council respondent cities is slightly higher at 2.278. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to 1.1802 at 262 degrees of

[9] Calculating the T-test and the ANOVA analysis including the two identified outliers did not change the significance of either test.

freedom. The resulting significance is .2390, well above the threshold of .05; therefore, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups.

Table 5.21 Two group means comparison t-test – quality of services rating for all municipal services

Government Form	N	MEAN	T	Degrees of freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Mayor-Council	94	2.278	1.1802	262	.2390
Council-Manager	170	2.226			

Table 5.22 ANOVA – adapted city type by quality of services score

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F	Significance
Between groups	.525521755	4	.131380439	1.15	0.3313
Within groups	29.4670545	259	.113772411		
Total	29.9925763	263			

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is analyzed for a relationship with the dependent variable of quality of services rating given by chief administrative officers.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 1.15 with a significance level of .3213; over the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table **5.22**). No significant difference is found between the five Adapted Cities types.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship between the quality of services rating given by chief administrative officers and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of whether the survey is completed by a mayor or an appointed CAO in a mayor-council form municipality, population, median household income, percentage of families living below the poverty line, urban/suburban/rural status, total number of services offered, and region. The three models are compared side by side in table 5.23 to allow the reader to examine the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[10]. All three of the models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For model one, using the nominal variable *government form* the F score is 4.34. The F score for the multinomial model two is 3.87. Model three, using the interval level variable *score* variable, has an F score of 4.30. These three F scores indicate that all three of the models are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting R square values for each of the three models are .1229 for the nominal variable, .1330 for the multinomial level variable, and .1217 for the interval level score variable. A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicate that in two of the three models (model one and model three) the primary research variable is found to be statistically significant at the .05 threshold level. In model two only the Adapted Political

[10] Two outliers were identified, one gave a much higher and the other a much lower quality rating score than similar cities. Running the models with these outliers included did not change the significance levels of any.

cities variable reaches the .05 significance level; the other three research variables (Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) are not significant.

Table 5.23 Multiple regression – dependent variable – quality of services score

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	263	263	263
Constant	2.622 *** (16.70)	2.519 *** (15.29)	2.650 *** (16.52)
government form	-.137 *** (-2.77)		
score			-.004 *** (-2.71)
Adapted Political		.206 ** (2.33)	
Conciliated		.038 (0.33)	
Adapted Administrative		-.023 (-0.31)	
Administrative		-.060 (-0.69)	
Appointed CAO in mayor-council municipality	-.176 ** (-2.45)	-.273 *** (-3.30)	-.157 ** (-2.27)
population	.001 * (1.99)	.001 * (1.89)	.001 * (1.94)
median household income	.001 (0.75)	.001 (0.91)	.001 (0.80)
poverty %	-.005 (-1.03)	-.004 (-0.85)	-.005 (-1.08)
dummy suburb	-.005 (-0.10)	-.017 (-0.31)	-.002 (-0.04)
dummy rural	-.049 (-0.73)	-.056 (-0.84)	-.043 (-0.64)
total number of services	-.046 *** (-4.83)	-.046 *** (-4.88)	-.046 *** (-4.84)
dummy South	.175 *** (2.68)	.176 *** (2.71)	.185 *** (2.83)
dummy mid-west	.187 *** (2.96)	.173 *** (2.74)	.194 *** (3.08)
dummy west	.082 (1.14)	.073 (1.03)	.091 (1.26)
F score	4.34 ***	3.87 ***	4.30 ***
Adjusted R^2	.1229	.1330	.1217

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

Model one results find that, controlling for all the other variables in the equation, CAOs in council-manager municipalities rate the total quality of their services .137 points lower than CAOs in mayor-council municipalities. In regression model three, again controlling for the other variables, for every additional point added to a municipality's score, the CAO in that municipality rates total quality of services .004 points lower. In all three models the dummy variable indicating mayor-council municipalities in which an appointed CAO completes the survey is highly significant. In model one this variable has a coefficient of -.176; this tells the reader that, keeping constant the other variables, appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities rate the total quality of services on average .176 points less than all other CAOs. Similar results are uncovered in models two and three. In model two the difference is .273 points less and in model three it is .157 points less. The variable capturing total number of services reported to be offered in the municipality is also significant in all three models. In all three models the coefficient of this control variable is -.046. This informs us that in each model, for every additional service offered by the municipality the quality score given by the CAO for that municipality decreases by .046 points. It appears that increasing the number of services that a municipality offers has a negative and significant affect on the quality of those services offered. The control variables for the south and mid-west region are also positive and statistically significant at the .01 levels in all three regression models. CEO's in the south and mid-west region will rate the quality of their services higher than those CEO's in the northeast region, controlling for the other variables in the regression.

Findings for Hypothesis Five

In the analysis of the three independent variables classifying municipalities, set against the dependent variable quality of services score, the research variables in model one and model three are found to have a statistically significant relationship allowing the author to reject the null hypothesis. Only the Adapted Political cities variable in model two is found to be significant. The adjusted-R-square or substantive significance of these three models indicates that the independent variables explain 12.29%, 13.30%, and 12.17% respectively of the variation in the dependent variable, total quality of service rating. The Two Group Mean T-Test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the mean quality of service ratings given by their respective chief administrative officers. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities from the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms what is found in regression model two; no statistically significant differences between the five types of cities is detected. The author finds, however, that all three regression models analyzed are significant as a whole. In addition, multiple regression analysis using the three research independent variables find that in two of the three regression models the research variable is statistically significant; in model two only the Adapted Political cities variable is significant. Based upon the findings in our regression analysis the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes the perception of the chief administrative officer concerning the quality of the services offered within their municipalities also changes.

Hypothesis Six

Hypotheses six, seven, eight, and nine examine the involvement level of the appointed chief administrative officer of a municipality in the Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management related dimensions within their municipalities as described by Svara in his 'Dichotomy-Duality Model' (1985, 1995). Svara uses this model to graphically show the division of responsibility for each of these four dimensions of government activity between the elected council in a municipality and its appointed administrative official. Svara points out that, "the logic of the model suggests that the involvement of both council members and administrators be measured separately. Part of the confusion in interpreting existing research is uncertainty over whether decision making is a zero-sum activity. Demonstrating that the manager's contributions are extensive does not necessarily mean that the council's role is diminished" (Svara, 1995, p. 38). To get a truer picture, both the CAOs and the council's involvement ratings must be used. "This approach does not assume a zero-sum situation. It permits any combination of involvement level for the two sets of officials" (Svara, 2006, p. 1069). In tables 5.24 and 5.25 a breakdown by form of government and type of city regarding the involvement level of CAOs in relation to the rating scale used in the survey is displayed. Although they are not included in the analysis, those municipalities without an appointed CAO and led by a mayor, are also listed for comparative purposes (all of these are mayor-council form municipalities and all but six of these municipalities fall into the Political city type classification).

Table 5.24 CAOs involvement level by governmental form

Form of Government	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Mayor-Council	4.202	4.418	4.357	4.070
Council-Manager	4.347	4.599	4.508	4.405
Mayor Led Cities	4.376	4.419	4.301	4.237

Table 5.25 CAOs involvement level by city type

Category of City	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Political	NA	NA	NA	NA
Adapted Political	4.191	4.397	4.319	4.000
Conciliated	4.394	4.614	4.576	4.515
Adapted Administrative	4.357	4.604	4.521	4.388
Administrative	4.283	4.567	4.463	4.439
Mayor Led Cities	4.376	4.419	4.301	4.237

In tables 5.26 and 5.27 a breakdown by form of government and type of city displaying the CAOs perception of the involvement level of councils in relation to the rating scale is also displayed.

Table 5.26 CAOs perception of council's involvement level by government form

Form of Government	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Mayor-Council	3.958	3.777	3.327	2.526
Council-Manager	3.725	3.409	2.663	1.398

Table 5.27 CAOs perception of council's involvement level by city type

Category of City	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Political	NA	NA	NA	NA
Adapted Political	3.957	3.788	3.375	2.528
Conciliated	4.091	3.727	2.909	2.455
Adapted Administrative	3.717	3.373	2.624	1.354
Administrative	3.700	3.506	2.789	1.496

Combining these two ratings gives us a picture of the relative involvement of both the appointed CAO and the council for each of the four dimensions. An example of such a comparison as a graphically display is shown in Figure 5.1. A graphic representation of each type of city institutional form discussed in the above charts is also included in Appendix C.



Figure 5.1 Relative involvement level of CAOs and council in mayor-council cities

Relative involvement levels of both the appointed CAOs and the councils are also calculated by finding the percentage of total involvement (both the CAO and the council together equal 100%) for each of the two groups. In tables 5.28 and 5.29 a breakdown regarding the level of total involvement as divided between the council and the appointed CAO, as perceived by the CAO, is displayed by government form and by the type of government. These percentages are calculated by taking the CAOs total average rating and dividing it into the sum of the CAOs plus council's average ratings. This tells us what percentage of total involvement is contributed by the appointed CAO. For example, from Table 5.28 it the reader finds that appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities are relatively more involved in mission activities than are council members in mayor-council municipalities (CAO:.5187 verses council: 1-.5187=.4813).

Table 5.28 CAOs percentage of total involvement – by government form

Form of Government	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Mayor-Council	.5187	.5413	.5702	.6313
Council-Manager	.5417	.5789	.6359	.7800
Mayor Led Cities	.5637	.5704	.5948	.6677

Table 5.29 CAOs percentage of total involvement – by city type

Category of City	Mission Activities	Policy Activities	Admin. Activities	Mgmt. Activities
Political	NA	NA	NA	NA
Adapted Political	.5179	.5393	.5645	.6272
Conciliated	.5222	.5575	.6197	.6668
Adapted Administrative	.5431	.5820	.6400	.7849
Administrative	.5384	.5689	.6214	.7671
Mayor Led Cities	.5637	.5704	.5948	.6677

These percentage allocations can also be graphically displayed (See Figure 5.2 for an example) to illustrate the relative involvement of the CAO and the council. A graphic representation of the division of total effort split between CAOs and councils for each of the different types of city institutional forms displayed in the above charts is included in Appendix D.



Figure 5.2 Percentage of Total Effort for CAOs and council in mayor-council cities

The author uses the CAOs percentage of total involvement, as displayed in Table 5.28 and 5.29, as the dependent variable to test hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9**.**

Hypothesis six proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer verses the council in Mission activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, the chief administrative officer of that municipality will rely at different levels on the elected officials of the community for mission type activities and will therefore also personally focus different amounts of his efforts on those mission type activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.30) show that the mean percentage of total involvement between the appointed chief administrative officers verses the council in mission related activities in the 167 council-

manager cities is statistically different from the 56 CAOs in the mayor-council cities responding to the survey at the .05 level. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities in the 167 council-manager municipalities is .5417. The mean percentage of total involvement between for appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities in the 56 mayor-council respondent cities is lower at .5187. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -2.4180 at 221 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0164; less than the threshold level of .05. Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups[11].

Table 5.30 T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in mission

Government Form	**N**	**MEAN**	**T**	**Degrees of freedom**	**Significance (2-tailed)**
Mayor-Council	56	.5187	-2.4180	221	.0164
Council-Manager	167	.5417			

Table 5.31 ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in mission

Model	**Sum of Squares**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**Mean Squares**	**F**	**Significance**
Between groups	.024087665	3	.008029222	2.11	0.0998
Within groups	.833261799	219	.003804848		
Total	.857349464	222			

[11] Analysis that included the seven outliers identified produced a T-test that was significant only at the .10 level of significance and an ANOVA test that was significant at the .05 level of significance.

The five level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed for a relationship with the dependent variable of mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative in mission related activities.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 2.11 with a significance level of 0.0998; over the .05 threshold for statistical significance but significant at the .10 level (See Table 5.31). Based upon these results, no significant difference is found in the dependent variable between the five Adapted Cities types.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship between the percentage of total involvement between the appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. In addition, a dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor rather than the appointed CAO completes the survey is added to control for this variable. The three models are compared side by side in table 5.32 to allow the reader to examine the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed. In models one, two, and three the F score is statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For model one, using the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 3.13; the F score for the multinomial model two is 2.60; and for model three, using the interval level

variable score, findings indicate an F score of 3.08. These three F scores indicate that all three of the models are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .0714 for the nominal variable, .0673 for the multinomial nominal level variable, and .0696 for the interval level score variable. Reviewing the individual independent variables in the three models indicates that the dummy variable controlling for a when mayor completes the survey is not significant in any of the three models. The author therefore concludes that it makes no statistical difference whether the mayor or appointed CAO completes the survey.

Table 5.32 Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in mission

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	223	223	223
Constant	.479 *** (27.58)	.479 *** (26.14)	.471 *** (22.91)
government form	.021 * (1.89)		
score			.001 * (1.78)
Conciliated		-.003 (-0.13)	
Adapted Administrative		.023 * (1.79)	
Administrative		.013 (0.86)	
mayor completing survey	-.023 (-1.30)	-.023 (-1.26)	-.022 (-1.27)
population	-.0001 (-0.92)	-.0001 (-0.97)	-.0001 (-0.84)
dummy suburb	.029 *** (2.77)	.030 *** (2.83)	.028 *** (2.71)
dummy rural	.006 (0.43)	.006 (0.38)	.006 (0.40)
dummy South	.031 ** (2.41)	.031 ** (2.40)	.029 ** (2.26)
dummy mid-west	.032 ** (2.51)	.031 ** (2.40)	.031 ** (2.42)
dummy west	.038 *** (2.60)	.039 *** (2.63)	.036 ** (2.46)
F score	3.13 ***	2.60 ***	3.08 ***
Adjusted R^2	.0714	.0673	.0696

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

In all three models, classifying a municipality as suburban is highly significant, as is the region of the country where the municipality is located. These findings tell us that, controlling for the other variables, an appointed CAO in a suburban municipality will contribute 2.9%, 3.0%, and 2.8% more, respectfully, for models one, two, and three of the total effort of involvement in mission activities than appointed CAOs in urban municipalities. Likewise, an appointed CAO in the South, Mid-west, or West will

contribute a higher percentage to the total effort put forth in the mission activities defined in the survey instrument than one that is located in the Northeast region. Neither the *government form* variable in model one (T-score of 1.89) nor the *score* variable of model three (T-score of 1.78) indicates a significance level reaching the .05 level required, although both do reach a significance level of .10. This may indicate that a real difference does exist but that difference does not reach the threshold level used within this study. Neither the rural nor the population variables in any of the three models are statistically significant.

Findings for Hypothesis Six

In the analysis of the three independent variables used to classify municipalities against the dependent variable percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in mission related activities, none of the research variables describing the institutional structure of the municipalities included in the study are found to have a statistically significant relationship. This does not allow the author to reject the null hypothesis[12]. The *govform* variable in model one, the *score* variable in model three, and the Adapted Administrative city variable in model two are all significant at the .10 level but all fail to meet the .05 significance level threshold. The adjusted-R-square indicates that each of the three models explain about 7% of the variation of the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the mean percentage of total involvement of the appointed chief administrative officers in mission related activities. The ANOVA analysis between the five categories of cities frome the

[12] Running these three regression models including the seven identified outliers produced similar results of significance. All outliers have mission involvement percentages significantly higher or lower than the mean level of similar municipalities.

'Adapted Cities Framework' confirms the results from regression model two, that any statistically significant differences in the dependent variable between the five types of cities does not reach the threshold level of .05 significance. Multiple regression analysis performed using the three research independent variables finds that, although all three of the models regressed are significant as a whole, the research variables in each of the models are not significant at the threshold level set within this study. Based upon all of these findings, the author cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data do not demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in Mission activities changes.

Hypothesis Seven

Hypothesis seven proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in Policy activities will also change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, the appointed chief administrative officer of that municipality relies on the elected officials of the community for policy type activities at different levels and will, therefore, personally focus different amounts of effort on these policy type activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.33) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities in the 171 council-manager cities is statistically higher than those of the appointed CAOs in the 55 mayor-council cities

responding to the survey[13]. The percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities in the 171 council-manager municipalities that responded in the survey was .5789. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities in the 55 mayor-council respondent cities is significantly lower at .5413. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -4.2632 at 224 degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is .0000, well below the threshold of .05. Analysis therefore shows that there is a statistically significant difference in the dependent variable between the two groups.

Table 5.33 T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in policy

Government Form	**N**	**MEAN**	**T**	**Degrees of freedom**	**Significance (2-tailed)**
Mayor-Council	55	.5413	-4.2632	224	.0000
Council-Manager	171	.5789			

Table 5.34 ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in policy

Model	**Sum of Squares**	**Degrees of Freedom**	**Mean Squares**	**F**	**Significance**
Between groups	.063675662	3	.021225221	6.55	0.0003
Within groups	.719617063	222	.003241518		
Total	.783292725	225			

The five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification, based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted

[13] When both the T-test and the ANOVA are calculated including the four identified outliers, the results were statistically the same.

Administrative, and Administrative), is also utilized to analyze whether a relationship exists with the dependent variable of percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in policy related activities.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 6.55 with a significance level of .0003, well below the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table 5.34). This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups. The Bartlett's test for equal variance for this ANOVA is, however, statistically significant. The assumption of equality of variance for each group is one of the primary assumptions for ANOVA analysis. The statistically significant Bartlett's test result indicates that this equal variance assumption is violated. To compensate for this violation of equal variance a post hoc test on the data is run in SPSS using a Games-Howell multiple comparison statistic. The Games-Howell multiple comparison shows that out of the six possible combinations of the four different city types (political is excluded leaving, adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) two combinations are found to be significantly different at the threshold .05 level of significance. Adapted Political cities, with a mean of .5392, are significantly different from Adapted Administrative cities, with a mean of .5820 (.000 significance). Adapted Political cities are also significantly different from Administrative cities, with a mean of .5697 (.025 significance). None of the other four combinations of city types meet the significance threshold of .05.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression is used to evaluate the relationship that percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative

officers in policy related activities has with the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region[14]. An addition dummy variable indicating whether the elected mayor rather than the appointed CAO completes the survey is added to control for this variable. Again, the three models are compared side by side in table 5.35 to allow the reader to examine the relationship these independent variables have with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed. The author finds that all three of the models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. For model one, using the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 5.07. The F score for the multinomial model two is 4.28. The model using the interval level variable *score,* model three, has an F score of 4.40. These three F scores indicate that all three of the regression models are statistically significant when explaining the variation in the dependent variable. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .1265 for the nominal variable (model 1), .1273 for the multinomial level variable (model 2), and .1079 for the interval level score variable (model 3).

[14] The percentage of CAO involvement in all four of the identified outlier cities is significantly higher than the mean for similar cities.

Table 5.35 Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement v. Council in policy

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	226	226	226
Constant	.503 *** (31.20)	.501 *** (29.29)	.497 *** (25.74)
government form	.038 *** (3.66)		
score			.001 *** (2.93)
Conciliated		.015 (0.78)	
Adapted Administrative		.044 *** (3.70)	
Administrative		.028 ** (1.98)	
mayor completing survey	-.019 (-1.21)	-.017 (-0.98)	-.023 (-1.40)
population	-.0001 (-1.12)	-.0001 (-1.19)	-.0001 (-0.99)
dummy suburb	.023 ** (2.42)	.024 ** (2.52)	.021 ** (2.22)
dummy rural	-.003 (-0.24)	-.004 (-0.33)	-.005 (-0.35)
dummy South	.032 *** (2.74)	.032 *** (2.71)	.030 ** (2.46)
dummy mid-west	.039 *** (3.22)	.038 *** (3.12)	.036 *** (2.97)
dummy west	.036 ** (2.69)	.037 *** (2.77)	.033 ** (2.47)
F score	5.07 ***	4.28 ***	4.40 ***
Adjusted R^2	.1265	.1273	.1079

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

Reviewing the individual independent variables from the three models indicates that in all three models most of the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The Conciliated cities variable in model two is the only research independent variable in any of the models not to be statistically significant. The Adapted Administrative and Administrative cities variables in model two are both positive and significantly different from Adapted Political cities

(the control dummy variable) at the .05 level. The *government form* research variable in model one and the *score* variable in model three both indicate a positive relationship that is significant at the .01 level. Model one indicates that changing the form of government from mayor-council to council manager results in a .038 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. In model three, a one point change in the calculated score of a municipality results in a .001 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in policy related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. A review of the individual control variables found within the three models indicates that the dummy variable controlling for a mayor completing the survey is not significant in any of the three models. In all three models, the fact that a municipality is suburban is found to be highly significant as is the region of the country where the municipality is located. This suggests that appointed CAOs in suburban municipalities are involved at significantly higher levels in policy related activities within their municipalities than the appointed CAOs in urban municipalities. Similar to findings in hypothesis six, an appointed CAO in the South, Mid-west, or West contributes a higher percentage to the total effort put forth in the policy activities, as defined in the survey instrument, than a similar CAO that is located in the Northeast region. Neither the rural nor the population variables in any of the three models are statistically significant nor does it matter whether the survey is completed by the mayor or appointed CAO.

Findings for Hypothesis Seven

In reviewing the analysis, using the three independent variables to classify municipalities against the dependent variable percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in policy related activities, all of the research variables, save one in model two (conciliated cities), are found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The direction of the relationship is positive. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these models indicates that the independent variables explain between 10.79% and 12.73% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference in the dependent variable between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the percentage of involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in policy related activities. Appointed CAOs in council-manager cities are significantly more involved in policy related activities than are appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities found in the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms findings in regression model two, that there is a statistically significant difference between the five types of cities when examining the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in policy related activities. Multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that in all three regression models the research variables (again with the exception of Conciliated cities in model two) are statistically significant and all three of the regression models are found to be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings, the author can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the

percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in Policy activities changes.

Hypothesis Eight

Hypothesis eight proposes that as the as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative activities will change. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, the appointed chief administrative officer of that municipality will rely more or less on the elected officials of the community for the performance of administrative related activities and will therefore personally focus more or less of his/her energy on these administrative type activities..

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.36) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities in the 170 council-manager cities is statistically higher than that of appointed CAOs in the 56 mayor-council cities responding to the survey[15]. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers' in administrative related activities in the 170 council-manager municipalities is .6359. This compares to .5702 for appointed CAOs in the 56 mayor-council respondent cities. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -5.7384 at 224

[15] Including the four identified outliers in the data for the T-test or ANOVA analysis did not change the statistical significance of either statistic.

degrees of freedom. The resulting significance is less than .0001, below the threshold of .05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

Table 5.36 T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement in administrative activities

Government Form	N	MEAN	T	Degrees of freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Mayor-Council	56	.5702	-5.7384	224	.0000
Council-Manager	170	.6359			

Table 5.37 ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement in administrative activities

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F	Significance
Between groups	.198185788	3	.066061929	12.04	0.00000
Within groups	1.21766444	222	.005484975		
Total	1.41585022	225			

The five-level multinomial nominal independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a relationship exists between it and the dependent variable of percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities.

For analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA, this analysis indicates an F score of 12.04 with a significance level of less than .0001, below the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table **5.37**). This finding indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups. The multiple comparison shows that out of the

six possible combinations using the four different city types (adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) the dependent variable in two combinations are significantly different at the threshold .05 level. Adapted Political cities (mean of .5645) are significantly lower than both Adapted Administrative cities (mean of .6400) (.000 significance) and Administrative cities (mean of .6214) (.010 significance). None of the other four combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship of the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities, and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. An additional dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor completes the survey is added to control for this variable. Again, the three models are compared side by side in table 5.38 to allow the reader to examine the relationship between these three independent variables and the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[16]. Based upon the regressions performed, findings indicate that all three of the models are statistically significant at the .01 level. For model one, using the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 5.39. The F score for the multinomial variable model two is 4.57. Model three, using the interval level variable *score,* has an F score of 5.35. The resulting

[16] Including the four identified outliers in the regression analysis does not change the significance levels in any of the models. All four outlier respondents have much higher percentages than the means of similar municipalities.

adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .1350 for the nominal variable (model 1), .1369 for the multinomial nominal level variable (model 2), and .1339 for the interval level score variable (model 3).

A review of the individual independent variables found in the three models indicates that in all three models the research variables are found to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The *government form* research variable in model one, the three city type variables in model two, and the *score* variable in model three all indicate a positive relationship that is significant at the .05 threshold level. Model one finds that changing the form of government from mayor-council to council manager results in a .062 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. For model two, the appointed CAOs percentage of total involvement in Conciliated cities are .052 higher than in the control type, Adapted Political, cities; Adapted Administrative cities are .074 higher; and, Administrative cities are .055 higher.

In model three, regression shows that a one point change in the calculated score of a municipality results in a .002 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities, when other independent variables are controlled for. None of the coefficients for any of the control independent variables in any of the three models are found to be statistically significant at the .05 threshold level.

Table 5.38 Multiple regression – dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement in administrative activities

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	226	226	226
Constant	.569 *** (27.25)	.561 *** (25.67)	.543 *** (21.79)
government form	.062 *** (4.55)		
score			.002 *** (4.52)
Conciliated		.052 ** (1.97)	
Adapted Administrative		.074 *** (4.79)	
Administrative		.055 *** (2.99)	
mayor completing survey	-.027 (-1.25)	-.018 (-0.84)	-.025 (-1.17)
population	-.0002 (-1.16)	-.0002 (-1.16)	-.0002 (-0.99)
dummy suburb	.002 (0.15)	.002 (0.18)	.0003 (0.02)
dummy rural	-.028 (-1.56)	-.029 (-1.62)	-.029 (-1.64)
dummy South	.012 (0.79)	.011 (0.71)	.007 (0.45)
dummy mid-west	.028 * (1.83)	.028 (1.79)	.025 (1.63)
dummy west	.015 (0.86)	.018 (1.00)	.010 (0.58)
F score	5.39 ***	4.57 ***	5.35 ***
Adjusted R^2	.1350	.1369	.1339

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 leve

Findings for Hypothesis Eight

In the analysis described above, when using the three independent variables for classify municipalities to compare the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities, the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. These findings allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The

adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these regression models indicates that the independent variables examined in the three regression models each explain approximately 13.5% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities when examining the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in administrative related activities. The appointed CAOs in council-manager cities exhibit a significantly higher percentage of total involvement in administrative related activities than appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities from the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms the findings in regression model two, that there is a statistically significant difference between the five types of cities (there were no appointed CAOs in Political cities) when examining the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in administrative related activities. OLS multiple regression analysis of the three research independent variables finds that in all three regression models the research variables are both positive and statistically significant and that the regression models are found to be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officers in Administrative activities changes.

Hypothesis Nine

In Hypothesis Nine the author proposes that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief

administrative officer in Management activities changes. The author anticipates that as changes to institutional and structural characteristics of municipalities are made to make the city more 'reformed' or less 'reformed' in character, then the chief administrative officer of that municipality will alter his or her reliance on the elected officials of the community for management related activities and personally focus different amounts of his or her own time and energy on these management type activities.

T-Tests and ANOVA analysis

Analysis of the data using the Two Group Mean Comparison T-Test (See Table 5.39) show that the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities in the 171 council-manager cities is statistically higher than it is for those CAOs in the 57 mayor-council cities that responded to the survey[17]. The mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities in the 171 council-manager municipalities responding in the survey is .7800 and the mean percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities in the 57 mayor-council respondent cities is significantly lower at .6313. Analysis results in a t-statistic equal to -7.9249 at 226 degrees of freedom. This resulting significance is less than .0001, below the threshold of .05; therefore it is shown that there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

[17] Including the two identified outliers in the T-test or NOVA analysis did not alter the findings.

Table 5.39 T-test – CAOs percentage of total involvement in management activities

Government Form	N	MEAN	T	Degrees of freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Mayor-Council	57	.6313	-7.9249	226	.0000
Council-Manager	171	.7800			

Table 5.40 ANOVA – adapted city type by CAOs percentage of total involvement in management activities

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F	Significance
Between groups	.957168729	3	.319056243	21.10	0.00000
Within groups	3.3869559	224	.015120339		
Total	4.34412463	227			

The five-level multinomial independent variable for city classification based on the 'Adapted Cities Framework' (Political, Adapted Political, Conciliated, Adapted Administrative, and Administrative) is also analyzed to determine if a relationship exists between it and the dependent variable of percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities.

Analysis of the data using One Way ANOVA analysis indicate an F score of 21.10 with a significance level of less than .0001, below the .05 threshold for statistical significance (See Table 5.40). This finding indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups. The multiple comparison shows that out of the six possible combinations from the four different city types (adapted political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative) three of the combinations are found to be significantly different at the threshold .05 level of significance. Adapted Political cities (mean of .6272) are significantly lower than both Adapted Administrative cities (mean of

.7849) (.000 significance) and Administrative cities (mean of .7671) (.000 significance). In addition, Conciliated cities (mean of .6668) are also found to be significantly lower than Adapted Administrative cities (.041 significance). None of the other three combinations meet the significance threshold of .05.

OLS Multiple Linear Regression analysis

The author uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple linear regression to evaluate the relationship between the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities, and the three research independent variables of government form, city type, and calculated score, along with the control independent variables of population, urban/suburban/rural status, and region. In addition, a dummy variable indicating that the elected mayor rather than the appointed CAO completes the survey is added to control for this variable. As before, the three models are compared side by side in table 5.41 to allow the reader to examine the relationship of these independent variables with the dependent variable.

Each of these models is run with the identified outliers removed[18]. The findings of the regressions show that all three of the models are statistically significant at the .01 level of significance. In model one, using the nominal variable *government form,* the F score is 11.78. The F score for the multinomial model, model two, is 9.44. For the interval level variable model, model three, using the variable *score,* results indicate an F score of 12.49. The resulting adjusted-R-square values for each of the three models are .2752 for the nominal variable (model 1), .2710 for the multinomial level variable (model 2), and .2881 for the interval level score variable (model 3).

[18] The two identified outliers had higher percentages than similar cities. Inclusion of these outliers did not change any significance levels in the models.

Table 5.41 Multiple regression – Dep. Var. – CAOs percentage of total involvement in management activities

Independent Variable	**Regression #1 (government form)**	**Regression #2 (city type)**	**Regression #3 (score)**
N	228	228	228
Constant	.545 *** (16.18)	.544 *** (15.30)	.482 *** (12.25)
government form	.126 *** (5.85)		
score			.005 *** (6.23)
Conciliated		.019 (0.45)	
Adapted Administrative		.132 *** (5.39)	
Administrative		.113 *** (3.85)	
mayor completing survey	-.067 ** (-1.98)	-.065 * (-1.83)	-.055 (-1.60)
population	.0005 ** (2.10)	.0005 ** (2.04)	.0006 ** (2.28)
dummy suburb	.036 * (1.76)	.036 * (1.75)	.032 (1.59)
dummy rural	.020 (0.72)	.017 (0.61)	.017 (0.62)
dummy South	.080 *** (3.19)	.081 *** (3.21)	.069 *** (2.75)
dummy mid-west	.065 ** (2.55)	.065 ** (2.53)	.058 ** (2.33)
dummy west	.078 *** (2.75)	.079 *** (2.79)	.067 ** (2.38)
F score	11.78 ***	9.44 ***	12.49 ***
Adjusted R^2	.2752	.2710	.2881

* sig. at .10 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level

A review of the individual independent variables in the three models indicates that in all three models the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, with the exception of one variable in model two. The Conciliated cities variable in model two (t score of 0.45) is the only research independent variable the author finds to not be statistically significant. The Adapted Administrative and Administrative cities variables in model two both indicate a positive

and significantly difference in the dependent variable from Adapted Political cities (our control city type) at the .01 level. The *government form* research variable in model one and the *score* variable in model three both indicate a positive relationship with the dependent variable that is significant at the .01 level. Model one finds that changing the form of government from mayor-council to council manager results in a .126 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities, controlling for the other independent variables. In model three, a one point changing the calculated score variable one point in a municipality results in a .005 increase in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities, again controlling for the other independent variables. In model one the variable indicating that a mayor completes the survey is shown to be both negative and significant, but this variable is only marginally significant in model 2 (.10 significance) and not significant at all in model three. Population has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable in all three models. In models one and two a one thousand person rise in population equates to a .0005 increase in the dependent variable; in model three a one thousand person rise in population results in a .0006 increase. This suggests that an increase in population has the effect of increasing the percentage of total effort that a CAO devotes to the management dimension. Regional differences are also found in all three models. In all three models a CAO in a municipality located outside of the Northeast region has a significantly higher percentage of total involvement in management related activities. This suggests that CAOs in municipalities outside of the Northeast see themselves as more involved in management activities than appointed CAOs in the Northeast region.

None of the coefficients for any of the other control independent variables in any of the three models are found to be statistically significant at the threshold level.

Findings for Hypothesis Nine

In the analysis described above, when using the three independent variables for classify municipalities to compare the dependent variable, percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities, the research variables are found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable with one exception, Conciliated cities in regression model two. The direction of the relationship is positive. The adjusted-R-square, or substantive significance, of these models indicates that the independent variables in these three models explain approximately 28% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Two Group Mean T-Test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities. The appointed CAOs in council-manager cities have a significantly higher percentage of total involvement in management related activities than do appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities. The ANOVA analysis using the five categories of cities found in the 'Adapted Cities Framework' also confirms the findings in regression model two, that there is a statistically significant difference between the four (there are no appointed CAOs in Political type cities) types of cities when examining the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities. OLS multiple regression analysis using the three research independent variables finds that in all three regression models the research variables are statistically

significant (except for one individual variable in model two) and the regression models analyzed are found to be significant as a whole. Based upon these findings the author can reject the null hypothesis. The data do demonstrate that as the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the appointed chief administrative officer in management related activities changes.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Discussion of Findings

In recent years scholars have observed and reported on a number of structural changes that are taking place in municipalities within the United States (Adrian, 1988; Moulder, 2008; MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Ebdon & Brucato, 2000; Frederickson, Logan & Wood, 2003). These various authors suggest that the traditional dichotomous classification system most scholars commonly use to describe the majority of municipalities as either mayor-council or council-manager may not prove adequate today when analyzing the differences found between these communities (DeSantis, 2002). The intent of this study is to test whether these well documented structural changes, taking place in many municipalities within the United States in recent decades, has any effect on important variables found in those communities. The author tests these effects using three primary independent research variables and a number of operationalized dependent variables. Three independent variables are tested. First, the author tests the traditional dichotomy classification system of mayor-council verses council-manager. Second, the five category classification system put forward by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a) in their book titled *The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change* is analyzed. Lastly, a classification system developed by the author that evaluates each municipality based upon various institutional and structural features and then assigns each municipality a score between zero and fifty is also tested.

Several variables of importance, designed to assist the author in evaluating distinctions between the various classification forms, are evaluated in this study including the general fund per capita expenditures, the percent of total time the CAO spends on management activities, the percent of total time the CAO spends on policy activities, the percent of total time the CAO spends on political activities, the quality of municipal services as perceived by the CAO, the percentage of involvement for the CAO in the total mission related activities of a municipality, the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in total policy related activities, the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in total administrative related activities, and the percentage of total involvement for the CAO of a municipality in total management related activities. Analysis of the data in this study produces mixed results. Significant differences are found between the various municipal classification forms in some dependent variables; in other dependent variables under examination, the data do not indicate any differentiation between forms. In its entirety, however, this analysis does contribute in a significant way to the overall knowledge of local government administration.

General Fund Per Capita Expenditures

Hypothesis 1 – The per capita expenditures of a municipality will be different depending on how the municipality's institutional form is classified.

Previous studies in the literature concerning the relationship between form of government and city expenditures have produced conflicting results. Most of these studies use the dichotomous system that differentiates municipal form as either mayor-council or council-manager. Only one study found uses a more elaborate classification

system to analyze city expenditures (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). Some of these studies confirm the idea that reformed cities spent less than unreformed cities (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Jung, 2006) while others find the exact opposite (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; French, 2004; Coate & Knight, 2009). For most studies, however, little evidence is found to link government form with expenditure level; rather, other socio-economic variables are found to be more closely linked to spending levels in municipalities (Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Meier, 1980, Wish, 1986; Farnham, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995; Campbell & Trunbull, 2003; Jung, 2006; MacDonald, 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). Data from this study confirms the findings of the majority of previous studies; no statistically significant relationship is found to exist between form of government and expenditure level regardless of what classification system is utilized. Form of government does not appear to affect the level that a municipality expends in the general fund on a per capita basis. The only variable that is found to be statistically significant in any of the three regression models performed in this study is the variable that indicates that a municipality is located in a suburban area. Suburban municipalities spent significantly less per capita than urban municipalities in all three regression models. These findings help to reword the traditional notion that professional managers operate a municipality more efficiently than elected ones, resulting in lower expenditure levels.

Multiple regression analysis using the three independent research variables finds while two of the three regression models analyzed for a relationship between form of government and expenditure levels are significant as a whole, none of the three models explains very much of the change in those expenditure levels (R^2) and in none of the

three models did the variables that describe form of government reach a statistically significant level. The T-test using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager government form variable and the ANOVA analysis using the five-category Adapted Cities Framework also confirm that no significant differences are found between the general fund per capita expenditure levels of the different form categories.

Hypothesis one predicts that different classification categories of municipalities will produce different levels of per capita expenditures. Analysis of the data does not find that a significant difference exists between the classification of government form that a municipality is given and the per capita expenditure level found in that municipality. No relationship is found to exist regardless of what classification system is utilized. Base upon this information, the null hypothesis is not rejected and hypothesis one cannot be accepted.

Use of Chief Administrative Officer's Time

Hypothesis 2 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management activities will change.

Hypothesis 3 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 4 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to political activities will change.

Studies by scholars in the past, concerning how CAOs make use of their working time, have primarily examined the difference between elected mayors and appointed CAOs in municipalities in the United States (Wright, 1969; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Newell, Glass & Ammons, 1995; French & Folz, 2004). Most of these studies demonstrate that there is a difference in how mayors and appointed managers allocate their working time between the activities associated with management, policy, and political activities. The author hypothesizes that as the institutional structure and forms of a municipality change from less reformed to more reformed in character, the amount of working time that the CAO of that municipality allocates to management, policy, and political activities will also change. Data analysis in this study show that in the population under study (municipalities between 10,000 and 250,000) there is a significant difference in the amount of time that CAOs allocate to management and political activities as the institutional form of a municipal government changes from less reformed to more reformed; however, no statistical difference is found in the amount of time CAOs allocate to policy activities.

Results found in this study tend to confirm the differences noted in previous studies concerning the percentage of total working CAOs devote to management activities in mayor-council and council manager municipalities (Wright, 1969; Blubaugh, 1987; Newell & Ammons, 1987; French & Folz, 2004; Killian & Choudhury, 2010). Multiple regression models using the three independent variables described in this study, indicate that the government form variable, the city type variable, and the score variable are all statistically significant. Regression coefficients for these models indicate (with the exception of moving from political to adapted political cities) that as a municipality becomes more reformed, the CAO in that municipality tends to spend more of his or her

total working time on management activities. The T-test and ANOVA analysis both confirm that there is a significant difference between CAOs for this variable between mayor-council and council-manager cities as well as some significant differences between the five types of cities. The regression model analysis also show that there is a significant difference between the percentage of time allocated to management activities between elected and appointed CAOs within mayor-council form cities (T-score of 3.7549 and .0004 significance). Elected mayors in these cities spend 38.9% of their time on these activities and appointed CAOs spend almost 58%.

Multiple regression analysis also reveals that a significant difference exists in the percentage of working time devoted to political type activities by CAOs in the different forms of government studied. Multiple regression models run using the three independent variables described in this study indicate that the government form variable, the city type variable, and the score variable are all statistically significant. Regression coefficients for these variables indicate that as a municipality adopts more reformed institutional structures, CAOs in those municipalities tend to spend less of their working time on political activities. Again, the T-test and ANOVA analysis confirm this conclusion. There is a significant difference between elected and appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities (T-score of -3.8409 and significance of .0003); appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities spent only 9.4% of their time on political activities while elected mayors spent 19.8%.

When it comes to the percentage of time that CAOs allocate to policy activities, however, the results are different. None of the three independent variables used in this study to describe government form are found to be significant in predicting the percentage of time a CAO devotes to policy activities in any of the three regression

models. In almost all classifications all CAOs spent, statistically speaking, an identical percentage of their time on policy related activities. Analysis shows that even between the elected and appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities there is not a highly significant difference (T-score of -1.871 and significance of .0665); elected officials allocate 36.8% and appointed CAOs allocate 29.4% of their time to policy related activities.

The results of this study indicate that some changes in how CAOs allocate their time has taken place over the past twenty-five years (See Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Comparison of CAOs Time Allocation Percentages

		Management	Policy	Political
Newell & Ammons 1985	council-manager	51%	32%	17%
	mayor-council	44%	26%	30%
French & Folz 2004	council-manager	56%	31%	13%
	mayor-council	37%	27%	36%
Current Study 2011	council-manager	55%	31%	15%
	mayor-council	50%	32%	12%

Note: may not add to 100% due to rounding and use of different cases

The largest change over time that is observed in Table 6.1 above is in the amount of time allocated by CAOs in mayor-council municipalities to political activities. The 12% of total time that CAOs in mayor-council cities report spending on political activities now is much lower than that reported in either the Newell or Ammons (1987) or the French and Folz (2004) studies. This may be the result of the presence of more appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities; however, when the study data is summarized

using the 49 elected mayors and the 211 appointed CAOs the author still finds that elected mayors allocation of total time to political activities has dropped from the 30% found in the Newell and Ammons study, and the 36% found in the French and Folz study, to 19.3% in this study. A similar explanation can be put forward for the change that is seen by CAOs in mayor-council cities in management related activities. Results from this study indicate that CAOs in these mayor-council cities spend slightly more time now in management related activities than they did in the prior two studies. Again, this could be the result of more appointed CAOs now present in mayor-council cities. CAOs in all municipalities, regardless of how they are classified as to form, spent approximately the same amount of time on policy related activities. This contradicts the findings from the earlier study conducted by French and Folz (2004). One major difference in results between the two data sets is in the percentage of time CAOs in mayor-council cities allocate to policy activities. This could be the result of more appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities, however, analysis does not indicate a statistically significant difference of time spent on policy activities between elected and appointed CAOs in mayor-council cities within this study (T-score of -1.871 and significance of .0665). Elected officials actually allocate more time to policy activities in these municipalities (36.8%) than appointed CAOs (29.4%); but, it was only significant at the .10 level. It simply appears that elected CAOs are taking a more active role in policy related activities today than they have in the past.

Overall, analysis of the data in this study support Hypotheses two and four but do not support Hypothesis three. As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total working time devoted by the chief administrative officer to management and political activities changes, however, the amount of total working time

devoted by the chief administrative officer to policy related activities does not change. Generally, CAOs devote more of their working time to management related activities as the municipality's institutional form become more reformed in structure. Conversely, as the municipality's institutional form becomes less reformed in structure, CAOs spend more time in political type activities. Changing the institutional structure of a municipality from less reformed to more reformed, does not change the percentage of time that the CAO spends on policy related activities. Based on this analysis, Hypotheses two and four are accepted and Hypothesis three is not accepted.

Form of Government and Provision of Public Services

Hypothesis 5 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the perception of the chief administrative officer about the quality of services offered within their municipality will change.

The author anticipated that as the institutional structure of a municipality changes from less to more reform in character, the perception of the CAO concerning the quality of services in meeting the citizens' needs will also change. Multiple regression conducted on the calculated quality of service score for each municipality using each of the three research independent variables in this study, indicate that there is a significant difference. The regression model using the dichotomous variable of mayor-council verses council-manager shows that CAOs in council-manager cities tend to view service quality less favorably than CAOs in mayor-council cities. When the calculated structural score variable is used in the regression model a similar result is observed. As more reformed structures are put into place, the CAO tends to view the service quality less favorably. The regression model using the adapted cities types shows somewhat mixed

results. The relationship takes on a more curvilinear relationship. Only in the Adapted Political type cities does a significant difference exist in the CAOs quality rating with Political cities (the control variable); CAOs in Adapted Political cities perceive a higher quality of services than CAOs in Political cities. Although not significant, the relationship in Conciliated cities is likewise positive. For both Adapted Administrative and Administrative cities, however (again although not significant), coefficients indicate that CAOs in these type cities perceived services in a less favorable light than CAOs in Political cities. In all three regression models, the variable used to control for the presence of an appointed CAO in a mayor-council municipality is both highly significant and negative, meaning appointed CAOs in these cities tend to have a more negative view of service quality then did elected CAOs in similar communities. A T-test performed between appointed and elected CAOs in mayor-council municipalities confirms this observation (T-score of -2.3804 and significance of .0206). Regression analysis for all three models also indicates that the total number of services offered within a community as well as the region of the country the municipality is located in has a significant effect on the CAOs perception of service quality. The more services a municipality offers the lower the quality score. CAOs in cities located outside of the Northeast region rate the quality of services offered in their communities significantly higher than do CAOs in the Northeast. Although only found to be significant at the .10 level, a municipalities population is also found to be positively related to service quality rating in all three regression models. The results of this study help confirm the conclusions of some studies that show that there is a relationship between form of government and service performance or output (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1978; Abney & Lauth, 1986; Rodriguez, 2007); and also confirm results from studies that note that differences are

more related to geographical location, population size, or other characteristics (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1979; Hayes & Chang, 1990).

Analysis performed in this study supports Hypothesis five. Changing the institutional structure of a municipality from less to more reformed, does change the perception of the chief administrative officer concerning the quality of services offered within their municipality. Based on this analysis, Hypothesis five is accepted.

Division of Responsibility and Form of Government

Hypothesis 6 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Mission activities will change.

Hypothesis 7 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Policy activities will change.

Hypothesis 8 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Administrative activities will change.

Hypothesis 9 – As the institutional form of a municipality changes, the percentage of total involvement for the chief administrative officer in Management activities will change.

Although the idea of the politic-administration dichotomy is one of the most enduring theoretical constructs in public administration (Svara, 1998), many scholars contend that it did not exist as a reality among the earliest classical writers (Rosenbloom, 2008; Lynn, 2001; Svara, 1999a). Scholars over the past decades have found both

normative and empirical issues in strictly using the dichotomy within the context of local government (Bosworth, 1958; Loveridge, 1968; Ammons & Newell, 1988; and Golembiewski & Gabris, 1994; Montjoy & Watson, 1995; Dunn & Legge, 2002; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; Svara, 1985). James Svara (1985) put forward a model that suggested that, rather than a strict dichotomy existing between elected and appointed officials, a blending of responsibilities in politics and administration is actually taking place. This 'Dichotomy-Duality' model, as he calls it, dissects this relationship in local government into four distinct conceptual dimensions of responsibility: Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management. Svara defines the functions associated with each of these dimensions and operationalizes them into various activities that can be measured (Svara, 1995). Originally, Svara visualized the Mission and Management dimensions as primarily the domain of the elected officials (Mission) and the appointed manager (Management), and referred to these as the dichotomy portion of the model. The Policy and Administrative dimensions he envisioned as consisting of a joint sharing of responsibility, or as the duality portion of the model. In latter writings Svara notes much more of a blending of responsibilities within all four dimensions; Svara refers to this as the Complementary model (Svara, 1999a). The author in this study uses Svara's four model dimensions and their related activities as dependent variables to examine how the appointed CAO in a municipality perceives the relationship between herself and the elected board or council that serves that same municipality. For each of the four dimensions (Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management), the author performs analysis to examine how institutional changes affect the mixture of responsibilities in each.

Numerous past studies have reaffirmed the utility of the basic dichotomy-duality model in helping to explain how responsibilities are shared between appointed managers and elected officials in the local government setting (Browne, 1985; Protasel, 1995; Svara, 1988b; Svara, 1995; Svara, 1999b; Demir, 2009). The author anticipated that as the institutional structures of a municipality changes from less to more reformed in character, the percentage of total involvement shared between the CAO and the council will change as well, for each of the four dimensions in the model. Data from this study indicate that, in the population under study (municipalities between 10,000 and 250,000 with an appointed CAO), there is a significant difference in the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimension activities as the institutional form of a municipal government changes from less to more reformed; however, no statistical difference is found in the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in the Mission dimension. Unlike what was anticipated by the author, no significant difference is found concerning the percentage of total involvement for the CAO when the activities associated with the Mission dimension are analyzed. Multiple regression analysis using the percentage of total involvement for appointed CAOs in the Mission related dimension activities as the dependent variable, do not indicate any significant relationship with any of the three independent research variables. Coefficients for the dichotomous government form variable did reach significance levels of .10 as did the interval level variable scoring the numerous reform structural changes and one of the five city type variables; however, none of the research variables reached the threshold level set at .05. In all three regression models, the most significant variables are those indicating that the municipality is located in a suburb and those indicating that the city is located in a region outside of the Northeast. A CAO located in

a suburb is likely to participate in Mission activities at a significantly higher percentage rate than a CAO in an urban location. Similarly, a CAO working in a region outside of the Northeast is likely to participate in Mission activities at a higher rate than a CAO located in the Northeast region. Overall, however, our models, even though significant, do not explain very much of the difference (only about 7%).

A significant difference is found, however, between the research variables and the percentage of total involvement for the CAO in activities associated with the Policy dimension. Multiple regression models are run using the three independent research variables described in this study against the dependent variable for CAO involvement in the Policy dimension. Results from all three models show that the dichotomous government form variable, the multinomial city type variable, and the calculated score variable are all statistically significant; in addition, the models as a whole are also significant. The coefficients of all three of these variables indicate that as a municipality adopts more reform institutional structures, appointed CAOs in those municipalities increase their percentage of total involvement in Policy dimension activities. Both the T-test and ANOVA analysis for this hypothesis confirm this relationship. The control variables used in the regression analysis, indicating that a municipality is located in a suburban location and in a region other than the Northeast, are also significant in all three models. An appointed CAO in a suburban location is likely to have a higher percentage of total involvement in Policy dimension activities than a similar CAO located in an urban area. Similarly, an appointed CAO in the South, Mid-west, or West regions of the country is likely to have a higher percentage of total involvement in the Policy dimension activities than a CAO working in the Northeast region of the country. Results show that

all three regression models, as a whole, are significant and explain between 10.79% and 12.73% of the variation of the dependent variable.

A significant difference is also found in the relationships between the independent and dependent variables using multiple regression analysis and percentage of total involvement of the CAO in Administrative dimension activities as the dependent variable. Multiple regression models using the three independent research variables described in this study show all three independent variables individually significant and the models as a whole also significant. All of the individual coefficients for these variables are significant and indicate that as a municipality adopts more reform institutional structures, appointed CAOs in those municipalities increase their percentage of total involvement in activities associated with the Administrative dimension. Unlike, however, the author finds in the Mission and Policy dimension regression models discussed above, none of the other control variables in this model indicate any significant relationship. The T-test and ANOVA analysis for this dependent variable confirm that a significant difference exists between the percentages of total involvement for Administrative activities of appointed CAOs in mayor-council verses council-manager municipalities, and also between the adapted city types. These three regression models as a whole are significant and explain between 13.39% and 13.69% of the variation of the dependent variable.

Results also indicate a significant difference in the final of the four responsibility dimensions examined within this study, the percentage of total involvement for the CAO looking at the activities associated with the Management dimension. Multiple regression models using the three independent research variables described in this study show that for the dichotomous government form variable, the multinomial city type variable, and

the calculated score variable, all are statistically significant. The coefficients of all three of these variables indicate that as a municipality adopts more reform institutional structures, appointed CAOs in municipalities tend to increase their percentage of total involvement in activities associated with the Management dimension. Both the T-test and ANOVA analysis perform for this hypothesis confirm this relationship as significant. Several of the control variables used within these three regression models is also found to be statistically significant at the threshold .05. As is true in the regression analysis using both the Mission and Policy dimension variables, CAOs in the South, Mid-west, and West regions demonstrate a significantly higher percentage of total involvement level in activities associated with the Management dimension. The variable measuring suburban location, unlike in the Mission and Policy dimensions, does not meet the threshold significance level of .05 in any of the three models analyzed. Two control variables, however, are found significant in the Management dimension analyses that are not found significant in any of the other three dimensions. Population of a municipality is both positive and significant in predicting the percentage of total involvement that an appointed CAO contributes in the Management dimension. As a municipality's population increases, the appointed CAO of that municipality is more likely to achieve a higher percentage of total involvement in Management dimension activities. In addition, in regression model one using the dichotomous mayor-council and council-manager research variable, if an elected mayor completes the survey (assigning the ratings of involvement for the appointed CAO) then that appointed CAOs score is likely to indicate a lower percentage of involvement in management activities than if an appointed CAO assigns his own ratings. The variable measuring this effect is significant at the .10 level for the city type model (model 2) as well, but is not significant at all for the score variable

(model 3). This suggests that, at least between mayor-council and council-manager cities, the mayor of those cities rate the appointed CAOs as being less involved in management dimension activities than the appointed CAOs rate themselves. When we capture and compare how mayors in the same 19 municipalities (where the mayor reported for his appointed CAO) rate their own percentage of involvement relative to the council, results show that these mayors view their own involvement (59.1%) as almost identical to the CAOs that they rate (59.4%). This gives us some explanation as to why this control variable is significant in the regression model. Mayors in these council-manager cities may see themselves as sharing some of the management responsibility with the appointed CAO, thus the lower CAO rating.

Overall the results from this study regarding the percentage of total involvement by the appointed CAO in Svara's four dimensions of responsibility are mixed. Analysis of the data support Hypotheses seven, eight, and nine but do not support Hypothesis six. As the institutional form of a municipality changes from less to more reformed in character, the percentage of the appointed CAOs total involvement, as perceived by the appointed CAO of that municipality, for activities related to the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimensions change as well, however, the percentage of involvement for CAOs in the Mission dimension does not change. Based upon this analysis, Hypotheses seven (Policy), eight (Administrative), and nine (Management) are accepted but Hypothesis six (Mission) is not accepted.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

This study is intended to test whether the well documented structural changes that have taken place in many, if not most, of the municipalities across the United States over

recent decades has had any effect on a number of important variables within those communities. To examine this question, three primary methods that classify municipalities from less reformed in character to more reformed in character are employed: 1) whether a city operates under a mayor-council or council-manager form of government; 2) how a municipality is classified as to form using the Adapted Cities Framework developed by Frederickson et al. (2004b); and, 3) the rating score that a municipality attains using a classification system that assigns point values to various institutional and structural features for each municipality and then assigns that municipality a value score between zero and fifty points. These three different classification schemes are compared and contrasted. Information concerning each municipality's per capital expenditures and the percentage of time devoted to the management, policy, and political roles by the CAO of each form is evaluated. Additionally, each respondent's perceptions concerning the quality of services offered within the municipality and the percentage of total involvement that the appointed CAO in that municipality exhibits for the Mission, Policy, Administrative, and Management dimensions, as described by Svara (1985) is analyzed and discussed. When appropriate, comparison of the study's findings with the findings of past literature is also presented.

Data from this study confirms what the majority of data from previous studies has found; no statistically significant relationship exists between how a city's institutional form is classified and the per capita expenditure levels found in that municipality. Data examined in this study show that structural changes made in a municipality that attempt make a city either more or less reformed in character do not make a difference in regard to that municipalities per capita expenditure level. This finding, of course, does not fully answer the question of whether one classification form is more 'efficient' than another,

but only if one spent more per capita than another. Future research needs to look at expenditures at a much more micro level than the entire general fund, as this study does, and needs to look at different specific aspects of the municipality in order to determine a better picture of efficiency. Police, fire, and public works departments, for example, are not the same in scope or function across all municipalities in urban, suburban, or rural areas. If efficiency is defined as inputs divided by outputs, then both of these terms must be defined fully and examined in order to produce an accurate measurement of efficiency for use in analysis.

Examining the way that CAOs in municipalities allocate their total working time between the management, policy, and political roles in their communities, data from this study demonstrates that changing institutional structures from less to more reformed does make a difference, but only in the management and political roles, not in the policy role. Comparing data from this study with previous studies also indicates that how these CAOs allocate their time between these three roles has changed over the past twenty years. Data indicates that while the time allocations between the three roles for CAOs in council manager cities has remained fairly consistent over this period of time, time allocations for CAOs in mayor-council cities has experienced substantial changes, especially in the percentage of time the CAO devotes to the management and political roles. This change remains evident even when the author performs analysis that separates elected CAOs (mayors) from appointed CAOs within mayor-council municipalities. CAOs in mayor-council municipalities devote more time today to the management role and they devote less time today to the political role than the results of past studies show. Some of this difference may be attributed to the presence of more appointed CAOs in mayor-council municipalities today than in the past, however, not all of the change can be accounted for

this way. It appears that elected mayors in mayor-council cities are today devoting more of their working time to the management role and less to the political role than in years past. Future research needs to explore this trend and search for reasons that it is occurring. It may be that the expectations and norms associated with elected mayors in these type cities has changed over time so that managing the day to day operations of the community, like budgeting and coordinating departmental activities, has grown simply more important in today's world than political activities, such as giving speeches and attending ceremonies. Another area for possible future research comes from the finding that CAOs in the three regions located outside of the Northeast (Mid-west, South, and West) all spent significantly more of their total working time on political activities than CAOs in the Northeast. Future research needs to examine why this occurs. Are CAOs in these regions expected to be more politically involved? Do specific job requirements demand more time to be spent in speech giving or attending ceremonies, or have changes in public expectations contributed to this deviation?

Analysis in this study finds that a significant difference does exist in the perception of the CAOs when it comes to the quality of services that are offered to the public by their municipalities. Generally, the CAOs perception of the quality of services within the municipality declines as the institutional structure of a municipality adopts more reformed characteristics. Those COAs that are appointed also rate the quality of municipal services significantly lower than do elected mayor CAOs. The number of services that a municipality offers also has a negative effect on the perceived quality of services. A municipality located in the South or Mid-west, as compared to the Northeast region, shows a positive and significant effect on ratings. Future research needs to examine in more detail the rationale behind the appointed CAOs relatively negative view

of municipal services. Developing methods to measure the expectations of both appointed and elected CAOs could allow researchers to reveal differences in baseline perceptions from which service quality ratings are made. If researchers can measure that mayors have a lower quality expectation baseline than appointed managers, this finding could help explain why mayors rate existing services at a higher level than their appointed CAO counterparts.

Using the four dimensions of responsibility from the dichotomy-duality model developed by James Svara (1985), data from this study indicates that a significant difference exists in how CAOs perceive the mixture of total involvement responsibility between themselves and their councils in the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimensions, but not in the Mission dimension. Based upon the results from data analyzed in this study, as the institutional structure of a municipal adopts more reformed structural characteristics, the CAO of that municipality will perceive his percentage of total involvement, relative to the city council, to increase in the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimensions. Although the data also show that the same relationship is true when looking at the Mission dimension, this change is not at the .05 significance level set in this study. Svara suggests that, "four alternative patterns of relative contributions from the council and the manager" (Svara, 1995, p. 39) are suggested to exist based on previous research. These four models are graphically depicted in APPENDIX E of this study and include the 'Council Dominance', 'Dichotomy', 'Dichotomy-Duality', and 'Executive Dominance' Models. In only Svara's Executive Dominance Model is the CAO depicted as contributing more than 50% of the total involvement, relative to council, in the Mission, as well as, in the other three dimensions of responsibility. Data from this study indicate, however, that in every instance, no matter how a municipality is

classified, CAOs perceive that they dominate every one of the four dimensions, including the Mission dimension. Analysis, described previously, does show that for the Policy, Administrative, and Management dimensions, there are significant differences between municipalities as the institutional structures they adopt changes from less to more reformed, however, in the Mission dimension municipalities do not change significantly. These findings suggest that CAOs in cities with a population from 10,000 to 250,000 are likely to view themselves as more involved in the activities described by these four dimensions than the councils that they work for, and this is true regardless of the institutional structure that a municipality adopts. The percentage of total involvement for CAOs in these municipalities fall somewhere between Svara's Dichotomy-Duality and Executive Dominance models, for the most part; with the Mission dimension closer to the Executive Dominance model. These results are similar to the findings of Svara (1995), however, Svara was only looking at council-manager cities in that study. The inclusion in this study of CAOs operating in mayor-council form communities contributes additional information to the literature. Future research needs to investigate why these appointed CAOs in mayor-council government municipalities perceive their contribution to these four dimensions of responsibility so highly. What formal and informal institutional structures or professional norms contribute to this perception? Analysis of these CAOs can give insight into the relationships that exist between councils and appointed CAOs regardless of the form a government formally adopts.

This study test whether the well documented structural changes taking place in many municipalities across the United States in recent decades has affected important variables associated with those municipalities. The analysis results in mixed findings.

Measured differences that are tested among municipalities classified in three different ways based on institutional reform structural characteristics, show that in six of the nine hypotheses tested, significant differences are found. The amount of working time that a CAO allocates to management and political activities is linked in a significant relationship with the degree that a municipality adopts structural characteristics associated with reformed local government. Likewise, the quality of services provided by a municipality, as perceived by the CAO, is related in a positive manner with how structurally reformed a municipality is measured. The CAOs percentage share of total involvement in the dimension of Policy, Administrative, and Management, are also found to be related in a positive fashion to how reformed a municipality's structure is measured. For three of the tested hypotheses, however, no significant difference is found. The per-capital expenditures of a municipality are not found to be significantly related to the degree to which a municipality has adopted reformed characteristics. Similarly, the amount of time that a CAO allocates to policy related activities does not significantly change as the structural characteristics of a municipality change; neither does the perceived percentage of involvement for the CAO in the Mission dimension activities.

This analysis has accomplished several of the goals outlined in Chapter One. Data has been examined using more complex methods of measuring the institutional structures of municipalities in order to compare and contrast these municipalities. This data has tested whether these institutional structural changes have any effect on a number of important variables found within these communities. Findings in this study have revealed that some differences do exist in a number of important areas. While not every variable tested provides evidence that structural reform changes in municipalities make a difference, substantial evidence on six of the nine areas examined has emerge. This study

has examined local municipalities in the United States with a population between 10,000 and 250,000 and provided valuable information about those communities which enhances the existing literature concerning local government in the United States at the municipal level.

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APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Mississippi State University Confidential Survey for Municipalities

Thank you for agreeing to complete this survey that serves as a major component of my doctoral dissertation. Please answer the following questions as completely and accurately as possible. All responses are strictly confidential and will be use only for my dissertation research.

For the purposes of this survey the term **CAO** (or chief administrative officer) will refer to a person hired to fill the position of either city manager, city administrator, or other position with similar administrative duties. The term **council** refers to an elected legislative body for the municipality and may also be called council, commission, aldermen, selectmen, etc.

1) Name of City or Town _____State _____

2) **Please provide the following information concerning your municipality:**

A) What is the population of your city/town _____

B) Has the population, *over the past ten years,* in your municipality (Check one):

Increased significantly _____
Decreased significantly _____
Remained the same _____

C) How would you describe your municipality (circle one):

1	**2**	**3**
Urban	**Suburban**	**Rural**

D) What is your adopted form of government (circle one)

1	**2**	**3**
Council-Manager	**Mayor-Council**	**Other**

(Please list if other)_____

E. What is your total annual municipal budget (in thousands)?

Revenues $_____ ***Expenditures*** $_____

F. What amount (in actual dollars **or** percent) of the municipal budget is devoted to the following departments:

Public works	***$***_____	_____***%***
Parks and Recreation	***$***_____	_____***%***
Public Transportation	***$***_____	_____***%***
Police and Fire	***$***_____	_____***%***
Education	***$***_____	_____***%***
Other	***$***_____	_____***%***

G. What is your municipality's Property Tax Rate

_____ **mills**

Or

_____ **cents per** $100 **valuation**

H. What is ***the estimated*** median annual household income of your municipality?

$_____

I. What ***is the estimated*** unemployment rate in your municipality? _____%

J. How many employees are in your municipal workforce?

i. Full Time _____
ii. Part Time_____
iii. Contracted Employees (if any) _____

K. What is the ***estimated*** percentage of homes in the municipality built prior to 1960?

Less than 10% ____ 10% to 25% ____ more than 25% ____

3) **In this study we are interested in the involvement levels of various key officials in a number of important municipal activities. For yourself and each applicable official listed below, please describe how that <u>you perceive</u> that person(s) level of involvement for each the following activities (mark one for each applicable row):**

		The Perceived Involvement Level					
Activity		**0 None**	**1 Very Low**	**2 Low**	**3 Average**	**4 High**	**5 Very High**
A) Determining the Purpose and Services of Municipal Government	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
B) Developing Strategies of Future Development of the Municipality	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
C) Setting Long-Term Fiscal Priorities for the Municipality	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
D) Developing Annual Goals and Objectives for Municipal Programs	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
E) The Budget Process	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
F) Identifying Current Issues that Require Attention by the Municipal Government	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
G) Developing Solutions to Current Issues	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
H) Evaluating the Accomplishment of Specific Programs	***Mayor***	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	CAO	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Council	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*

	The Perceived Involvement Level						
Activity		**0 None**	**1 Very Low**	**2 Low**	**3 Average**	**4 High**	**5 Very High**
I) Resolving Citizens Complaints about Services	***Mayor***	0	1	2	3	4	5
	CAO	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Council	0	1	2	3	4	5
J) Implementing Programs and Delivering Services	***Mayor***	0	1	2	3	4	5
	CAO	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Council	0	1	2	3	4	5
K) Changing Management Practices or Reorganizing City Government	***Mayor***	0	1	2	3	4	5
	CAO	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Council	0	1	2	3	4	5
L) Hiring Decisions About Department Heads	***Mayor***	0	1	2	3	4	5
	CAO	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Council	0	1	2	3	4	5
M) Hiring Decisions: Employees below Department Head Level	***Mayor***	0	1	2	3	4	5
	CAO	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Council	0	1	2	3	4	5

4) It is important for us to know about the quality of services provided within your municipality. Please assess the services listed in the following chart that are provided by your municipality and give us your opinion regarding <u>your perception</u> of the adequacy of each service using the following scale (mark one for each service listed):

SERVICE	0 No Service Available	1 Available but less than desirable	2 Available and meets the needs of citizens	3 Exceeds Citizens Needs
A) Health/Inspection Services	0	1	2	3
B) Garbage Collection	0	1	2	3
C) Water Service	0	1	2	3
D) Sewer Service	0	1	2	3
E) Public Transportation	0	1	2	3
F) Education	0	1	2	3
G) Parks and Recreation	0	1	2	3
H) Public Libraries	0	1	2	3
I) Cultural Activities	0	1	2	3
J) Police Protection	0	1	2	3
K) Fire Protection	0	1	2	3
L) Public Housing	0	1	2	3

5) We would also like to know more about you. Please provide the following information about yourself:

A) What is your position (circle one):

1 2 3 4

Mayor City Manager City Administrator Other

(Please list if other)_____

B) ***What is your highest level of education (check one):***

High School/GED ____ Some College ____ 4 Year College Degree ____

Masters Degree ____ PhD ____ Professional Degree (Law-Med) ____

C) ***What is the field of study for your highest degree (check one):***
Public Administration ____ Business ____ Engineering ____ Finance____

Other____

D) ***How many years have you served in your current position*** _____

E) ***What was the title of your Previous Position*** _____

F) **In a normal workweek how many hours would you devote to municipal work related activities?** _____hours

G) We are interested in how you spend your working time. Please estimate the percentage of your working time that you actually devote now to the following 3 broad activity areas and ,if given a choice, how you would prefer to spend your time. (These percentages should add to 100%)

	How You Actually Spend Your Time	How Would You Prefer to Allocate Your Time
Policy Activities: (Includes all meetings with council members, agenda setting, and policy development, policy proposal, and policy advise)	%	%
Management Activities: (Includes staffing, budgeting, coordination of departments evaluating, directing, etc)	%	%
Political Activities: (Includes ceremonies, public relations, meetings with other governmental officials at other levels of government, speeches, etc)	%	%

H) ***Using the scale below please rate <u>your perception</u> of the level of trust that the residents of your municipality have in the local government. (circle one)***

	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High
Level of Citizen Trust	1	2	3	4	5

I) ***Using the scale below please rate <u>your perception</u> of how professional the top administrative staff (those that directly report to Mayor or CAO) of the municipality rank. (circle one)***

	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High
Level of Top Staff Professionalism	1	2	3	4	5

J) ***Concerning administrative organizational matters within your municipality, whom would you consider to be the most pivotal person or persons (check one):***

☐	☐	☐	☐
Mayor	**CAO**	**Council**	**Department Heads**

In our study we need to obtain information about the institutional structure of your municipality. Please check the appropriate box for each of the following questions concerning the structural characteristics of your municipality:

6) **Please answer the following questions concerning the Mayor:**

Characteristic	YES	NO	NA
A) Does the municipality have the position of Mayor (or its equivalent)?			
B) Is the Mayor directly elected by the citizens?			
C) Does the Mayor serve a term of 4 or more years in length?			
D) Is the Mayor selected by the council?			
E) Does the Mayor serve as a voting member of the council?			
F) Is the Mayor allowed to veto council decisions?			
G) Can the Mayor's veto be overridden by a super majority of council members?			
H) Does the Mayor serve in a full time capacity?			
I) Does the Mayor have a staff?			
J) If he has staff, is it professional staff?			
K) Is it secretarial staff?			

7) **Please answer the following questions concerning the Council:**

Characteristic	YES	NO	NA
A) Are most council members elected in at-large elections?			
B) Are most council members elected in ward or district elections?			
C) Do council members serve in a full time capacity?			
D) Do council members have a staff?			
E) Do council members serve a term that is four or more years in length?			

F) *How many council members serve on your council?* _____

8) **Please answer the following questions about the municipal staff:**

A) Does the municipality authorize the appointment of a Chief Administrative Officer (regardless of title such as city manager, municipal manager, city administrative officer, etc) (CAO)?

Yes____ No____

If no, skip to question 7D; If yes then:

B) If appointment of a CAO is authorized, by what method is it allowed?

City Charter____ Ordinance____ State Statute____ Resolution____ Custom____

C) Please check the appropriate box in the following chart concerning the CAO.

	Mayor	Council	Mayor w/ Council Consent
i. Who appoints the CAO?			
ii. Who can remove the CAO?			
iii. Who does the CAO report to?			

D) Who do the following staff members directly report to:

Staff Position	*Reports directly to (check box):*			
	Mayor	***CAO***	***Council***	***NA***
i. Police Chief				
ii. Fire Chief				
iii. City Attorney				
iv. Assistant City Manager/CAO				
v. City Clerk/Secretary				
vi. City Treasurer				
vii. Other Operating Department Heads				

E. ***Who is responsible for appointing most key officials***

Mayor____ Council____ Mayor & Council jointly____

CAO____ CAO & Council jointly____

F. ***Who prepares the annual budget?***

Mayor____ CAO____ Other____

(Please explain other)_____

G. ***Who presents the annual budget?***

Mayor____ CAO____ Other____

(Please explain other)_____

9) **Please answer the following about the municipality in general**

	YES	NO
A) Is a civil service system present in the municipality?		
B) Are any employees represented by a union?		
C) Is a bidding system for purchases present in the municipality?		
D) Are municipal elections partisan?		
E) Are standing council committees authorized?		

10) **Would you like to receive a copy of the results of this survey?** ***(If yes, please supply an e-mail address where results may be sent).***

Yes____ No____

Your e-mail address _____

11) **We have a few supplemental Information questions about you we would like to ask if you choose to answer them:**

A) ***What is your Gender*** **:**

1 2

Female Male

B) ***What is your Race:***

1 2 3 4

Caucasian African-American Hispanic Other

(Please list if other) _____

C) ***What is your Marital Status:***

1	2	3	4
Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed

D) ***What is your Political Preference:***

1	2	3	4	5
Republican	Democrat	Independent	No affiliation	Other

(please list if other)_____

E) ***How would you describe your political ideology :***

1	2	3	4	5
Very Liberal	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Very Conservative

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT

PURPOSE: The purpose of this research is to study the effects that various institutional structural differences have on the professional, policy, and managerial roles of Mayors and City Administrators.

PROCEDURES: Your name has been selected because of your role and position in local government. If you agree to participate in this research you will be asked to complete either a printed or web based survey. Only the researcher and his faculty advisor will have access to the survey results. If you so desire and indicate on the survey instrument, a summary of survey information will be provided to you.

DURATION: Your time commitment to participate in this interview should equal approximately 15-20 minutes; which is the time required to complete the survey.

CONFIDENTIALITY: As a public employee or elected official, your responses may be subject to open records requirements. If for any reason you wish to have a pseudonym assigned to you and your answers kept confidential, we will be pleased to do so. Feel free to contact the researcher at 662-325-8677 or rde55@pspa.msstate.edu to make any arrangements.

RISKS: There are not any foreseeable risks or discomforts to you as a participant in this research.

BENEFITS: Some benefits that may accrue from this research include a better understanding of the relationship between institutional structures and forms of local governments and the various policy making and decision making roles performed by key players. This study in its final form will become available to

all who wish to see it. All or parts of the final results from this study will be submitted for publication either as a whole or as articles for scholarly and professional journals.

WITHDRAWAL: Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and refusal to participate will involve no penalty. If you agree to participate, you may refuse to answer any question on the survey at your discretion. You may withdraw from the study at any time by informing the researcher of your wish to do so either verbally or in writing.

CONCERNS: If you have any further questions in regard to this research, you may contact Robert Eskridge at 662-325-8677 (office), 662-325-2716 (fax), or e-mail rde55@pspa.msstate.edu or you may contact Dr. P. Edward French at 662-325-2711 (office), 662-325-2716 (fax), or e-mail efrench@pspa.msstate.edu .. For information regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of Regulatory Compliance at Mississippi State University at 662-325-3994.

APPENDIX B

CODEBOOK

CODE BOOK

1. City Name

2. State

Alabama	= 1.00	Montana	= 26.00
Alaska	= 2.00	Nebraska	= 27.00
Arizona	= 3.00	Nevada	= 28.00
Arkansas	= 4.00	New Hampshire	= 29.00
California	= 5.00	New Jersey	= 30.00
Colorado	= 6.00	New Mexico	= 31.00
Connecticut	= 7.00	New York	= 32.00
Delaware	= 8.00	North Carolina	= 33.00
Florida	= 9.00	North Dakota	= 34.00
Georgia	= 10.00	Ohio	= 35.00
Hawaii	= 11.00	Oklahoma	= 36.00
Idaho	= 12.00	Oregon	= 37.00
Illinois	= 13.00	Pennsylvania	= 38.00
Indiana	= 14.00	Rhode Island	= 39.00
Iowa	= 15.00	South Carolina	= 40.00
Kansas	= 16.00	South Dakota	= 41.00
Kentucky	= 17.00	Tennessee	= 42.00
Louisiana	= 18.00	Texas	= 43.00
Maine	= 19.00	Utah	= 44.00
Maryland	= 20.00	Vermont	= 45.00
Massachusetts	= 21.00	Virginia	= 46.00
Michigan	= 22.00	Washington	= 47.00
Minnesota	= 23.00	West Virginia	= 48.00
Mississippi	= 24.00	Wisconsin	= 49.00
Missouri	= 25.00	Wyoming	= 50.00

3. Region

    1. Northeast
    2. South
    3. Midwest
    4. West

4. Wave

    1. First Wave
    2. Second Wave
    3. Third Wave

5. Population – coded as pop

6. Status of the population – coded as popchg

    1. increased significantly
    2. decreased significantly
    3. remained the same

7. Is the municipality in an urban, suburban, or rural setting – coded as urbsubrur

    1. urban
    2. suburban
    3. rural

8. Form of government – coded as govform

    0. mayor-council
    1. council-manager

9. Total budget revenue in millions – coded as budrev

10. Total budget expenditures in millions – coded as budexp

11. Per Capita expenditures (total exp/ population; 10/5) – coded as prcapex

12. Per Capita revenues (total rev/ population; 9/5) – coded as prcaprev

13. How much of the budget is devoted to public works in millions - coded as budpubwk

14. How much of the budget is devoted to public works in percentage - coded as budpubwkper

15. How much of the budget is devoted to parks and recreation in millions - coded as budparks

16. How much of the budget is devoted to parks and recreation in percentage - coded as budparksper

17. How much of the budget is devoted to public transportation in millions - coded as budtrans

18. How much of the budget is devoted to public transportation in percentage - coded as budtransper

19. How much of the budget is devoted to police and fire in millions - coded as budsafet

20. How much of the budget is devoted to police and fire in percentage - coded as budsafetper

21. How much of the budget is devoted to education in millions - coded as budedu

22. How much of the budget is devoted to education in percentage - coded as budeduper

23. How much of the budget is devoted to something other than listed in millions - coded as budother

24. How much of the budget is devoted to something other than listed in percentage - coded as budotherper

25. Property tax rate in mills – coded as proptxmill

26. Property tax rate in cents per $100 – coded as proptxcents

27. Estimated median household income (in thousands) – coded as mhsinc

28. Estimated unemployment rate (in percent) – coded as unempl

29. Number of full time employees that work for the municipality – coded as fullemp

30. Number of part time employees that work for the municipality – coded as partemp

31. Number of contract employees that work for the municipality – coded as contremp

32. Percentage of homes built prior to 1960 – coded as built

    1. less than 10%
    2. 10% to 25%
    3. over 25%

33. Activity level of MAYOR in "Determining the purpose and services of municipal government"– coded as mpurpose

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

34. Activity level of CAO in "Determining the purpose and services of municipal government"– coded as caopurpose

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

35. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Determining the purpose and services of municipal government"– coded as ccpurpose

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

36. Activity level of MAYOR in "Developing Strategies of future development of the municipality"– coded as mstrategy

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

37. Activity level of CAO in "Developing Strategies of future development of the municipality"– coded as caostrategy

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

38. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Developing Strategies of future development of the municipality"– coded as ccstrategy

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

39. Activity level of MAYOR in "Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the municipality"– coded as mfiscal

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

40. Activity level of CAO in "Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the municipality"– coded as caofiscal

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

41. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Setting long-term fiscal priorities for the municipality"– coded as ccfiscal

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

42. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for MISSION activities (total sum of responses in 33, 36, 39 – coded as mmission

43. Total activity level score for the CAO for MISSION activities (total sum of responses in 34, 37, 40 – coded as coamission

44. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for MISSION activities (total sum of responses in 35, 38, 41 – coded as ccmission

45. Activity level of MAYOR in "Developing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs"– coded as mgoals

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

46. Activity level of CAO in "Developing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs"– coded as caogoals

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

47. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Developing annual goals and objectives for municipal programs"– coded as ccgoals

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

48. Activity level of MAYOR in "The budget process"– coded as mbudp

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

49. Activity level of CAO in "The budget process"– coded as caobudp

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

50. Activity level of COUNCIL in "The budget process"– coded as ccbudp

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

51. Activity level of MAYOR in "Identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government"– coded as missue

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

52. Activity level of CAO in "Identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government"– coded as caoissue

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

53. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Identifying current issues that require attention by the municipal government"– coded as ccissue

0. none
1. very low
2. low
3. average
4. high
5. very high

54. Activity level of MAYOR in "Developing solutions to current issues"– coded as msolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

55. Activity level of CAO in "Developing solutions to current issues"– coded as caosolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

56. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Developing solutions to current issues"– coded as ccsolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

57. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for POLICY activities (total sum of responses in 45, 48, 51, 54 – coded as mpolicy

58. Total activity level score for the CAO for POLICY activities (total sum of responses in 46, 49, 52, 55 – coded as coapolicy

59. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for POLICY activities (total sum of responses in 47, 40, 53, 56 – coded as ccpolicy

60. Activity level of MAYOR in "Evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs" – coded as meval

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

61. Activity level of CAO in "Evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs" – coded as caoeval

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

62. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Evaluating the accomplishment of specific programs" – coded as cceval

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

63. Activity level of MAYOR in "Resolving citizens complaints about services"– coded as mresolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

64. Activity level of CAO in "Resolving citizens complaints about services"– coded as caoresolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

65. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Resolving citizens complaints about services"– coded as ccresolv

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

66. Activity level of MAYOR in "Implementing programs and delivering services" – coded as mimple

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

67. Activity level of CAO in "Implementing programs and delivering services" – coded as caoimple

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

68. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Implementing programs and delivering services" – coded as ccimple

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

69. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for ADMINISTRATION activities (total sum of responses in 60, 63, 66 – coded as madmin

70. Total activity level score for the CAO for ADMINISTRATION activities (total sum of responses in 61, 64, 67 – coded as coaadmin

71. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for ADMINISTRATION activities (total sum of responses in 62, 65, 68 – coded as ccadmin

72. Activity level of MAYOR in "Changing management practices or reorganizing city government" – coded as mchange

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

73. Activity level of CAO in "Changing management practices or reorganizing city government" – coded as caochange

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

74. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Changing management practices or reorganizing city government" – coded as ccchange

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

75. Activity level of MAYOR in "Hiring decisions about department heads"– coded as mdhhire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

76. Activity level of CAO in "Hiring decisions about department heads"– coded as caodhhire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

77. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Hiring decisions about department heads"– coded as ccdhhire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

78. Activity level of MAYOR in "Hiring decisions: employees below department head" – coded as mhire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

79. Activity level of CAO in "Hiring decisions: employees below department head" – coded as caohire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

80. Activity level of COUNCIL in "Hiring decisions: employees below department head" – coded as cchire

    0. none
    1. very low
    2. low
    3. average
    4. high
    5. very high

81. Total activity level score for the MAYOR for MANAGEMENT activities (total sum of responses in 72, 75, 78 – coded as mmgmt

82. Total activity level score for the CAO for MANAGEMENT activities (total sum of responses in 73, 76, 79 – coded as caomgmt

83. Total activity level score for the COUNCIL for MANAGEMENT activities (total sum of responses in 74, 77, 80 – coded as ccmgmt

84. Quality of Health/Inspection Services – coded hltsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

85. Quality of Garbage Collection Services – coded garbsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

86. Quality of Water Services – coded watrsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

87. Quality of Sewer Services – coded wwsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

88. Quality of Public Transportation Services – coded transsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

89. Quality of Education Services – coded edusvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

90. Quality of Parks and Recreation Services – coded pnrsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

91. Quality of Public Libraries Services – coded libsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

92. Quality of Cultural Activities Services – coded culsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

93. Quality of Police Protection Services – coded polsvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

94. Quality of Fire Protection Services – coded firesvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

95. Quality of Public Housing Services – coded housesvc

0. no service available
1. available but less than desirable
2. available and meets the needs of citizens
3. exceeds citizens needs

96. Total number of available listed services offered by the municipality (from 84-95; 0-12 services) – coded totsvc

97. Total sum of scores for all services (sum total the ratings in 84 -95) – coded sumscore

98. Overall quality rating score for municipal services (total sum in 97 divided by number of services available in 96) – coded qualscore

99. What is your position – coded position

    1. Mayor
    2. City Manager
    3. City Administrator
    4. Other

100. What is your highest level of education – coded educate

    1. High School / GED
    2. Some College
    3. 4 Year College Degree
    4. Masters Degree
    5. PhD
    6. Professional Degree (Law/Medicine)

101. What is the field of study for your highest degree – coded edfield

    1. Public Administration
    2. Business
    3. Engineering
    4. Finance
    5. Other

102. How many years have you served in your current position – coded tenure

103. What was the title of your previous position – coded prevpos

104. In a normal workweek how many hours would you devote to municipal work related activities – coded workave

105. Percentage of your time actually spent on 'Policy' activities – coded actplcy

106. Percentage of your time actually spent on 'Management' activities – coded actmgmt

107. Percentage of your time actually spent on 'Political' activities – coded actpoltc

108. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on 'Policy' activities – coded likeplcy

109. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on 'Management' activities – coded likemgmt

110. Percentage of your time you would like to spend on 'Political' activities – coded likepoltc

111. What is your perception of the level of trust that residents of your municipality have in local government – coded trust

    1. Very Low
    2. Low
    3. Average
    4. High
    5. Very High

112. What is your perception of how professional the top administrative staff of the municipality rank – coded profes

    1. Very Low
    2. Low
    3. Average
    4. High
    5. Very High

113. Concerning administrative matters within your municipality, whom would you consider to be the most pivotal person or persons – coded pivotal

    1. Mayor
    2. CAO
    3. Council
    4. Department Heads

114. Does the municipality have the position of Mayor – coded mayor

    1. Yes
    2. No

115. How does the Mayor obtain his office – coded elecmayor

1. elected by citizens
2. appointed by council

116. Does the Mayor serve a term of 4 or more years in length – coded termmayor

1. 4 years or more
2. Less than 4 years

117. Does the Mayor serve as a voting member of council – coded votemayor

1. Yes
2. No

118. Is the Mayor allowed to veto council decisions – coded vetomayor

1. Yes
2. No

119. Can the Mayor's veto be overidden by a supermajority of council – coded overmayor

1. Yes
2. No

120. Does the Mayor serve in a full time or part time capacity – coded posimayor

1. Full Time
2. Part Time

121. Does the Mayor have a staff – coded staffmayor

1. Yes
2. No

122. If the Mayor has a staff, is it professional or secretarial – coded typstfmayor

1. professional
2. secretarial

123. Are most council members elected at-large or in ward or district elections – coded eleccc

1. at-large
2. ward or districts

124. Do council members serve full time or part time – coded posicc

1. full time
2. part time

125. Do council members have a staff – coded staffcc

1. Yes
2. No

126. Do the council members serve a term of 4 or more years in length – coded termcc

1. 4 years or more
2. Less than 4 years

127. How many council members serve on your council – coded numcc

128. Does the municipality authorize the appointment of a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) – coded cao

0. No
1. Yes

129. By what method is appointment of a CAO authorized – coded authcao

1. City Charter
2. Ordinance
3. State Statute
4. Resolution
5. Custom

130. Who appoints the CAO – coded apptcao

1. Mayor
2. Council
3. Mayor with Council consent

131. Who can remove the CAO – coded removecao

1. Mayor
2. Council
3. Mayor with Council consent
4. Both Jointly

132. Who does the CAO report to – coded rptcao

1. Mayor
2. Council
3. Mayor with Council consent
4. Both Jointly

133. Who does the Police Chief report to – coded rptpolch

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

134. Who does the Fire Chief report to – coded rptfirech

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

135. Who does the City Attorney report to – coded rptattrny

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

136. Who does the Assistant City Manager (Asst' CAO) report to – coded rptastcao

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

137. Who does the City Clerk/ Secretary report to – coded rptcsec

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

138. Who does the City Treasurer report to – coded rptctytres

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

139. Who do other operating department heads report to – coded rptdepthds

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Council

140. Count for reporting of department heads to MAYOR (133-139) – coded dhmayorct

141. Count for reporting of department heads to CAO (133-139) – coded dhcaoct

142. Count for reporting of department heads to COUNCIL (133-139) – coded dhcouncilct

143. Who is responsible for appointing most key officials – coded apptkey

1. Mayor
2. Council
3. Mayor and Council jointly
4. CAO
5. CAO and Council jointly

144. Who prepares the annual budget – coded prepbud

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Other

145. Who presents the annual budget to council – coded presbud

1. Mayor
2. CAO
3. Other

146. Is a civil service system present in the municipality – coded civilsvc

1. Yes
2. No

147. Are any employees represented by a union – coded union

1. Yes
2. No

148. Is a bidding system for purchases present in the municipality – coded bid

1. Yes
2. No

149. Are municipal election partisan or non-partisan – coded munelec

1. Partisan
2. Non Partisan

150. Are standing council committees authorized – coded scomm

1. Yes
2. No

151. What is your gender – coded gender

1. Male
2. Female

152. What is your race – coded race

1. Caucasian
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Other

153. What is your marital status – coded marital

1. Single
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Widowed

154. What is your political preference – coded party

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent
4. No Affiliation
5. Other

155. How would you describe your political ideology – coded ideology

1. Very Liberal
2. Liberal
3. Moderate
4. Conservative
5. Very Conservative

156. Score on the city rating scale for form of government – coded a1form

0 points – mayor-council form
20 points – council-manager form

157. Score on the city rating scale for who appoints the CAO – coded b4aptcao

0 points – cao is not authorized
2 points – mayor appoints the cao
4 points – mayor appoints cao with the council consent
6 points – council appoints the cao

158. Score on the city rating scale for who CAO reports to – coded b7rptcao

0 points – the cao reports to the mayor
2 points – the cao reports to the council

159. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor serving full or part time – coded c10ptmyr

0 points – mayor serves in a full time capacity
2 points – mayor serves in a part time capacity

160. Score on the city rating scale for how the mayor is elected – coded c12elecmyr

0 points – mayor is directly elected by citizens
2 points – mayor is appointed by the city council

161. Score on the city rating scale for Council serving full or part time – coded d14ptcc

0 points – council serves in a full time capacity
2 points – council serves in a part time capacity

162. Score on the city rating scale for how council is elected – coded d16eleccc

0 points – council is elected by districts or wards
2 points – council is elected in at-large elections

163. Score on the city rating scale for whether the Mayor serves on council – coded e18myrsvc

0 points – mayor does not serve on the city council
2 points – mayor does serve on the city council

164. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor having veto power – coded f20veto

0 points – mayor has veto power
1 point – mayor does not have veto power

165. Score on the city rating scale for term length of Mayor – coded g22mterm

0 points – mayor serves for 4 year term or longer
1 point – mayor serves for a term of less than 4 years

166. Score on the city rating scale for term length of council – coded g24ccterm

0 points – council serves for 4 year term or longer
1 point – council serves for a term of less than 4 years

167. Score on the city rating scale for who prepares the budget – coded h26budp

0 points – mayor prepares the budget
1 point – cao prepares the budget

168. Score on the city rating scale for who department heads report to – coded i28dhprt

0 points – department heads report to the mayor
1 point – department heads report to the cao

169. Score on the city rating scale for who appoints key officials – coded j30apptkey

0 points – mayor only appoints most key officials
1 point – mayor and council share authority to appoint most key offials
2 points – CAO and council share power to appoint most key officials
3 points – CAO only appoints most key officials

170. Score on the city rating scale for the size of council – coded k34ccsize

0 points – council is composed of more than 7 members
1 point – council is composed of 7 or fewer members

171. Score on the city rating scale for standing committee allowed – coded k36scath

0 points – standing council committees are authorized
1 point – standing council committees are not authorized

172. Score on the city rating scale for Mayor having staff – coded l38mstaff

0 points – mayor has staff
1 point – mayor does not have staff

173. Score on the city rating scale for council having staff – coded l40ccstaff

0 points – council has staff
1 point – council does not have staff

174. Total score for all of the structural characteristics of a city (total sum of responses in 156 – 173) – coded as score

175. The type of city from worksheet using original adapted cities rating system – coded ctytype

1. Political
2. Adapted Political
3. Conciliated
4. Adapted Administrative
5. Administrative

176. Total general fund operating budget expenditures in millions – coded as gfexp

177. Per Capita general fund operating expenditures (gfexp/ pop; 176/5) – coded as gfprcapex

178. City typology using the Nelson & Svara typology rating system (uses information from variables 8, 115, 128, and 130 to calculate type) – coded as stype

    1. Mayor-council
    2. Mayor-administrator-council
    3. Mayor-council administrator
    4. Mayor and council-administrator
    5. Empowered mayor-council-manager
    6. Mayor-council-manager
    7. Council (mayor) - manager

179. The calculated alternative total score for all of the structural characteristics of a city (total sum of responses in 156 – 173) with the removal of the 20 points given for council/manager form in variable 156 – coded as altscore

180. The average household size – coded as ahsz

181. The percentage of families living below the poverty level – coded as pov

182. The percentage of owner occupied housing units – coded as prcoohu

183. The median value of owner occupied housing – coded as mvhs

184. The percentage of the population that is age 65 or older – coded as prc65

185. The percentage of the population that are minority – coded as prcminor

APPENDIX C

INVOLVEMENT LEVEL BY RATING



Figure C.1 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: mayor-council cities



Figure C.2 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: council-manager cities



Figure C.3 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Adapted Political cities



Figure C.4 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Conciliated cities



Figure C.5 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Adapted Administrative cities



Figure C.6 Total Involvement Levels by Rating: Administrative cities

APPENDIX D

INVOLVEMENT LEVEL BY PERCENTAGES



Figure D.1 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: mayor-council cities



Figure D.2 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: council-manager cities



Figure D.3 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Adapted Political cities



Figure D.4 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Conciliated cities



Figure D.5 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Adapted Administrative cities



Figure D.6 Total Involvement Levels by Percentages: Administrative cities

APPENDIX E

SVARA'S FOUR MODELS



Figure E.1 Svara's Council Dominance Model



Figure E.2 Svara's Dichotomy Model



Figure E.3 Svara's Dichotomy-Duality Model



Figure E.4 Svara's Executive Dominance Model